tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21170333761540946132024-02-19T12:23:18.671-04:00Venezuela's Constitutional ReformThis blog was created by a group of bloggers to explain to the outside world why the Venezuelan constitutional reform is dangerous for Venezuelan democracy.Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.comBlogger22125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-6694211962845942622007-11-30T10:08:00.000-04:002007-12-01T11:05:20.240-04:00Organization post, always on topThis blog compiles studies on the constitutional reform in Venezuela as it has been examined by a group of bloggers and their readers. It is a team effort.<br /><br />Each post title includes the Article number and the name of the author of the said article. The sequential index is on the right margin. Each post will include at the end the link to the original publication and any translation that might exist.<br /><br />There is also a section with some important newspaper articles, constitutional texts and also some general comments post that have been added to help understand. These are listed on the right side too.<br /><br />Note that there is <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/">a mirror blog in Spanish</a> that includes many of these articles translated but also some original information in Spanish.<br /><br />If you wish to contact the authors of the different posts, please write to the address indicated on the left side of this blog and include in the subject line the article number and the name of the author. Most authors have access to the same e-mail and will check on occasion. Some prefer to be written to directly, which is also indicated at the bottom of the page.<br /><br />Alternatively you can seek the link of the original publication and read what comments were made at the time and leave an additional note.Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-272761001861581672007-11-29T16:33:00.000-04:002007-11-29T16:42:02.751-04:00TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE? THAT IS THE QUESTION!<div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">In the comment thread of the popular <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/">Venezuela News & Views</a> blog I engaged in a discussion with a fellow blogger (<a href="http://feathersblog.blogspot.com/">Citizen Feathers</a>) about the current political situation in Venezuela. After posting comments back and forth we were able to iron out our discrepancies and agree on everything except for one issue. I promised Feathers that I would address this issue in a separate comment but due to unforeseen circumstances I was not able to keep my word.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Even though late, I am herewith posting my comments on that issue not only because I gave Feathers my word but because I believe the issue is today more relevant than ever. </span><br /><br />I believe that to answer the vote/not vote question we need to take into account two different considerations. One is the constitutional and legal implications of the decision and the other is the personal implications of that decision.<br /><br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Let me start with the constitutional and legal implications.<br /><br />The <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">Bolivarian Constitution</a> grants every citizen the right to vote. This right is also a prerogative because voting is not mandatory and, except for “referendums” (<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">articles 72, 73 and 74</a>) where a minimum number of voters is required, a majority vote is enough to approve the election of any government official. This means that, under the constitution, the lack of voter participation in a general election does not make an election less valid and/or illegal in any way.<br /><br />The right to vote can be exercised by Venezuelans in basically two situations.<br /><ol><li>To elect government officials in general elections</li><li>In “Referendums”</li><ul><li>To revoke the mandate of an elected government official <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">(Article 72)</a> (Requires participation of a minimum of 25% of voters)</li><li>To approve or repeal laws, measures and /or amendments and reforms to the Constitution <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">(Article 73)</a> (Requires participation of a minimum of 25% of voters)</li><li>To revoke laws passed by the National Assembly and/or the President (Article 74) (Requires the participation of a minimum of 40% of voters)<br /></li></ul></ol><a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">Articles 341 (4) and 344</a> mandate that constitutional amendments and reforms are subject to referendum and therefore the rules of article 73 apply in both cases meaning that the participation of 25% of the voters is required to approve the referendum.<br /><br />General elections are partisan political processes were citizens are requested by politicians and/or political parties to endorse their candidacy as well as their political programs and/or ideology.<br /><br />Referendums though are not intended to be partisan but instead are electoral processes were citizens are asked to vote based on their conscience and/or believe. Indeed, the votes on a referendum are basically votes on principles. They might have political, social and even economic implications but they are not partisan by nature.<br /><br />I am not going to stress how important it is to vote for representatives in general elections even if they end up accounting for only a minority representation because that is milk that has already been spilled.<br /><br />I will concentrate on analyzing the current “referendum” electoral process and separate what is legal, constitutional or not within this process.<br /><br />In the current process the President, as per <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 342</a> of the constitution, submitted an “initiative” of constitutional reform to the National Assembly for its discussion and approval.<br /><br />The National Assembly, according to <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 343</a> of the constitution, had two years to discuss and approve or not the Presidential constitutional reform “initiative”. In order to do so, the National Assembly had to comply with discussing the proposed articles in three separate sessions.<br /><br />To understand why article 343 of the Bolivarian Constitution calls for three separate discussions of the constitutional reform “initiative” in three separate sessions of the National Assembly we need to understand first, what is the role of the National Assembly in the constitutional reform process?<br /><br />The National Assembly has no power to change or add anything to a constitutional reform “initiative”. Once the “initiative” has been filed by either the President, 15% of the voters and even by the National Assembly itself every constitutional reform “initiative” has to follow the same process and it can not be altered in any way or form by the National Assembly.<br /><br />The Bolivarian Constitution grants the right to the President, the people and the National Assembly to file constitutional reform “initiatives”. These “initiatives” are documents that have to be voted “as is” on a referendum with no changes whatsoever. Otherwise, the National Assembly would be the only one with the power to make a constitutional reform and that is not what the Bolivarian Constitution mandates.<br /><br />So, why then the National Assembly has to discuss the constitutional reform “initiative” in three sessions?<br /><br />Well, the first discussion is intended as a general and procedural discussion to establish if the constitutional reform “initiative” falls within the limited scope of what constitutes a reform under the constitution and if such has complied with the requirements set forth in the constitution. For example, the President by himself can not file a constitutional reform “initiative” unless it has been approved by the “council of ministers”. By the same token, any citizen and/or party can not file a constitutional reform “initiative” unless it is supported by at least 15% of the registered voters.<br /><br />In the first discussion, the National Assembly would verify all the procedural aspects of the reform and to do so it might need to ask the executive branch to submit a copy of the minutes of the council of ministers where the “initiative” was approved or ask the CNE to verify the signatures of the voters filing the “initiative” and certify that they account for a minimum of 15% of all registered voters. The National Assembly would also need to certify that the “initiative” is not being submitted to “referendum” twice during the same constitutional period. After the procedural aspects have been verified and cleared by the National Assembly the constitutional reform “initiative” would be ready for a second discussion.<br /><br />According to article 343 of the constitution the second discussion should be by Titles and Chapters as it may be the case. There is a reason for this as well. The Bolivarian Constitution is organized in Titles, Chapters, Sections, Articles, Items and Transitory Provisions.<br /><br />Each Title sets the general scope of the matter that is to be legislated under that title and each of the Chapters and Sections provide more specific definitions within the scope set forth by title and thereon by each division and subdivision.<br /><br />For example, Title V of the constitution legislates what is the scope, powers and responsibilities of the National Public Power. Title V has five Chapters, one for each branch of the National Public Power (Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral). Each Chapter in turn has a number of Sections that deal with specific matters concerning each branch of power.<br /><br />The powers or attributions of the President are set forth in <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">Title V, Chapter II Section II articles 236 and 237</a> of the constitution. All and any powers of the President are included <span style="font-weight: bold;">exclusively</span> in this section and can not be included anywhere else in the constitution. This provides a conceptual unity to every Title, Chapter and Section in the constitution and avoids the powers of the President to be scattered in multiple articles through out the constitutional text. Every single matter in the constitution is legislated in the same way and this is what constitutes the “structure of the constitution”.<br /><br />The intent of the second discussion is therefore to make sure that the constitutional reform “initiative” does not modify, corrupt and/or change in any way the structure of the constitution.<br /><br />Many and perhaps even most articles of the constitutional reform “initiative” submitted by the President to the National Assembly modify the structure of the constitution. For example, in the modified text of article 11 the President is granted the power to create “Special Military Regions anywhere in the territory and to appoint Special Authorities” by decree.<br /><br />The problem is that <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 11 is part of Title II</a>, of the constitution that deals with the Geographical Space and Political Division and more specifically part of Chapter I of that title that deals exclusively with the Geographical Space. Granting new powers to the President in this article is an open violation and modification of the structure of the constitution since such powers can only be included in Title V, Chapter II, Section II of the constitution that deals with the attributions or powers of the President.<br /><br />The National Assembly should have identified this and other violations and/or modifications to the structure of the constitution in the second discussion of the President’s constitutional reform “initiative”.<br /><br />The Constitution mandates that the third discussion of the constitutional reform should be article by article. This discussion is intended to weed out any violations to the “Fundamental Principles” of the constitution.<br /><br />For example, the modified text of <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-230-brunilde-sans.html">article 230</a> provides for the unlimited re-election of the President. This modification is in open violation of <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">Title I – Fundamental Principles - article 6</a> of the constitution and therefore such modification is in fact unconstitutional. There are many more articles in the President’s constitutional reform “initiative” that are unconstitutional and they should have been identified by the National Assembly during the mandated third discussion of the initiative.<br /><br />After the three discussions the National Assembly has to either approve or reject the constitutional reform “initiative”. The National Assembly though has only the power to reject the reform under procedural grounds because under the constitution it has no power to decide over constitutional issues.<br /><br />In order for the National Assembly to reject a constitutional reform “initiative” on constitutional grounds it would first have to submit its findings as well as the “initiative” to the Supreme Court on consultation and ask the court to issue an interpretation ruling - <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 266 (6)</a>. If the ruling of the Supreme Court supports their findings then the National Assembly can reject the “initiative” on constitutional grounds.<br /><br />The Supreme Court on the other hand can not nullify the constitutional reform “initiative” even if it finds that indeed it is unconstitutional because under the constitution the power to nullify can only be exercised “after the fact”. The Supreme Court can issue though an interpretation ruling that bounds every court of the judicial system should the decision of the National Assembly to reject the constitutional reform “initiative” be challenged in a court of law.<br /><br />A reform of the constitution is a very delicate matter and that is why the constitutional reform process is a long and mostly legal endeavor. It was not intended to be taken lightly and in a rush. The framers of the constitution foresaw these conditions and therefore decided to give the National Assembly up to two years to approve or reject a constitutional reform “initiative”.<br /><br />Some people, including my fellow blogger <a href="http://feathersblog.blogspot.com/">Citizen Feathers</a>, argue that they do not believe they should vote because if the constitutional reform “initiative” is unconstitutional then the approval of the reform by the National Assembly would also be unconstitutional and their vote would only validate such unconstitutionality. This argument is not accurate though.<br /><br />Given the fact that the National Assembly does not have the power to decide on constitutional matters and/or change or alter in anyway a constitutional reform “initiative” and, lacking an interpretation ruling from the Supreme Court for whatever reason, including a majority decision not to ask for a Supreme Court ruling, the National Assembly has no other alternative but to approve any constitutional reform “initiative” that has complied with the procedural process mandated by the constitution. This would be a valid, constitutional and legal decision even if the findings during the discussion process support the argument that the “initiative” is unconstitutional. In essence, the National Assembly has the power to approve a constitutional reform “initiative” that is clearly unconstitutional and subject it to a referendum.<br /><br />The CNE on the other hand has no other choice but to comply with the decision of the National Assembly and organize a referendum. As for the Supreme Court, there is nothing the court can do until the “initiative” is approved by the voters and it is sanctioned by the President. Only when the unconstitutional reform is sanctioned by the President the reform becomes illegal and the Supreme Court has the power to move and nullify the reform.<br /><br />This is what the Bolivarian Constitution mandates and though in the current circumstances it would seem unfair the fact is that these provisions were included by the framers of the constitution to protect the rights of the people and the democratic system of government.<br /><br />In constitutional matters it is important to understand - What is unconstitutional? - What is illegal? - and, when an unconstitutional provision becomes illegal?<br /><br />Having said this, it should be noted that in the current constitutional reform process the National Assembly has not followed the above mention procedures as mandated by the constitution and, by not doing so, has rendered the whole process both unconstitutional and illegal.<br /><br />In the current process the National Assembly has not complied with discussing the President’s constitutional reform “initiative” in three separate sessions as mandated in <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 343</a> of the constitution. The approval of the “initiative” is therefore unconstitutional and illegal.<br /><br />Further, the National Assembly has illegally and unconstitutionally modified the Presidential constitutional reform “initiative” by introducing additional articles to such initiative without having the power to do so. The constitutional reform therefore is not anymore a Presidential “initiative” and it is not a National Assembly “initiative” either since it has not been properly filed and/or discussed as such. By doing so the National Assembly has arrogated on themselves powers that are only granted by the constitution to the members of a National Constituent Assembly.<br /><br />Last but not least, the National assembly has made a mockery of the constitutional reform process by sponsoring a national debate that was a useless and futile travesty because under the constitution no change could be made to the President’s constitutional reform “initiative” once it was filed with the National Assembly. As a matter of fact, it is the President who should have encouraged that debate before sending his constitutional reform “initiative” to the National Assembly when changes could have been introduced.<br /><br />Therefore, the first constitutional and legal conclusions that we can reach about the current constitutional reform process are the following:<br /><br /><ol><li>The President has complied with the constitution by submitting to the National Assembly a constitutional reform “initiative” approved in the council of ministers.</li><li>The National Assembly undertook a legal but futile and useless national debate of that “initiative” making a mockery of the constitutional reform process.</li><li>The National Assembly has illegally approved the President’s constitutional reform “initiative” without complying with the discussion of such in three separate sessions. This lack of due process makes the approval of the Presidential “initiative” not only unconstitutional but illegal as well.</li><li>The National Assembly has illegally modified the original Presidential constitutional reform “initiative” by adding to it new provisions. By arrogating upon themselves powers that the constitution does not grant to the National Assembly representatives, they have rendered the approved constitutional reform both illegal and unconstitutional.</li><li>Many of the modifications to the constitution included in the Presidential constitutional reform “initiative” are unconstitutional and hence the “initiative” should have been rejected by the National Assembly after requesting and obtaining an interpretation ruling from the Supreme Court.</li><li>The Supreme Court and for that matter every other judge in the country have abrogated on their duty to comply with the constitution by not challenging the illegal and unconstitutional approval of the so called constitutional reform by the National Assembly.</li><li>Even though under the constitution (<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">articles 26 and 27</a>) every citizen has the right to file a “recurso de amparo constitucional” (Habeas Corpus) in any Venezuelan court against the unconstitutional and illegal approval of the constitutional reform “initiative” by the National Assembly, not a single citizen and/or political party, to my knowledge, has filed a complaint.<br /></li></ol>I hate to say it but, while Feathers was wrong in believing that the National Assembly could not legally approve a constitutional reform “initiative” that is clearly unconstitutional, she is certainly absolutely right when she says that this specific constitutional reform “initiative” approved by the National Assembly is illegal and unconstitutional. Therefore, her argument about validating the illegal reform with her vote does have merit and indeed makes sense. Not that I agree with her point of view but, in all fairness, it is a valid argument.<br /><br />The ineptitude and ignorance with which the constitutional reform has been handled by the National Assembly is nothing short of mind boggling. All they had to do was discuss the initiative in three sessions, avoid consulting the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the initiative, something they had the power to do, and approve the initiative with no modifications. That was it!<br /><br />The reform “initiative” would still have been unconstitutional but the discussion and approval process as well as the referendum would have been legal and constitutional. From there on, it would have been up to the Supreme Court to challenge the reform on constitutional grounds once it had been sanctioned by the President but, given the composition of the court, the government certainly had the upper hand in avoiding that challenge.<br /><br />Instead of this simple and clean violation of the constitution the National Assembly decided to mess up the process and now the government is tangled up with an illegal and unconstitutional reform “initiative”, an illegal and unconstitutional approval of the reform “initiative” by the National Assembly and, hence, an illegal and unconstitutional referendum.<br /><br />By doing so, under <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 139</a> of the Bolivarian Constitution, every single member of the National Assembly that participated in the illegal approval of the constitutional reform is personally liable under the law for abuse of power, deviation of power and violation of the constitution. In this case, not even <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 199</a> will shield them from that responsibility.<br /><br />By any account what has happened with this constitutional reform is absolutely amazing. So much so, that if I was the government I would be desperately supporting the NO vote to get me out of this gigantic constitutional and legal nightmare.<br /><br />One thing is sure though, if the referendum takes place and the reform is approved, the government of Venezuela will not be able to call itself democratic anymore and will certainly loose whatever credibility it has left within the international community.<br /><br />So, we are left only with the personal implications of the decision to vote or not to vote in the referendum.<br /><br />As I mentioned before, the votes on referendums are votes of conscience and belief; they are not partisan. In this case though, the constitutional reform is set out to endanger individual freedoms and democracy in Venezuela and therefore voting in the referendum has also become a matter of principle.<br /><br />In matters of principle the righteous have no other alternative but to take a stance. Not because they can change a given abusive condition or because they may be able to score a victory but because that is the essence of righteousness.<br /><br />The righteous can not walk away or avoid raising their voice if a child is abused; if a person is tortured; if someone is denied of his rights because of race and/or gender; if a woman is abused; if someone is denied the right to worship his God and certainly, if someone’s right to freedom is taken away by force.<br /><br />In all and every single case when matters of principle are at stake the righteous have the duty to take a stance because not doing so validates the abuse and/or the perception that abusing others is warranted or not worth denouncing depending on the circumstances.<br /><br />The burden of the righteous is very heavy but their power is also immense. That power has been evident through out history when in some cases the righteous stance of one single individual has triggered events that have changed the course of history itself. That same inspiring power is what we identify in the righteous stance of the students in Venezuela.<br /><br />In this ageless and on going confrontation between freedom and oppression tyrants and dictators have the upper hand because they do not have to follow rules. The righteous though have the inspiring power of their principles and that is what despots fear the most.<br /><br />Those of us who, as me, happen to be religious have twice that burden since we are compelled as well to take a stance when matters of faith are at stake.<br /><br />I sincerely believe that, on December 2, all Venezuelans who believe in freedom and democracy have no choice but to take a stance and vote regardless of what the outcome of the election is and even though there are strong indications that the election will be fraudulent. As I said before, in matters of principle you can not stand on the sidelines and avoid taking a stance if at all, to let the tyrant know that the will and determination of those who believe in freedom is not and will never be broken.<br /><br />I wish all Venezuelans the best in these times of trial and hope that better times lie ahead for themselves, their families and their country.<br /><br />I also want to thank my fellow blogger Feathers for being so stubborn, passionate and uncompromising when it comes to defending her points of view and beliefs. By doing so she encouraged me to write this post and made me realize that I also needed to be reminded of the above concepts.<br /><br />I leave you with a quote that is credited to Edmund Burke; a quote I think is indeed self explanatory:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”</span><br /></span></div>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-60874512634841229702007-11-22T00:15:00.000-04:002007-11-22T00:17:21.764-04:00Article 98: (Kensey Amaya)<span style="font-weight: bold;">Patents and the decline of science and technology in Venezuela</span><br /><br />In May I posted information published by the National Science Foundation (NSF) that discussed science and engineering in Latin America. In it they reported that Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have been trending upwards in technology development to become "high-tech exporters". Not surprisingly Venezuela ranked the lowest of the countries scored, mainly because: <a href="http://venezuela-usa.blogspot.com/2007/05/science-and-technology-development-in.html">"[it] suffered because it was considered the riskiest or least attractive site for foreign investment"</a>. Instead of stimulating foreign and domestic investment and encourage technology development, the Chavez government has made decisions that adversely affect Venezuelans competitiveness and economy while currently they are taking steps to further discourage innovation. Specifically within the constitutional reform, to be voted on December 2nd, a modification to article 98 is planned. <span style="font-weight: bold;">The original article states:</span><br /><br /><blockquote>Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right to invest in, produce and disseminate the creative, scientific, technical and humanistic work, as well as legal protection of the authors rights in his works. The State recognizes and protects intellectual property rights in scientific, literary and artistic works, inventions, innovations, trade names, patents, trademarks and slogans, in accordance with the conditions and exceptions established by law and the international treaties executed and ratified by the Republic in this field.</blockquote><br /><br /><b>Modified article 98</b> - text changes are underlined<br /><br /><blockquote>Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right <u> to cultural diversity pertaining to invention, production and dissemination for creative works, scientific, technological, and humanistic, including the legal protection and rights to the author for their work. The state recognizes the rights of all to participate in the cultural community, enjoy the arts, and participate in scientific technological progress, and enjoy their benefits.</u></blockquote><br />The most concerning aspect of this reform is that it limits protection to cultural diversity, to the exclusion of any protection that may be strictly intellectual or economic. In addition, the term "cultural diversity" is non-specific, how should one define it or interpret it? More than likely the interpretation will be left to the court system which is controlled by Chavez.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />A simple interpretation of the new article suggests that most science and technology would not be protected since most do not contribute to cultural diversity. There are countless examples of how this will affect Venezuela, from books to merchants with the sole goal of bringing everything under state. State control has proven to be inefficient and a hindrance on scientific and technological progress, the participation of the private sector and intellectual property protection is essential for it to flourish.<br /><br />It is clear that the Chavez government is reforming and will interpret the new article in a way that will significantly decrease intellectual property rights and severely limit patent protection. In the words of National Assembly member Carlos Escarra <a href="http://www.eluniversal.com/2007/10/11/refco_ava_excluyen-derechos-ec_11A1125563.shtml">these are economic (i.e. capitalist) rights not cultural rights</a>. Cultural rights constitute art, poetry, and literature whereas "inventions" have economic benefits. Apparently, Escarra fails to realize that art, music, and literature do have economic benefits to the inventor, through the sale of their work.<br /><br />It is unfortunate that the new reform is designed to decrease patent protection since it is well established that patent protection, along with property rights and decreasing state bureaucracy play key roles in spurring innovation and economic development, ultimately leading to decreased poverty. This is not a new concept, but Chavez seems intent on creating a society based on a <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2006/11/barter-economy-chavez-aint-no-milton.html">barter system</a> and where some of the most important technological advances, such as<a href="http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnl42911.htm">Orimulsion</a> is being phased out while giving the Chinese the technological knowhow for production while collecting little to no royalties.<br /><br />The proposed reform to article 98 is simply putting on paper what the Chavez has been doing for years, either directly or indirectly though his actions. To see how Venezuela has declined in technological innovation we can look at the number of U.S. patents awarded to individuals in Venezuela (see graph below).<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvqZQy3pZ-i3MTs4QymSg_oMvFOtkem4sYr3Eu99Hcu_lAsNWb3Deb_BBX0Up3cXRxKYdW_A86nbbmwk67EzT-5VmCmGTgwEguPYokVYhjuiXB6i6Br9P8hniI69-eNcxALzugVS4dX6w/s1600-h/patents-venezuela.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvqZQy3pZ-i3MTs4QymSg_oMvFOtkem4sYr3Eu99Hcu_lAsNWb3Deb_BBX0Up3cXRxKYdW_A86nbbmwk67EzT-5VmCmGTgwEguPYokVYhjuiXB6i6Br9P8hniI69-eNcxALzugVS4dX6w/s400/patents-venezuela.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5135512615022329570" border="0" /></a><br /><br />In the graph we see that Venezuela averaged about 32 patents a year from 1993 to 2002. From 2002 to 2006 the number patents dropped sharply to 15 after hitting a 13 year low of 10 in 2005. The most probably explanation for this sharp drop in patents is Chavez's decision to purge PDVSA of political opponents, particularly those such as <a href="http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=37">the PhD investigators at PDVSA research institute (INTEVEP), where 66% (108 out of 164) were fired</a>. The loss of highly skilled/educated individuals comes at a huge loss to the State, making it less competitive, reducing innovation and investment, resulting in a less diverse economy and loss of potential revenue. The loss of these investigators is particularly damaging to PDVSA since it accounts for the bulk of the economy and requires technological innovation to stay competitive among the other oil companies. Sadly this loss is long term since the time and investment required to create a highly skilled worker with a PhD is high, approximately 5 years of education and $300,000 not counting the experience needed post PhD. Making the Venezuelan situation worse is that most of these skilled workers have left, and/or have been prevented from working in Venezuela, thus they have emigrated and sought jobs with other petroleum companies taking their knowledge and skills with them. So who loses? <a href="http://blogs.salon.com/0001330/">Venezuela</a>.<br /><br />Over the years we have seen how Chavez has made decisions that adversely affect innovation in Venezuela, now the Chavez government is poised to modify article 98 which will further discourage investment and innovation that will not only affect the oil industry but the wider economy. The Venezuelan chamber of franchises has already stated that modification to article 98 will negatively affect that business sector, which has seen significant growth recently and now accounts for <a href="http://www.noticierodigital.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=275908">2.2% of the GDP</a>.<br /><br />The modification of article 98 is an obvious decision by the Chavez government that will only lead to decreased technological innovation in Venezuela. However, this is only one decision, although a significant one, among many that Chavez has made during the past 10 years that will adversely affect Venezuela for many years.<br /><br />--- --- --- --- --- --- ---<br />Kensey writes his own blog, <a linkindex="2" href="http://venezuela-usa.blogspot.com/">Venezuela US topics</a>, and he can be reached there also for further questions.</span><br /><br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-6865494493717934212007-11-09T00:36:00.000-04:002007-11-09T01:00:40.878-04:00The transition to the Socialist Constitution: Katy<span style="font-weight: bold;">Introduction</span>: This post does not review a specific article but does examine the "Transitional Statutory Provisions", and as such is equally as important than any article since it will define how and when the new constitution will be applied.<br /><br />--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---<br />By Katy (who can be contacted at <a href="http://caracaschronicles.blogspot.com/">Caracas Chronicles</a>). Originally published <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/11/chavez-new-constitution-transitional.html">here</a>.<br /><br />If Venezuelan voters approve the proposed Constitution, the Reform project has included a number of “Transitional Statutory Provisions” to be implemented right after the vote. Reading them gives us a hint of what the Constitutional reality will be on December 3rd if the “Sí” option wins.<br /><br /><span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;" >1. Legislative priorities – “We prioritise all and everything”</span></span><br /><br />Assuming the Constitution is approved, the National Assembly will proceed to modify the laws necessary to establish a socialist economy. Its first priority will be to pass Organic laws in matters such as the promotion of the socialist economy (or is that the destruction of the private economy?), the regulation (or is it pillage?) of the Central Bank, the creation of the National Fund of Popular Power, the downgrading of municipal power, regulation of oil and gas, regulation of social security, regulation of pensions for informal workers, anti-monopoly legislation and annuity payments for workers on payroll.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />What this hints at is that the National Assembly will go to work quickly to begin implementing the laws that back economic reforms on practically everything. Communal councils will begin receiving loads of cash, and state and local government will see their resources dwindle. Chávez will be in complete control of the Central Bank and its reserves. Informal workers will supposedly begin getting a pension fund and the oil and gas laws will be changed. The curious thing is that many of these laws are already part of Chavez’s enabling package, which makes the emphasis on how they will get to work quickly rather odd.<br /><br />The last bit on the list of laws to be changed is the Organic Education Law. The immediate discussion and passage of this new law will be a chance for the government to steamroll a demoralized opposition and impose its control over private education once and for all.<br /><br />Other laws that will be prioritised include Organic laws for the territorial (dis?)organization of the country, for the Foreign Service (to make them what, more chavista? Is that even possible?), a reform of the penal code to include sanctions against torture (don’t we have that already?) and an organic law for the justice system (see comment on Foreign Service law).<br /><br />What this amounts to is that the National Assembly will “prioritise” absolutely everything in its grasp. In other words, they will leave no stone unturned, and there’s no way of telling which stones they will overturn first.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" >2. Perks – “Fellas, come back to Congress whenever you want”</span><br /><br />One of the Transitional articles includes a provision that any National Assembly representative elected December of 2005 can reclaim their seat after having served in any position in the Executive Power. In other words, if Chávez fires you, you still have a job to go back to, unlike now, where you have to settle for any old Embassy he might throw your way.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" >3. Indigenous representatives and annuity charges – “Oh, let’s do our job”</span><br /><br />Eight years after approving the current Constitution, there are still many provisions in it that have not been regulated. The Assembly, in a curious act of devilishness, has included a number of provisions that regulate articles in the established Constitution but are not part of the group of articles being considered for reform.<br /><br />An example of this is Article 92, which says all workers have a right to their annuity payments, or “<span style="font-style: italic;">prestaciones sociales.</span>” The Assembly has decided to include in their Transitional Provisions an article explaining exactly how workers will get their annuities. It says workers will earn annuities according to their last salary, and that this right will last for ten years (the writing is very vague on this one, pardon but I don’t yet have my Ph.D. in Chavistology to make ends or tails of it). The purpose of this seems to be to ensure workers’ annuities do not suffer because of the change in the workweek.<br /><br />Another example is Article 125 of the current Constitution, which is not up for discussion and simply says that indigenous people will have their own representatives. Transitional Provisions explain exactly how indigenous representatives will be elected, bypassing the need for a special law in that regard. They also say that the demarcation of indigenous lands, something that according to the existing Constitution should have been done a long time ago, will have to be done… in the next two years!<br /><br />The indigenous lobby must be thrilled with all this attention they’re getting. Too bad it amounts to not much.<br /><br /><span style=";font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);">4. Deferring to other people – “The following things will be handled by the people who are supposed to handle them according to existing legislation.”</span></span><br /><br />Somehow the National Assembly saw the need to specify that things that specific people are in charge of handling specific things under existing laws, and that these things will continue to be handled by those people under existing laws, unless they (the Assembly) change their minds. If this sounds to you, as it does to me, as complete mumbo-jumbo and a total waste of paper, then maybe we didn’t go to enough law classes to understand the “intricacies” of the judicial “sciences.”<br /><br />For example, the Provisions delegate to the CNE any authority to decide the details of how elections are to be carried out while new electoral laws are passed. In other words, it includes a paragraph saying that the CNE is in charge of elections until we change the laws, which is totally and completely obvious to me.<br /><br />Furthermore, it specifies that, until new legislation is brought forth regarding empty lots of land, the administration of said lands will continue in the hands of Chávez under the guise of whatever the hell he decides is his will on a particular day, ermm, sorry, “existing legislation.”<br /><br />The provisions also specify that the matters of “professional titles,” and “professional associations” will continue to be guided by existing legislation. Again, oddly enough, this is referring to an Article (105) that surprisingly! exists in our actual Constitution, which says something completely banal about how the law will regulate the requisites people need to earn a professional degree and associate with colleagues and, doubly surprising! is not even one of the articles being considered for the reform.<br /><br />Finally, the Comptroller’s office and the regulations that govern its functioning are supposed to continue working under existing legislation. In other words, the Comptroller and his cronies can continue keeping their heads in the sand just fine.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" >5. The economy again – “Oh, in case it wasn’t clear by now, Chávez will run everything for as long as he wants”</span><br /><br />There are separate provisions specifying that Chávez will have immediate power to modify key things about our economy. It would seem like the fact that Chávez has an Enabling Law with an actual expiration date is not enough, since the Transitional Provisions effectively hand over power to Chavez “until laws are passed” which could perfectly be never.<br /><br />Insofar as laws are not approved, Chávez will be able to begin the transition to a socialist economy by decree. Chavez will also be able to fund Communal Councils immediately, until an Organic Law for the Popular Power is approved.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" >6. Decentralization – “Bye-bye suckas!!”</span><br /><br />As was expected, a number of the transitory provisions deal with the immediate dismantling of decentralization.<br /><br />The changes to the Constitutional Entitlements (Situado Constitucional), by which state and local governments are entitled to a certain percentage of the national budget, will come into effect with the Budget Law of 2009. In other words, decentralization has exactly one year before it ceases to exist.<br /><br />Furthermore, it hands over to Chavez the power to create the Federal District of Caracas, remove current Major Mayor (no pun intended) Barreto and pass all administrative and bureaucratic tasks to the new Federal District authorities. Oh, I forgot, “as long as a new law isn’t passed”, which could be never. In other words, Chávez becomes the king and sole decider of the Federal District as well.<br /><br />Finally, it says the State has one year to transfer all the power stipulated in the reform from the different local governments to Chavez.<br /><br />The idea is clear: we have exactly one year before the decentralization experiment is part of history.<br /><br /><span style=";font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);">7. Presidential elections in 2012 – “Wait – Chavez resigns at the beginning of his fourth period?”</span></span><br /><br />Curiously enough, the Provisions specify that the new, seven-year presidential term will only come into effect once the current one is done. In other words, there will be Presidential elections in 2012 and not 2013.<br /><br />This is a surprise to me. If my calculator is correct, that means that elections following that will take place in 2019, for a term that would begin in early 2020. That means that if Chavez plans on staying until 2021, he’s planning to resign after the start of that term?<br /><br />Wait, maybe they’re confused just like they were with the changes in the clock. Maybe Chavez wants to stay until 2030. But wait – elections would take place in 2026 and then in 2033. How would he only stay until 2030? Is he planning to die that year? Is he going to resign? Is he planning on changing the Constitution again in the future? Should we expect a change in 2010 saying the Presidential term is now TEN years instead of seven?<br /><br />However, the article itself is written in quasi-grammatical fashion, as is usual with these shamefully uneducated lawmakers. It says, “Fourteenth: The presidential term established in article 230 of this Constitution will be applied once the current presidential term has expired.” Putting aside the issue that Presidential terms are not “applied”, it seems like there’s a wee-bit of a gray area there, but I find it unlikely that they will come up with nonsensical interpretations of this article. Then again, stranger things have happened.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-size:130%;" >8. State of exception – “Oh, I almost forgot, your rights will be taken from you whenever we say for as long as we want, starting now”</span><br /><br />It’s been said before, but it begs repeating. The law passed in 2001 that regulated when, how and for how long the State can decree a “State of Exception” - see Musharraf (2007) – will cease to exist as soon as this Constitution is approved. In other words, if in the days after the Constitution is approved the government decides to enact an unlimited State of Exception, we will be in true legal limbo since there will be no law to regulate it – meaning, no law that says what the State can or cannot do during those “exceptional” times.<br /><br />In this scenario, the National Assembly makes clear that it would not be violating any laws by enacting a State of Exception since, well, States of Exception will be completely unregulated. When the government begins to censor newspapers at will, it will have the law on its side.<br /><br />Furthermore, the State of Exception will be for as long as the government wants it to be. Say, did you know that people in Egypt have been living under a State of Exception since 1967? Did you know that Hitler enacted a State of Exception following the Reichstag fire in 1933, and the German Constitution was effectively suspended until the war was over? Did you know that Syria has been in a State of Exception since 1963? Just thought I’d throw that out there. It’s amazing the kind of stuff you can learn from Wikipedia.<br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-81725658552383488322007-11-02T01:06:00.000-04:002007-11-02T01:07:34.740-04:00Articles 328 and 329: Alek Boyd<span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 328 (1999):</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially professional institution, with no political orientation, organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation and ensure the integrity of its geographical space, through military defense, cooperation for the purpose of maintaining internal order and active participation in national development, in accordance with this Constitution and the law. In performing their functions, they are at the exclusive service of the Nation, and in no case at the service of any person or political partisanship. The pillars on which they are founded are discipline, obedience and subordination. The National Armed Forces consist of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the National Guard, which function in an integrated manner within the scope of their competence to fulfill their mission, with their own overall Social Security system, as established under the pertinent organic law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Proposed Amendment:</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 328: The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist institution organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation; to preserve it from any internal or external attacks and ensure the integrity of its geographic area through the study, planning and execution of the Bolivarian military doctrine, the implementation of the principles of integral military defense and the war of popular resistance, the permanent participation in tasks akin to maintaining security of the citizenry, and the upkeep of the internal order as well as the active engagement in economic, social, scientific and technological development plans in accordance to this constitution and the law.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">In the performance of its functions it will always be at the service of the Venezuelan people defending its sacred interests and under no circumstances will serve any oligarchies or imperial foreign powers.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">Its fundamental pillars are this constitution and the law, as well as discipline, obedience and subordination.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">Its historical pillars are in Bolivar's mandate: to free the nation, to take the sword to defend social guarantees and to deserve people's blessings.<br /><br />Commentary:</span> The first and most important aspect that jumps from the proposed amendment is that the National Armed Forces will no longer be an apolitical body. Professionalism is replaced by “patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist” one supposes according to Hugo Chavez's understanding of these terms. A fact that has not gone unnoticed in recent military parades in Venezuela is the chant “fatherland, socialism or death” (P<span style="font-style: italic;">atria, socialismo o muerte</span>). In fact president Chavez maintains that <a href="http://www.minci.gov.ve/noticias-prensa-presidencial/28/13225/patriasocialismo_o_muerte.html">such premise has to become the<span style="font-weight: bold;"> backbone</span></a> of Venezuela's soldiers. <span class="fullpost"><br /><br />This amendment plainly seeks to remove any traces of separation between Executive and military power, fusing the two and subordinating the latter, according to the new constitution's fundamental pillars, to the president, ergo Hugo Chavez effectively becomes the people. Such absolutist measure has no parallel in Venezuela's contemporary history though it is to be expected from a militaristic caudillo hell bent in ruling indefinitely.<br /><br />The term “popular” seems misplaced within the context. However the introduction of an “anti-imperialist” reference within the constitutional framework serves the purpose of legalizing an otherwise rhetorical term, deprived of its meaning, commonly used by the president and his supporters, considering the leverage that the Cuban dictator has not only on Chavez but in matters of State in Venezuela.<br /><br />The Boliviarian military doctrine remains as unknown as an intelligible definition of 'XXI century socialism.' However the term “war of popular resistance” has got an awfully similar ring to Cuba's “<a href="http://www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/minfar/guerra_pueblo.htm"><span style="font-weight: bold;">guerra de todo el pueblo</span></a>.”<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 329 (1999):</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The Army, Navy and Air Force have as their essential responsibility the planning, execution and control of military operations as required to ensure the defense of the Nation. The National Guard shall cooperate in the carrying out of these operations, and shall have as its basic responsibility that of conducting operations as required to maintain internal order within the country. The National Armed Forces shall carry out activities of administrative policing and criminal investigation activities as provided for by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Proposed Amendment</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 329: The Bolivarian Armed Forces are formed by the different land, sea and air bodies, administratively organized in the following components: the Bolivarian Army, the Bolivarian Navy, the Bolivarian Air Force, The Bolivarian Territorial Guard and the Bolivarian Popular Militia, said components structured in combined units of assistance, training and joint operations, both at the tactical and strategic level in order to fulfil its mission.</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Bolivarian Armed Forces will be able to perform administrative police and penal investigation activities as mandated by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Provisional ordinance (from the National Assembly dispositions)<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">The National Guard will become an essentially military body that might be destined by its commander in chief to form land, sea and air units as part of other military components. With part of its human, technical and material resources police corps could also be formed. Its military definition will change to that of Territorial Guard.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Another provisional ordinance<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">The units and components of the military reserve will become units of the Bolivarian Popular Militia.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary: </span>“defense of the nation” is not reiterated in the proposed amendment to article 329. Rather it aims at restructuring the armed forces and introduces the militia, that president Chavez has been forming and arming, as just another branch of it. To date no legislation to regulate the militia has been drafted and no evidence has been presented as to the final destination of the many thousands of Kalashnikov riffles imported from Russia, thought to be in the hands of the militia. The common military hierarchical meritocratic structure will coexist alongside a poorly trained civilian component. Revolutionary fervor and absolute allegiance to Hugo Chavez appears to make up for military knowledge. The interesting aspect of it is that Bolivarian militias will perhaps keep orthodox military personnel / components in check in order to inform the maximum leader. Having no formal, professional or institutional structure militias could have direct access to the office of the presidency. Needless to say that there is no contemporary constitutional precedence of giving praetorian guards such status within Venezuela's armed forces. Again its resemblance with Cuba's structure is <a href="http://www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/minfar/far/mtt.htm"><span style="font-weight: bold;">remarkable </span></a><br /><br />It is to be noted that the Bolivarian militias, as part of the armed forces “will be able to perform administrative police and penal investigation activities as mandated by law.” It remains to be seen what laws will be drafted and passed to regulate such activities, in particular those of the militias and what balancing mechanisms will be put into place to make it accountable before the law. Taking into consideration current circumstances it is highly unlikely that victims of 'revolutionary laws and justice' will get any redress from Venezuela's totally subordinated to the Executive judiciary. The implications that it has for the common folk are manifold, however the most worrying element is that the militias could become a sort of constitutionally backed vigilante groups with plenty of discretionary and fire power and under the direct orders of the president, that could be unleashed on those often referred to as the enemies of the process; read the opposition, human rights NGOs, student movements, the Church, the media, etc.<br /><br />This measure regarding the militias is already affecting the region, as <a href="http://www.opinion.com.bo/Portal.html?CodNot=7467&CodSec=3">reports from Venezuelan military presence</a> arrive from <span>odd places</span> such as Santa Cruz in Bolivia. Furthermore the prospect of a confederation between Venezuela and Cuba is constantly announced by president Chavez and one is already seeing Cuban ‘doctors’ working alongside Venezuelan military / militia, as <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/2007/10/23/0001/14/2E5AF59B29F54382A7CFA92EF2BFA586.aspx"><span style="font-weight: bold;">denounced </span>in Bolivia</a> . To date the representatives of the Venezuelan people –read Congressmen and Congresswomen- have not legislated and approved laws with regards to sending troops to foreign countries, for this is a measure that depends solely on the discretion of he in charge of conducting foreign affairs: i.e. the president. Thus the ‘enemies of the revolution’ need be countered regardless of whether they are in Caracas, Bogotá, Santa Cruz, Managua, Buenos Aires or Lima. As Hugo Chavez <a href="http://www.diariolasamericas.com/news.php?nid=38371"><span style="font-weight: bold;">promised recently</span> from Havana</a>, he is prepared to turn Bolivia into a Vietnam should Morales opponents oust him.<br /><br />Alek Boyd can be joined directly at his own site, <a href="http://www.vcrisis.com/">Vcrisis</a>.<br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-55895535382370037102007-10-31T00:16:00.000-04:002007-10-30T23:18:07.361-04:00Article 70: Virginia<span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 70 - 1999 Constitution</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Means of people’s participation and involvement <u>in the exercise of their sovereignty, in political affairs, among others</u>, are: the election of public officials, the referendum, the consultation of public opinion, mandate revocation, the legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, the open town council, and the citizens’ assembly, whose decisions shall be binding. <u>Means of participation in social and economic affairs are:</u> the citizens’ service bureaus, self-management, <u>co-management</u>, all forms of cooperatives, including those of financial nature, credit unions, community enterprises, and other forms of association guided by the values of mutual cooperation and solidarity. The law shall establish conditions for the effective functioning of the means of participation contemplated under the present article.</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"> (underlined sections are removed from the reformed article)</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 70 Reformed</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Means of people’s participation and involvement in the direct exercise of Their sovereignty, and FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM are: the election of public officials, the referendum, the consultation of public opinion, mandate revocation, the legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, the open town council, and the citizens’ assembly, THE DECISIONS OF THE LATTER BEING BINDING, THE COUNCILS OF POPULAR POWER (COMMUNAL COUNCILS, WORKERS COUNCILS, STUDENTS COUNCILS, FARMERS COUNCILS, AMONG OTHERS), THE WORKERS DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOCIAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE, THE COMMUNAL self-management, FINANCIAL AND MICRO-FINANCIAL COMMUNAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNAL PROPERTY COOPERATIVES, COMMUNAL credit unions, NETWORKS OF FREE ASSOCIATED PRODUCERS, VOLUNTARY WORK, community enterprises and other forms of association constituted to develop values of mutual cooperation and SOCIALIST solidarity</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The law shall establish conditions for the effective functioning of the means of participation contemplated under the present article.</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"> (sections in capital letters are new in the reformed article)</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The section in parenthesis was modified by the National Assembly in the following way:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">…/…THROUGH THE COMMUNAL COUNCILS, WORKERS COUNCILS, STUDENTS COUNCILS, FARMERS COUNCILS, ARTISAN COUNCILS, FISHERMEN COUNCILS, SPORTS COUNCILS, YOUTH COUNCILS, ELDERLY ADULTS COUNCILS, WOMEN COUNCILS, DISABLED PERSONS COUNCILS, AMONG OTHERS…/…</span><br /><br />And the last paragraph will say: <span style="font-weight: bold;">A NATIONAL LAW,</span> instead of ‘<span style="font-weight: bold;">The law</span>”<br /><br />--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---<br /><br />In order of appearance, this is the second article in the proposed reform presenting socialism as an exclusive system framing the activity of the government and of the citizens. “<span style="font-weight: bold;">Means of people’s participation and involvement in the direct exercise of their sovereignty, and FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM</span>”.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />Taking into account that article 2 - part of the Fundamental Principles which cannot be altered by a constitutional reform- says that political pluralism is held as a superior value of the legal order and actions of the State, the first question the new article 70 poses is: Which article describes the means of participation of the people for purposes different from the construction of socialism?<br /><br />There is no such article.<br /><br />Does that mean that participation for other purposes will be considered unconstitutional? Let’s see:<br /><br />“The government is and shall always be democratic, participatory and pluralist”, says Article 6 and “the organs of the State emanate from and are subject to the sovereignty of the people”, says article 5. The protection of the democratic exercise of the will of the people is guaranteed in article 3. All three also being part of the unalterable Fundamental Principles.<br />Furthermore, article 21 says that “all persons are equal before the law, and, consequently any discrimination with the intent or effect of nullifying or encroaching upon the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal terms, of the rights and liberties of every individual shall not be permitted”.<br /><br />Moreover, article 22 says that “The enunciation of rights and guarantees contained in this Constitution is not to be understood as negating others inherent to individuals, not expressly mentioned in such enunciation. The absence of a law regulating these rights shall not adversely affect the exercise thereof.”<br /><br />The content of articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 21 and 22 clearly lead to the conclusion that the words ‘<span style="font-weight: bold;">FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM</span>” are superfluous and useless. And that is not even considering that the alluded socialism, (if it is the same as the so called ‘21st century socialism’) is nothing anybody can agree or disagree with, since it has only been defined in terms of what it will not be. It is something yet to be invented.<br /><br />But this conclusion is only valid if the interpretation of the constitution is performed by an autonomous and impartial Judicial Power, one where its members are endowed with the honesty, capability, probity and excellence mandated by the constitution. With a Judicial Power under the control of the Executive and where the president of its Supreme Tribunal (twice fired from the Judicial system for illicit actions, in 1989 and 2003) is a member of the presidential committee for the constitutional reform (which makes her a judge and a party in the issue), the intention of the reform of article 70 of reducing the political rights of citizens to a single alternative becomes evident.<br /><br />Another modification in article 70 is the elimination of co-management as a way of participation in social and economic affairs. Now there is no distinction between political, social or economic means of participation and only self-management is mentioned as a form of workers involvement in enterprise management. Is this an improvement? It depends on what kind of enterprises will the workers be allowed to manage themselves. Would Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) for example be managed from now on by the company workers? Well, no. The article makes it clear that only in the restricted realm or environment of what is ‘communal’ the workers may have any involvement. The term ‘communal’ would be related to either Communes (political entities with forms of self government equivalent to parishes) or Communities, (a new micro political division that is being introduced by article 16 which can only be explained as an obsession to micro manage the lives of the people.- <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-16-mousqueton.html">Mousqueton-Article 16</a>). The alleged increase in participation and power transfer to the people, used to advertise the constitutional reform would be manifested only in matters of little transcendence, matters with virtually no significance in the national context.<br /><br /><br />Then what is the meaning of ‘<span style="font-weight: bold;">THE WORKERS DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOCIAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE</span>’? Perhaps PDVSA falls into the category of Social property? Well, no. Direct Social Property will be “what the State assigns to Communes or Communities or Cities”. Indirect Social Property is something “exercised by the State in the name of a Community”, according to the reformed article 115. Again any enterprise management where the workers will be in charge will not be anything over which the State doesn’t have full control. Nowhere in this reformed article it is said that the workers will have something to do with Public Property, the one that ‘belongs’ to State Entities. One can foresee that it is in the latter category where PDVSA belongs.<br /><br />Notably missing among the means of participation listed in the new article 70 is the exercise of popular control over the State entities through ‘<span style="font-style: italic;">contraloria social</span>’.<br /><br />The effort of the National Assembly to make this article attractive by adding Fishermen, The Young, Women, Disabled people etc, to the list of the Councils of Popular Power (where they were already implicitly included with the words ‘among others’), denotes the disregard and disrespect of the servile group of legislators (that represents less than 20% of the electorate) for the citizens, condescendingly underestimating intelligence. Why? Because the Popular Power, as described in the reformed article 136, is not exercised by electing any communal, woman, elderly or student leader in any election. It is exercised by “being part of communes, communities and cities self-government.”<br /><br />The National Assembly was careful to emphasize that no form of self-government at any of the micro-levels where participation is graciously allowed could ever create special legislation.<br />They had to include the word ‘National’ to qualify the type of law that will establish the <span style="font-weight: bold;">conditions for the effective functioning of the means of participation.</span><br /><br />Another reduction of the people’s rights is the transformation of the formerly binding decisions of the Open Town Councils (Town Meetings), into non-binding in the reformed article 70.<br /><br />There is no way to know how <span style="font-weight: bold;">“SOCIALIST </span>solidarity” deviates from the universally understood concept of solidarity. But if the deviation follows the same pattern as “revolutionary justice” or “revolutionary democracy” from their respective original concepts, we can expect a result with no resemblance whatsoever to what the term pretends to invoke.<br /><br />Finally, voluntary work now is characterized as a means of participation. Since it is incomprehensible to consider it as a political, social or economical right, it is feasible that some National law will make it a duty or a condition to exercise some fundamental right.<br /><br />Article 70 is under TITLE III of the constitution, which refers to Duties, Human Rights and Guarantees. The proposed modifications imply a substantial reduction of the people’s rights,<br />which is contrary to the principle of progressiveness, contemplated in the 1999 constitution. <br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-11524460573068154192007-10-29T10:19:00.000-04:002007-10-29T21:57:58.560-04:00A first evaluation of the impact of the 69 amendments to the 1999 constitution (Guillermo P. translation and introduction)Although Hugo Chavez is fond of portraying himself as a revolutionary in the tradition of Lenin, Mao, Fidel and Che, he has followed a distinctly unique approach on his path for absolute power over Venezuela. The key to that approach has been a limitless patience as well as an ability to charm a wide range of Venezuelans and international citizens. He has managed to convince many that his is a peaceful and democratic revolution, whose main concern is the well-being of the poor in Venezuela and the world.<br /><br />But as the December deadline approaches for the modification of the Venezuelan constitution, Chavez's mundane desires become clearer: to have absolute power for as long as possible. As the constitutional lawyers Alirio Abreu Burelli and Carlos Ayala Corao point out in this article for El Nacional on Sunday, the modifications to the constitution represent an assault on democratic principles. Up until now, Chavez has been able to proceed by masking his dictatorial intentions. However, these constitutional changes being voted on by a puppet National Assembly are a de facto constitutional <span style="font-style: italic;">coup d’état</span> that will centralize power in Chavez's hands and allow him to stay in power indefinitely. Abreu Burelli and Ayala Corao discuss some of the consequences of this impending assault in seven different sections of the constitution.<br /><br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh5m8LQJpvPyVaww0gJ0xD8UHY9zM6t_hOVyqDVQu-DipiyUlPaTGnw2L_RxwfnrvIafEaoX-J2yFnmXJIaIUf6D3iMlIaQrKlnrnGUb90XmrIngY-4uUVJFxMIFwYkfjF7lIPsXibAZkw/s1600-h/chavez-y-su-corte.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh5m8LQJpvPyVaww0gJ0xD8UHY9zM6t_hOVyqDVQu-DipiyUlPaTGnw2L_RxwfnrvIafEaoX-J2yFnmXJIaIUf6D3iMlIaQrKlnrnGUb90XmrIngY-4uUVJFxMIFwYkfjF7lIPsXibAZkw/s400/chavez-y-su-corte.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5126757149424674946" border="0" /></a>(<span style="font-style: italic;">Editor's note</span>: To help illustrate the absolute power for Chavez trend within the regime El Nacional publishes this revealing picture of Chavez in the middle of his court. The original Spanish text of El Nacional article, by subscription, <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/ms-prdidas-que-ganancias-abreu-y-ayala.html">has been posted here</a>. )<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;font-size:130%;" >More losses than gains</span><br />El Nacional, 28 October 2007<br /><br />Alirio Abreu Burelli, ex-magistrate for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and Carlos Ayala Corao, ex-president of the Inter-American Commission on Human rights, warn about the risks of modifying the Magna Carta so quickly and how it is an attempt to tailor it to the President’s political project.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">AUTONOMY OF POWERS</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">It Will Be Easier to Remove Magistrates</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />The Supreme Court judges will be able to be freely removed by a simple majority of the National Assembly. Such a change reduces the independence and autonomy of the highest authorities of the Judicial Power, to the degree that they could give in to pressures in order to keep their positions.<br /><br />The postulation committees will be made up of entities of the State and not by organizations from society, which diminishes the guarantees of impartiality for the rectors of Judicial Power and Citizen Power. The National Assembly will not have to approve the Plan for National Development.<br /><br />The autonomy of the Central Bank of Venezuela, the autonomy of monetary policy and the administration of cash; all these will be in the hands of the President of the Republic.<br /><br />The national government council and the State council were presided by the vice president (now it will be by the President).<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />More awareness within Venezuelan society about the importance of the independence and autonomy of public powers for a democracy.<br /><br />More awareness among the international community about the undemocratic nature of the constitutional reform.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">DECENTRALIZATION</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The Entire Country Will Be Controlled From Miraflores Palace</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />The “national system of cities” will imply centralization in the Executive Power of the local duties of cities. The nationalization and centralization of the regulations for Caracas and the Federal District.<br /><br />The centralization of communal councils within the national power; their registry, regulation and financing.<br /><br />The centralization of the national government council: its members will include only those governors and mayors “convened” by the President.<br /><br />The President will be able to create military regions and name their authorities.<br /><br />He will be able to create central entities that are above the states and municipalities, such as federal provinces, federal territories, functional districts; and to name their authorities (they will not be elected).<br /><br />The elimination of the Metropolitan District of Caracas and its substitution by a Federal District. The democratic origin of its authorities is not clearly visible.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />In theory, more constitutional stipends, but not in practice, because now the states and municipalities will have to share not only with the Federal District, but also with the communal councils and the rest of the organs of popular power (and it is not clear if also with the federal provinces, federal territories and functional districts).<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">STATES OF EMERGENCY</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The Government Will Act Without Control During Emergencies</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />The right to information and due process could be affected, rights that are fundamental for avoiding abuses of authority. It is not enough to guarantee a few rights of due process, since it is an integral right that cannot be divided.<br /><br />When article 337 of the current Constitution is modified, in order to exclude the right to information as one of the rights that cannot be suspended during states of emergency, the principle of progressiveness is violated, as expressly consecrated in article 19 of the Magna Carta.<br /><br />The parliamentary control for revoking the decree of a state of emergency.<br /><br />From the limited notion of “restriction” we now return to the dangerous notion of “suspension.”<br /><br />The temporal limits of states of emergency as a guarantee.<br /><br />The judicial control that figures in the current Constitution as an unavoidable requisite is not made clear.<br /><br />Specific references to the international limits of states of emergencies (Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights).<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />More awareness about the risks of restrictions on freedom of expression during states of emergency.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">PROPERTY</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Goods Deemed Liable to Expropriation Can Be Occupied Immediately</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />The explicit constitutional acknowledgment of property as a right.<br /><br />The consecration of the social function of property.<br /><br />The universality of the goods that can be the object of property. The distinction between “goods for use and consumption” and “goods for production acquired legitimately” is an invitation to arbitrariness so that the law can determine what goods are susceptible to property. Moreover, what does goods “acquired legitimately” mean, and who will determine what they are?<br /><br />The goods that are the object of appropriation can be occupied administratively without any previous judicial authorization, which leaves them practically powerless at the hands of the State.<br /><br />The guarantee against the confiscation of land.<br /><br />Environmental offenses will be able to be punished with the confiscation of land; moreover, the types of offenses are not determined.<br /><br />The dismantling of intellectual property, its protection is not fully guaranteed.<br /><br />All of this generates judicial insecurity for all Venezuelans.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />More awareness about the risks of arbitrary actions against property in the new Constitution.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">WORKERS RIGHTS</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Security for Independent Workers Was A Debt</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />Work as a freedom for human beings.<br /><br />The right of citizens to dedicate themselves to a legal economic activity of their choice. Now, Venezuelans will work under whatever conditions the Government imposes, within the range of State policies.<br /><br />The risks for the autonomy of unions when facing the new workers councils.<br /><br />In practice, the right of workers to associate with one another for the sake of making demands could be evaded by a State-promoted leadership, despite the fact that in many cases the State is the patron.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />The reduction of the work cycle to 6 daily hours or 36 weekly hours.<br /><br />A social security system that supports independent workers, with the provision of creating a fund nourished with contributions from the State and the worker.<br /><br />Because it is a matter of social justice, it is logical to see an almost general support for the improvement of the working conditions and guarantees for Venezuelan workers.<br /><br />Both matters could have been resolved legally several years ago, according to the specific mandates of the current Constitution.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Now It Will Be Harder To Revoke Bad Elected Officials</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />Political pluralism, since the mechanisms of participation (elections, referendums, etc.) will be tied to a single ideology: socialism.<br /><br />The conditions that facilitate popular initiatives (constitutional and constituent reform) and the various referendums.<br /><br />Governance by elected authorities. The President of the Republic will be able to name central authorities to govern without being elected (federal territories, federal provinces, functional municipalities, military and special regions, and others).<br /><br />A popular power that does not surge from the votes of the people. The authorities in charge of popular power will not be elected by their communities through free and secret elections.<br /><br />The gathering of society and the masses under the control of the State: Popular Power ends up being a “power” of the State, and it no longer belongs to citizens who participate from society.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />More awareness among people about the loss of participatory and democratic spaces in the new Constitution that is about to be approved.<br /><br />An excessive stability for elected officials.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">NATIONAL ARMED FORCES</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The State Will Fight Against the “Internal Enemy”</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is lost?</span><br />The character of an institution that is not at the service of any single person.<br /><br />Its institutional mission within a Constitutional State of Law, beyond any political or party conceptions (Bolivarian Armed Forces).<br /><br />The conception of the Armed Forces as being within “national security” so as to maintain order and defend itself from “internal” enemies.<br /><br />The militarization of a large sector of the population, by means of their incorporation to a new component of the Armed Forces: the national militia.<br /><br />The promotion of a popular war of resistance, instead of a culture of peace.<br /><br />The disregard for recommendations by international organizations about the need for security forces to be of a civilian nature.<br /><br />Increased direct interference from the President in promotions at all levels.<br /><br />Increased direct interference from the head of State in the bodies, components and units of the National Armed Forces.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">What is gained?</span><br />More awareness about the risks of dismantling the institutional nature of the National Armed Forces with the new Constitution.<br /><br /><br />(<span style="font-style: italic;">Editor's note</span>: this is the first comprehensive summary of the new changes, which include the articles added quickly by the National Assembly to the Original proposal of Chavez of "only" 33 articles. That is, the changes now are a whopping 69 amendments to the 1999 constitution. We must admire the efforts of Abreu and Ayala to have tried to be as objective as possible in their discussion of such a flagrant legal coup).<br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-7464536390525638432007-10-27T21:27:00.000-04:002007-10-28T22:36:56.806-04:00Article 90: Manuel T.<span style="font-weight: bold;">Old Article:</span><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Working hours shall not exceed eight hours per day or 44 hours per week. Where permitted by law, night work shall not exceed seven hours per day or 35 hours per week. No employer shall have the right to require employees to work overtime. An effort shall be made to reduce working hours progressively in the interest of society and in such sphere as may be determined, and appropriate provisions shall be adopted to make better use of free time for the benefit of the physical, spiritual and cultural development of workers. Workers are entitled to weekly time off and paid vacations on the same terms as for days actually worked.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">New Article:</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">With the intention that workers have enough time for their integral development; day-shift work hours shall not exceed 6 hours per day and 36 hours per week, and night-shift work hours shall not exceed 6 hours per day and 34 hours per week. No employer shall force its employees to work overtime. Moreover, it (the subject in the Spanish version is tacit, so I’m guessing it refers to the employer as well) shall program and organize the mechanism for the better enjoyment of workers’ free time in benefit of their education, and human, physical, spiritual, ethical, cultural and technical development.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Workers shall have the right to a weekly rest and paid vacations in the same conditions as regular work shifts. </span><br /><br /><br />Well, where do I start? First and foremost, I see no reason why such an article should be in the Constitution. Whether you agree or not with constraining work hours, the Constitution is not the place for this kind of stuff. This could be written in a regular law, if anything.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />Before going to the economic analysis of imposing a shorter work shift, let me point out some details of the proposed article. The new article encourages employers to “program and organize the mechanisms for the better enjoyment of workers’ free time in benefit of their education and integral development.” I guess employers know better what’s in the best interest of their employees, do they? Let’s say you have a couple of more hours to do what you please during the day. What would you do? In principle you would choose whatever it makes you happier (in the broadest sense of the word). I hope you agree with me on this. As far as I know that could include going home with your family or to the library, a museum, school, the gym, the church, yoga class, or even your favorite bar. If you feel that you need more education, you would enroll in classes at the nearest college (or any educational institute that suits you), or simply go to the library and pick up a couple of books in Accounting or Philosophy. If you think that you’re a bit out of shape, you would hit the gym, take yoga class, or go hiking to the mountain more often. And so on. More importantly, perhaps, if you think that you have a poor “integral development” (whatever that means) , probably you would do your best to improve in that direction. I don’t see a reason why you wouldn’t. If a couple of more hours daily are what you needed, then you’re all set. Unless one argues that you are shortsighted and myopic, and therefore don’t know what’s best for yourself. Generally that’s not the case. I think everyone one of us has a pretty good idea of what we want, of what makes us happy and better person, right? So, why would our employer organize something for us to do in our free time for our benefit? Plus, if we believe that each one of us has different goals, preferences and constraints, then a one-size-fit-all employer-organized free-time program would not work for all its employees. Unless you think everybody should be and do the same, and their individual differences do not matter.<br /><br />I personally believe that this little twist in the proposed article does not aim the (shrinking) private sector but the (growing) public one. I can imagine some governmental institution coming up with the idea of organizing one-hour daily workshops on (presumably) some topic of interest for its employees, say “The New 21st Century Man”. I can also imagine that participation in this type of events will not be exactly voluntary.<br /><br />I also think that this addition to the article is to some extent irrelevant for all practical purposes. Nowadays, the government already coerces its workers to participate in certain extracurricular activities. Thus, I don’t see how they would not organize a “The New 21st Century Man” workshop if they wanted to even without the proposed reform. Now you could say that if they haven’t done it yet, why they would do it after the constitutional reform. Obviously, the “revolution” is moving forward (or is it backward?), and with it, we’ll see all sort of new things.<br /><br />How about the economic consequences of the proposed article 90? In general, a tighter constraint on work hours cannot make anybody better off as long as we assume that the length of the work shift is an endogenous variable of the economy. Nowadays the limit is 8 hours. Some people may choose to work less than that. Don’t you think that if everyone were better of by working 6 hours daily they would have done that? But they didn’t. So it must be that they are fine with working 8 hours. Of course, you could argue that our evil entrepreneurs are forcing their employees to inhumanly work that much. But I wouldn’t give much credit to that argument because that would mean that there exists a huge market failure that workers and unions wouldn’t have let pass that easily. I have never heard unions seriously complaining about the shift length. If that market failure existed, it’d be in workers’ best interest to fix it. However, for quite some time they were happy with the 8-hour shift. Oh, it could be now that Chavez not only realized of this failure but also came to the rescue of the people. Right!<br /><br />Now, let’s analyze the short-run consequences of the new article 90. Bolivarian revolution wisdom would tell you that the people is going to benefit with this because they will be able to enjoy more leisure (which everyone agrees is a good thing), at least those who have a job, and earn the same amount (as far as I know monthly salaries are not going to be initially cut because of the shorter work shift). However, there is no free lunch. Something’s got to give. So, what’s the cost of this? First of all, everything else equal, total output (GDP) is going down (1). In particular, private sector output will take the biggest hit. Public output will not suffer that much because it is largely inefficient. However, the quantity (and perhaps quality as well) of the few public goods and services the States provides will fall and taxpayers will get less for their money.<br /><br />Thus far we have made a big assumption, namely, employment does not change. Bolivarian revolution wisdom would tell you here that employment is actually going to increase because firms are going to hire more people to make up for the difference. Oh boy! I beg to differ. In fact, employment (unemployment) is going to fall (increase). Why? Keep in mind that our evil entrepreneurs are profit driven whether you like it or not, right? Given prices, salaries and employment constant, when firm’s output falls, so does its profits. Remember that its wage bill is constant up to this point. So, what does this firm do? It has several alternatives. One is to adjust the number of workers. Let’s try first with hiring new workers. I can assure you that it ain’t happening. Why? Well, if it were profitable to hire a new worker now, it would have been profitable to do so before. Since the firm didn’t hire any new worker before, then it must be that it wasn’t profitable to do so and it still isn’t now.<br /><br />The firm then has two other options, keep the same workers or fire some of them. If there were no firing cost and other restrictions to firing, some firms would probably lay off some of its workers because possibly some workers might “bring to the table” less than what they are paid, that is, their productivity is less than their salary. With firing restrictions, firms would lay off less people or even none if these restrictions are cumbersome enough.<br /><br />Another alternative that firms have is simply to increase prices and, hence, more inflation. This is a way to adjust real wages down which would mitigate the drop in workers’ productivity. When real wages fall, the negative impact on employment explained above is reduced.<br /><br />For some firms price adjustment is not an option because either they face government price controls or international competition. Some of these firms might see their profits go towards the red side, and have only one alternative. That is, to shut down. That means that unemployment will rise.<br /><br />Therefore, in the short run, shortening work hours by law will only bring a combination of more unemployment, inflation, and a drop in real wages. Everyone will be worse off. For the unemployed, it will be more difficult to find a job. Some workers will be laid off and the rest, the lucky ones who kept their jobs, will be poorer.<br /><br />The long-run analysis is a bit more complicated. However, I can point out some bad consequences of this measure. First, since workers are less productive, private investment will fall further, which will have a negative impact of job creation and long-run unemployment. Moreover, Venezuela will be even more dependent of oil and the public sector will more important. You could argue that the drop in private investment will be offset by increasing public investment. That could be, but in any case, public capital is going to be less productive because of the shorter work shift. So, to produce the same amount of public good it will take more public investment, meaning that there will be more taxes and less consumption.<br /><br />In the long-run, this measure could also have an important negative effect on human capital accumulation. Since workers are going to be less productive (both because of the shorter shift and because of a lower capital stock), their real wage necessarily has to go down. That has a negative impact on the return to schooling, which will dampen the accumulation of human capital and, in consequence, workers’ productivity further.<br /><br />In summary, putting more limits on work hours is not going to make anyone better off. I cannot think of anybody who would benefit from this. Moreover, the poor are the ones who are going to be hurt the most.<br /><br />1) Why? Assuming employment does not change, if everybody works fewer hours, they are going to produce less. Unless you come up with some crazy argument in which workers will put more effort on those 6 hours up to the point where their average daily productivity remains the same. If that’s the case, why didn’t they do it long before? <br /><br />--- --- --- --- --- --- ---<br /><br />Manuel contributed this piece from a well known Spanish campus.<br /><br />He can be joined at: venezuela. constitution. trap @ gmail. com<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-82789231343194072662007-10-23T08:38:00.000-04:002007-10-23T08:39:11.139-04:00Article 100 (Kensey Amaya)<b><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);">Article 100</span></b> (<em>original</em>)<br /><u>The folk cultures comprising the national identity of Venezuela enjoy special attention, with recognition of and respect for intercultural relations under the principle of equality of cultures.</u> Incentives and inducements shall be provided for by law for persons, institutions and communities which promote, support, develop or finance cultural plans, programs and activities within the country and Venezuelan culture abroad. The State guarantees cultural workers inclusion in the Social security system to provide them with a dignified life, recognizing the idiosyncrasies of cultural work, in accordance with law.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);"><b>Modified Article 100</b><br /></span><em>*Note modifications are underlined<br /></em><u>The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a product of the mixing of various cultures; consequently the State recognizes and values the diversity of its Indigenous, European, and African roots that has created our great South American nation. The popular cultures, of Indigenous and African decent constituting the Venezuelan identity, enjoy special attention by recognizing and respecting its intercultural nature under the principle of cultural equality.</u> Incentives and inducements shall be provided for by law for persons, institutions and communities which promote, support, develop or finance cultural plans, programs and activities within the country and Venezuelan culture abroad. The State guarantees cultural workers inclusion in the Social security system to provide them with a dignified life, recognizing the idiosyncrasies of cultural work, in accordance with law.<br /><br /><span style="font-size:130%;"><b><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;" >Comments on the modification</span></b><br /></span><span class="fullpost"><br />After reading the modified article it appears the changes are rather benign and minor. The major change has been defining the cultural heritage of Venezuela and what the “popular cultures” are. After a more careful read of the modification, one realizes that chavismo is defining what it is to be Venezuelan in a very narrow sense by inserting this statement: <em>“The popular cultures, of Indigenous and African decent constituting the Venezuelan identity…”,</em> this ultimately constitutes cultural and racial discrimination.<br /><br />The most obvious problems with this modification is that Venezuelans are a mix of European, African, and Indigenous blood and culture. So how should Venezuelans define themselves, African? European? Indigenous? How should they/we divide and quantify the contribution of each culture when ours is a mixture of each one? To exemplify the stupidity of the modification one only has to highlight one of Venezuela’s most famous cultural traditions the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dancing_Devils_of_Yare">Diablos de Yare</a>. Traditions such as this were created through the mixing of Indigenous, African, and European cultures. To diminish European influence in creating Venezuelan culture and identity is cultural discrimination in its crudest form.<br /><br />Chavismo’s discrimination towards European heritage is not something new. One of the most public acts was the destruction of a statue of Christopher Columbus on Columbus Day (“<em>Dia de la Raza</em>” in Venezuela) and the renaming of the day to “Indigenous day of resistance”. This act alone is symbolic of the dislike Chavismo has for European historical cultural heritage in Venezuela. This seems hypocritical since Venezuelan identity has been formed by these historical events, however horrifying some of them were. But rather than embrace, understand, and provide a context in which Venezuelan identity has been created, Chavismo has resorted to favoring one particular culture and interpretation of history to teach future generations what being a Venezuelan is, and is not.<br /><br />The modified article is currently written in a way that suggests State support for cultural activities pertaining to the influence of European tradition in Venezuela will not be awarded. However, activities that promote the “popular cultures” (i.e. African and Indian) will be State supported. Again Chavez is discriminating against European culture by potentially not funding activities that uphold European influences in developing Venezuelan identity. Additionally, the new modification could be interpreted as allowing for State funding for autochthonous religious/cultural activities resulting in State sponsored religion. If the government were inclined to do so they could attempt to displace Catholicism/Christianity (European religion) with something more <a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-blackmagic5sep05,1,4548785.story?ctrack=1&cset=true/">”popular”</a><br /><br />In a broader sense the modification is discriminatory to other cultures since it does not mention Asian and Middle Eastern influence, which has recently been influencing Venezuelan culture and history. The exclusion of these two geographic regions and its peoples from the modified article poses an interesting question. Why is Chavez limiting “popular cultures” to just Indigenous (Native Americans) and African roots? Native Americans were here before Africans and Europeans so why not define “popular culture” as just Indigenous activities? Essentially Chavez is defining what it is to be Venezuelan in a very narrow sense, by excluding recent cultural influences (ex. Asia, Middle East) and ignoring the historical European influences.<br /><br />In short the modification to article 100 constitutes nothing short of cultural discrimination with the possible ulterior intention of rewriting history. </span><br /><p><span class="fullpost">--- --- --- --- --- --- ---</span></p><p><span class="fullpost">Kensey writes his own blog, <a href="http://venezuela-usa.blogspot.com/">Venezuela US topics</a>, and he can be reached there also for further questions.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /><br /></span></p>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-52458893220388801032007-10-19T09:18:00.000-04:002007-10-19T09:19:52.145-04:00Article 18 (Mousqueton)<span style="font-weight: bold;">Preamble</span>: <span style="font-style: italic;">While reading the text of the proposed amendment to article 18 I remembered a conversation once held with the elected President of a Latin American country who is now deceased. We talked about the sad role of some armed forces in Latin America and how they have become the nemesis of democracy and individual freedoms and in many cases the “jail keepers” of their people. He said that while the armed forces have a congenital tendency to misread the social and political expectations of the people and therefore, most of the time, end up in the wrong side of history, the good thing is that they are slow.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">He liked to say that most people believe that bullets kill people when in fact they don’t. If I put a bunch of bullets in your hand they will not kill you. It is the combination of factors and “speed” what makes a bullet lethal.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">This president was a retired General and what he basically wanted me to understand is that, at one time or another, every political force has knocked on the doors of the armed forces to buy their support. Throughout history some of those forces have succeeded, though temporarily, in getting that support but it could have been far worst if the armed forces were fast at deliberating instead of slow and had supported every political adventurer who came looking for them.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">You can argue with the Generals’ reasoning and certainly with his sense of style. I, for one, never cease to be amazed by the crude use the military make of that elegant language artifice called “metaphors”.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">He is definitely right in one sense though; in politics, “speed” is certainly a critical element and when combined with the wrong leaders and policies it can become, if not lethal, certainly extremely dangerous.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">While <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-11-mousqueton.html">the modifications to article 11</a> provides a way for the government to have absolute power over the people and the territory of Venezuela in case things go wrong, <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-16-mousqueton.html">article 16 lays out a parallel and overlapping centralized and un-elective political structure</a> to drive the Venezuelan Federal Government into political oblivion and replace it with a centralized national power. Accomplishing this, with or without constitution, will take time though and therefore the modifications to article 18 introduces that missing critical element, “speed”, which will most certainly make the policies in these three articles “lethal” for the Venezuelan federal democracy.</span> <br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(0, 0, 153);"><u>The city of Caracas is the capital of the Republic and the seat of the organs of National Power. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the exercise of National Power elsewhere in the Republic. A special law shall establish the territorial and political unit of the city of Caracas, </u>incorporating into a two-tier system of municipal government the Municipalities of the Capital District and those of the State of Miranda. Such law shall provide for the organization, government, administration, competency as well as resources of the city, with a view to its harmonious overall development. In any case the law shall guarantee the democratic and participative character of its government.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-weight: bold;"><u>The city of Caracas is the capital of the Republic and the seat of the organs of National Power. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the</u> said <u>National Power</u> from being <u>exercised elsewhere in the Republic</u>.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Venezuelan State will develop an integral policy to articulate a national system of cities, structuring logically and reasonably the relationship between the city and its associated territories and unifying and supporting the local and regional scales in the systematic vision of the country. For that purpose, the State will confront every speculative action in regard to the economic return of the land, the economic unbalances, the asymmetries in the provision of services and infrastructure as well as the conditions of accessibility, physical and economic, of each and every one of the components of the national system of cities. Every citizen, without discrimination of gender, age, ethnicity, political and religious orientation or social condition, will enjoy and will be holders of the Right to the City, and that right should be understood as the equal benefit received by each one of the citizens as per the strategic role articulated by the city both at the regional urban context and the National System of Cities. <u>A special law shall establish the territorial and political unit of the city of Caracas,</u> which shall be called the “Crib of Bolivar” and “Queen of the Guaraira Repano.”<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">The National Power, through the Executive Power and with the collaboration and participation of all the entities of the National, State and Municipal Public Power as well as the Popular Power, its Communities, Communes and Communal Councils and other social organizations, will take all necessary actions for the urban reorganization, road restructuring, recuperation of the environment, attainment of optimal personal and public security levels, integral reinforcement of the neighborhoods, urbanizations, health, education, sport, entertainment and cultural systems, total recuperation of their center and historical sites, construction of small and medium size Satellite Cities along their territorial axis of expansion and, in general, to accomplish the most humanizing sum possible in the “Crib of Bolivar” and “Queen of the Guaraira Repano.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">These dispositions will be applicable to the whole National System of Cities and their regional components.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Modifications and Comments: </span>I am herein quoting both the text of the original article 18 and the text of the modifications being proposed by the government. The underlined part of the text is all that has survived from the original article 18. The rest has either been deleted from the original text or added in the new text of article 18.<br /><br />From the reading of the original article 18 it is clear that the intention of the framers of the Bolivarian Constitution was to give Caracas a special status since it is home to the Federal (national) government. It is also clear that the framers of the Bolivarian Constitution were adamant in their intention of making sure that this special status would not jeopardize the right of the citizens to a democratic representation and/or the autonomy of the State of Miranda. So much so, that the city of Caracas was defined as a “Capital District” in article 16 of the Bolivarian Constitution as opposed to “Federal District” which was the status it had under the Constitution of 1961 (article 9).<br /><br />The modified text of article 18 though moves away from what was originally intended by the framers of the Bolivarian Constitution and introduces new concepts that substantially modify the structure of the constitutional text. Modifications, that are in line and expand further those shady and unconstitutional amendments introduced to article 16.<br /><br />Let’s start with what has been deleted from the original text of article 18. The paragraph that has been deleted basically indicated that Caracas was to have a two tier municipal structure of government that would protect both the city and the State municipal representation. It also indicated that a special law …"<span style="font-style: italic;">shall provide for the organization, government, administration, competency as well as resources of the city</span>”… Finally, it stated that the …"<span style="font-style: italic;">law shall guarantee the democratic and participative character of its government</span>.”<br /><br />The first question that comes to mind when you look at the deleted text is, why has this paragraph been deleted?<br /><br />It is clear that Caracas needs a special law to outline its organization and government since there is no reference as to the political structure of the “Capital District” anywhere else in the constitution. As for the democratic and participative character of the “Capital District” government, it is clear that this sentence is basically guaranteeing that such authorities would necessarily have to be elected.<br /><br />So; the question stands; why has this text been deleted?<br /><br />The only answer I can think of is the following. The modified text of article 16 introduces a new political division called “Federal City”. Federal cities are created by Presidential decree and their authorities are designated by the “National Power” (<span style="font-style: italic;">sic</span>). Therefore, Caracas would not need a special law if it is going to be appointed a Federal City subject to the executive power. Its government does not need to be …"<span style="font-style: italic;">democratic and participative</span>”… either, because, according to the modifications of article 16, all the authorities of Federal Cities and Federal Municipalities will be appointed by the National Power.<br /><br />The modification to article 18 goes further and creates what it calls a “National System of Cities” that unifies and supports the …"<span style="font-style: italic;">local and regional scales in the systematic vision of the country</span>.”…<br /><br />The “systematic vision” of the country has been outlined in article 16 which creates a parallel and centralized political structure to compete and eventually destroy the federal structure mandated by the constitution.<br /><br />In essence, every major city in Venezuela could be appointed a “Federal City” by decree. Further, all municipalities in the city, as well as in their ..." <span style="font-style: italic;">associated territories</span>”…. can be appointed “Federal Municipalities” and hence, all their authorities would be appointed by the National Power.<br /><br />To have an idea as to how in a very short period of time (speed) the whole landscape of the Venezuelan federal division of government could be destroyed and the right of the people to elect their local authorities eliminated, we are herewith including a table of the potential cities that could become “Federal Cities” within the “National System of Cities”. We are including in this table all the capital cities of each State as well as a group of large cities with populations over 300,000 inhabitants.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyLiQrbC-PUxARa8eCi_DkLPV4Ezmjs3vg0OqsicdrRF13s-SZHlmYJrclag1A0H6m_T5NOoJxuzTLk7v3zhGhTQEDY8zqVOpDuNEg7qJsj5uWtB0tzVN4YOxXbzCfLxMTImr2XZYPzks/s1600-h/venezuela-new-chavez-cities.gif"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyLiQrbC-PUxARa8eCi_DkLPV4Ezmjs3vg0OqsicdrRF13s-SZHlmYJrclag1A0H6m_T5NOoJxuzTLk7v3zhGhTQEDY8zqVOpDuNEg7qJsj5uWtB0tzVN4YOxXbzCfLxMTImr2XZYPzks/s400/venezuela-new-chavez-cities.gif" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5123035779509697666" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Bringing 45 cities into the so called “National System of Cities” would allow the National government to exercise direct political power without elections and/or elected officials over 47% of the Venezuelan population. As a matter of fact, starting with only 7 cities would give the national government that same power over 25% of the population. Of course it will also allow the national government to control any public gathering and/or legal demonstration against their policies since the federal municipalities would be the ones in charge of granting those permits.<br /><br />The two last paragraphs of the modified article 18 basically give the National Power a blank check to take over, through the Federal Cities and Federal Municipalities, almost all the functions of the Municipalities and even some from the States. Of course, it also states that the National Power will exercise all these functions through the Executive Power and that this is applicable to all the cities that are included in the so called “National System of Cities”.<br /><br />Overall, most of the modifications to the text of article 18 basically expand further what has already been mentioned in article 16.<br /><br />There is though some intriguing text that has been included in this article. This text basically creates a new right called the “Right to the City”; a right that, by itself, seems to be a first in a constitutional text. What makes this concept so intriguing is the fact that this right is being defined as an “equitable benefit” that every habitant has the right to enjoy and further, hold title to.<br /><br />Granted that the text is as confusing as they come, there are some concepts though that could give some light as to what this text means.<br /><br />One concept that I believe particularly relevant is what should be understood by the term “city”.<br /><br />In essence a city is basically a gathering of private homes, private businesses, public roads, public parks, public government buildings, private empty lots, public empty lots, private social, cultural and sport facilities, public facilities such as public transportation, bus/train/sub terminals and airports, public cultural and sport facilities and the power, communication, water and sewer infrastructure. There is really nothing else in a city.<br /><br />Now, most of these elements are already public and everyone has the right to enjoy them. So, why is there a need to create a special new “Right to the City” when the people already have that right? It makes no sense, unless, the intention is to make public what is not public today. That is, private homes, private businesses, private empty lots and private social, cultural and sport facilities.<br /><br />Could it be that this is what the phrase “equitable access” is referring to?<br /><br />I can not answer that question but I can certainly say that the modification of this article is written in such a confusing and shady way that the possibility of an outrageous violation of private property using this article as an excuse is indeed a clear and present danger.<br /><br />I can also say that giving the National Power and/or Executive Power the right to exercise their power at the State and Municipal level is unconstitutional because:<br /><blockquote>1) It violates article # 164, Title IV, Chapter III of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …<span style="font-style: italic;">"Is of the States exclusive competence: … (2) Organization of their Municipalities and other local organs and the territorial and political divisions between them</span>"…<br /><br />2) It violates Title IX, Chapter II, article # 342 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …"<span style="font-style: italic;">The purpose of the constitutional reform is to effect a partial revision of this Constitution and replacement of one or more of the provisions hereof, without modifying the fundamental principles and structure of the text of the Constitution.</span>”…<br />Giving power to the National Government to act at the Municipal and State level attempts against the autonomy of the States and the nature of the Federal Government and therefore violates the fundamental principles (Title I, article # 4 of the “Fundamental Principles” - …<span style="font-style: italic;">The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a …Federal State</span>”…) and introduces a significant modification to the structure of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999.</blockquote><br /><br />Mousqueton<br />venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com<br /><br />Spanish language version of this post can be found at the following site: “No a la reforma constitucional de Chávez”<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-66553499586393781372007-10-15T21:50:00.000-04:002007-10-15T21:52:39.659-04:00Article 167 (AIO)Article 167 is notable more for what was removed than what was changed or added. Before I start though, <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/constitucion_admin_es/sharedfiles/Articulo_167.jpg">take a look at this</a>. Are bolivars green? How about bolivars <span style="font-style: italic;">fuertes</span>? It’s a telling statement about what Chavismo seems to think matters in terms of government revenue…<br /><br />Here is the original article (translation courtesy of <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/">www.constitucion.ve</a> , please blame them for the poor grammar):<span class="fullpost"><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Are revenues of the States:</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">1. Those deriving from their property and the management of their assets.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">2. Charges for the use of their goods and services, fines and penalties, and any charges allocated to them.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">3. Proceeds from the sale of State-owned commodities.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">4. The resources to which they are entitled by virtue of constitutional revenue share (</span><span style="font-style: italic;">situado constitutional</span><span style="font-weight: bold;">). The revenue share is equivalent to up to 20% of total ordinary revenues as estimated annually by the National Treasure, which is to be distributed among the States and the Capital District as follows: 30% of the aforementioned percentage in equal shares, and the remaining 70% in proportion to the population of each of such entities.</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">During each fiscal year, the States must invest at least 50% of the amount to which they are entitled by way of revenue share. During each fiscal year, the Municipalities of each State shall be entitled to at least 20% of the revenue share and of all other ordinary revenues of the State corresponding. In the event of changes in the revenues of the National Treasury that require an adjustment to the National Budget, the constitutional revenue share shall be adjusted in the same proportion.</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Principles, rules and procedures with a view to ensure the proper and efficient use of the resources deriving from the constitutional revenue share and the share of the Municipalities therein shall be established by law.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">5. Any other taxes, charges and special contributions that may be allocated to them by national law for the purpose of helping to develop the state treasuries.</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Laws creating or transferring tax revenues to the States may offset these allocations by means of changes in the other revenue categories indicated in this article, in order to preserve interterritorial fairness. The percentage of estimated ordinary national revenues allocated to the constitutional revenue share shall be no less than 15% of estimated ordinary revenues, taking into account the financial position and sustainability of the National Public Treasury, without neglecting the ability of the state administrative authorities to provide adequately for the services for which they are responsible.<br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">6. Resources deriving from the Interterritorial Compensation Fund and from any other transfer, subsidy or special appropriation, as well as those allocated to them as a share of national tax revenues, in accordance with the pertinent law.</span><br /><br />Here is a summary of changes in the proposed Article 167. Sections 1-3 were unchanged, as were the parts of 4-6 that aren’t addressed here. (And I kept some of the poor grammar.):<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Are revenues of the States:</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">4. Minimum raised from 20% to 25%. Distribution now includes Federal Territories, Federal Municipalities, Communes and Communities. Proscribed ratio deleted.</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Municipality minimum share raised from 20% to 25% (of state total).</span><br /><span style="font-weight: bold; color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Deleted</span>: “<span style="font-style: italic;">In the event of changes in the revenues of the National Treasury that require an adjustment to the National Budget, the constitutional revenue share shall be adjusted in the same proportion.</span>”<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0); font-weight: bold;">Deleted</span>: “<span style="font-style: italic;">la participación municipal</span>” in use of revenue share.<br />5. <span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0); font-weight: bold;">Deleted</span><span style="font-weight: bold;">: </span>“T<span style="font-style: italic;">he percentage of estimated ordinary national revenues allocated to the constitutional revenue share shall be no less than 15% of estimated ordinary revenues, taking into account the financial position and sustainability of the National Public Treasury, without neglecting the ability of the state administrative authorities to provide adequately for the services for which they are responsible.</span>”<br />6. <span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0); font-weight: bold;">Deleted</span>: “<span style="font-style: italic;">Resources deriving from the Interterritorial Compensation Fund.</span>”<br /><br />First, minimum distribution of revenues has been increased, both for states and for municipality portion of that state revenue. This sounds good on the surface. However, the phrase that was deleted ensures that states will not get what appears to be their full share, at least in terms of share of total federal government expenditures.<br /><br />The Venezuelan government has, for several consecutive years, created a budget, then gone and passed additional expenditures later in the year. (Often more than once.) I’d like to tell you how much that has been the last few years, but the Ministry of Finance for some reason doesn’t make that little fact easily available on its website. (Perhaps they don’t want us to know?) If you don’t think it’s a big number, consider this: the budget is drafted with an estimate of oil revenue, which is typically low. In 2006, for example, the budget value was $26. Average oil price for the year was $56.45 – 117% above the budgeted value. Since oil income is somewhere around half of national income, states can expect to lose about a quarter of what should have been their revenues. And a quarter of 25% off leaves them with 18.75% of oil income, less than the 20% they would get without the reform.<br /><br />And that 25% does not include one of Chavez’s biggest pet projects: <span style="font-weight: bold;">Fonden</span>. I don’t know quite how much money that fund has supposedly received since it was created, but it’s quite a few billion (not that there are any transparent accounts if it anywhere). Let’s say it’s been 10 billion – that’s 2 billion that should have gone to the states already but didn’t. So there are two mechanisms which will ensure that states will get a larger share of the pie, but guarantee that the pie will be much smaller than it used to be.<br /><br />Finally, the money distributed also has to be shared with “Federal Territories, Federal Municipalities, Communes and Communities,” not all of which exist or are even defined. Nor does it say what share those entities will get. Since there is no longer a set ratio, any of those could theoretically get all of it. I won’t predict that as a possibility, but note one fact: the new version gives no description of how those funds will be split up. Any guess who gets to decide?<br /><br />Section 5 removes the minimum amount that the states could receive under any circumstances. In other words, while they used to be guaranteed 15% of total estimated ordinary revenue, there is no longer any certainty of that. Given the size of additional expenditures each year and the Fonden, it’s easy to believe that state share will end up well under 15%.<br /><br />Section 6 removes the “Interterritorial Compensation Fund” from potential state revenue. Honestly, I’m not even sure what this was, but it evidently was money just for the states, and this makes one more source of their revenue dry up and go away.<br /><br />So the net result of this reform will be for less money to go directly to the states, and more money to stay with the federal government. This certainly doesn’t preclude the feds from spending money on specific states, including on important projects. But it does create a system which appears designed specifically to facilitate political patronage, which has been one of the best friends of Latin American <span style="font-style: italic;">caudillos </span>of every stripe for the last 200 years.<br /><br />So the governors (and mayors, plus whatever the name of a commune leader will be) who are seen as the best at their job will be the ones who can secure the most federal funds for their areas. And the ones who succeed at that will probably be the ones who are best at sucking up to Chavez. Is that a skill that anyone really wants in an elected representative?<br /><br />Our cartoon friends who help us understand the old Constitution <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/constitucion_admin_es/sharedfiles/Articulo_167.jpg">tell us</a> that “<span style="font-style: italic;">Los recursos son fundamentales para el desarollo de los estados</span>” – “resources are fundamental for the development of the states.” If that was so true, then what motive does Chavez have for giving them fewer resources?<br /><br />It’s quite simple: all of the funds that would have been transferred to the states remain under control of the federal government, and with fewer controls and more discretion than before. In other words, Chavez has more money at his disposal and fewer restrictions on how it gets spent.<br /><br />Thanks to this reform, because even more government resources will depend on Chavez, he will be able to make himself seem even more indispensable than ever.<br /><br />--- --- --- --- ---<br />This is the second article reviewed by AIO<br />aninterestedobserver at yahoo dot com<br /><br />Original article published <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/chavez-new-constitution-article-167.html">here</a>.<br />Spanish version to be announced<br />--- --- --- --- ---<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-52307534930057471742007-10-07T23:43:00.000-04:002007-10-08T08:16:51.236-04:00Articles 318, 320 and 321 (Miguel Octavio)The proposed Constitutional Reform includes three articles that have to do with monetary policy, the Central Bank and international reserves, so that it makes sense to discuss them all at the same time, as I will do in this post. The Articles to be modified are 318, 320 and 321.<br /><br />Let's start with Art. 318, which has the most extensive modifications. So extensive in fact, that it is not even worth looking at the original article except to note that the current Constitution grants the Central Bank "<span style="font-weight: bold;">exclusive, obligatory and…autonomous</span>" power over the country's monetary policy.<br /><br />In contrast, the new text as proposed for Art. 318 says:<span class="fullpost"><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 318. The national monetary system has to tend to achieve the essential goals of the Socialist State and the well being of the people, above any other consideration.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Executive Branch and the Venezuela Central Bank, in strict and obligatory coordination, will fix monetary policy and will exercise the monetary competence of the National Power.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The specific objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank, jointly with the Executive Branch, is to attain price stability and preserve the internal and external value of the monetary unit. The monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In the case that a currency is established in the framework of Latin American and Caribbean integration, that currency that is the subject of treaties subscribed by the Republic can be adopted</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Venezuelan Central bank is public law entity without autonomy for the formulation and exercising of the corresponding policies and its functions will be subordinated to the general economic policy and the National Development Plan to reach the superior objectives of the Socialist State and the greatest sum of happiness for all of the people.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">For the adequate fulfilling of its specific objectives, the Central Bank of Venezuela will have among its functions, shared with the National Executive Power, those of participating in the formulation and execution of monetary policy, in the design and execution of foreign exchange policy, in the regulation of the coinage, credit and fixing interest rates. </span><br /><br />Since they are so closely related (and maybe even repetitive), I will also list Articles 320 and 321, underlining what is new:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Art. 320 The state shall promote and defend economic stability, avoid the vulnerability of the economy and watch out for monetary and price stability of the economy, to insure social well-being. Equally, it will watch out for harmony in fiscal and monetary policy for the achievement of macroeconomic objectives</span> (Two whole paragraphs disappear)<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Art. 321:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Within the framework of his function as administrator of international reserves, the Head of State will establish, in coordination with the Venezuelan Central Bank and at the end of each year, the level of necessary reserves for the national economy, as well as the amount of the excess reserves, which will be destined to the funds earmarked by the national Executive Branch for productive investment, development and infrastructure, financing of the "</span><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">misiones</span><span style="font-weight: bold;">" and overall, in the integral, endogenous, humanist and socialist development.</span> (The FIEM,<br />the macroeconomic stabilization Fund disappears)<br /><br />The first consequence of the proposed reform is that as I mentioned before, the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be independent.<br /><br />What that does mean?<br /><br />There are roughly two ways of establishing monetary policy: You either have a Central Bank, like most countries do or you have a Currency Board, which is rare. In the Currency Board model, like Hong Kong, the currency in circulation exactly matches the reserves of the country.<br />The money is "backed" by the reserves, which may include gold, monetary instruments and investments. In the Central Bank model, you have a group of people who establish the policies to intervene in the monetary, currency and interest rate markets.<br /><br />Central Banks are usually independent. That is, while the Government has representatives on the Board of the Central Bank, they function independently and can make independent decisions. The reason for this is that economic studies have proven that when Central Banks are not independent, the short-term political goals become a priority over the stability of the currency and prices. Thus, most countries have found this to be the optimum, if not perfect solution. As an example, if an election is coming up, the Government may not care if it spends too much, because it makes people feel that things are going well, but in the long run this creates inflation.<br /><br />Thus, the first negative aspect of the reform is that the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be autonomous or independent, but will have to reach all decisions jointly with the Executive branch, allowing politics to get in the way. Of course, this has already happened, since all member of the Board of the Venezuelan Central Bank have by now been named by Hugo Chavez, the Central Bank has not even complained about this change in the Constitution and policy has become less and less independent in the last few years.<br /><br />In the last few years, economists in the Central Bank have resisted some of Chavez' policies and forcing the Central Bank to implement them, but in most cases Chavez has gotten his way in the end.<br /><br />However, in the end, the policies set by the Venezuelan Central bank have not been that great or independent in the last few years. Despite the mandate by the Venezuelan Constitution to maintain price and currency stability, the Venezuelan currency has devalued from Bs. 573.25 the day before Chavez took office to Bs. 2,150 (official rate) or Bs. 5,600 (parallel rate). Why? Because monetary policy has been out of control as the amount of Bolivars in circulation has gone from <span style="font-style: italic;">US$ 5.5 billion to US$ 62.5 billion, a factor of 12, while in the same period international reserves have only doubled</span> [editor's emphasis]. That is why the currency continues to drop, to devalue constantly. In some sense, Articles 318 and 320 are repetitive, since some of the goals outlined in them are exactly the same, the goal of price and monetary stability and harmony, which is already mentioned in Article 320. This shows in part the level of improvisation in writing the proposed reforms.<br /><br />Thus, up to a point, the changes in Article 318 and 321, simply formalize and institutionalize the policies that have been carried out in the last few years, which will simply allow the Government to do what it needs for political reasons, which economic studies have precisely shown does not work in the medium and long term.<br /><br />These three articles also prove that the proposed reform of the Constitution violates the procedure for changing it, since in these articles everything is secondary to the aims and goals of establishing a Socialist State, something Venezuelans have never voted on. This should require a Constituent Assembly, as Art. 342 specifically says that a Constitutional reform can only be done when the fundamentals and structure of the Constitution are not changed. What could be more fundamental that restricting the country to being a socialist State?<br /><br />We could also say that Art. 321 could also have been included in either Article 318 or 320. Essentially it incorporates into the Constitution the concept of "excess" international reserves. This concept "invented" by our current Minister of Finance Rodrigo Cabezas, says that once a year the Government will "determine" what is the optimum level of international reserves and any "excess" will be taken away from the Venezuelan Central Bank and given to funds for investment, development and infrastructure. This concept has no economic basis and sealed the progressive devaluation of the currency when it was first implemented. If it was absurd to make it into a law, like it was in 2004, it is simply irresponsible to incorporate this level of detail and precision into the Venezuelan Constitution.<br /><br />Again, this simply institutionalizes what the Government has been doing in the last few years. For three years in a row, the Government has withdrawn these supposed "excess" reserves and given them to Fonden, which by the way has not really fulfilled its mandate to invest those funds in infrastructure and development.<br /><br />Additionally, the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund disappears from the Constitution. That fund, if well managed, could represent the best option for the country to avoid the boom and bust cycles of oil prices, which will certainly repeat one day.<br /><br />In conclusion, the changes to Art. 318, 320 and 321 of the Constitution, formally remove the independence of the Central Bank which has been somewhat questionable in the last few years anyway and place monetary policy right in the hands of Hugo Chavez. This is exactly the opposite of what economic theory suggests a country should do, it subordinates monetary policy to social and political goals, and bodes badly for the future of inflation and the currency in Venezuela, as even valid structures to dampen the effect of oil fluctuations are eliminated.<br /><br />---------------------------------------<br /><br />Miguel Octavio writes <a href="http://blogs.salon.com/0001330/">The Devil's Excrement</a> since late 2002 and can be contacted there directly.<br /><br />This text originally published <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/chavez-new-constitution-articles-318.html">here</a>.<br /><br />A Spanish version of this text will be available soon.<br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-30115514726647726642007-10-03T11:32:00.000-04:002007-10-04T10:46:29.784-04:00Article 16 (Mousqueton)<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Preamble</span>: When I first asked the editor of this blog to allow me to comment on the constitutional modifications of articles 11, 16 and 18, I was totally aware, from the first reading, of the dangers that the modifications to article 11 posed to the Venezuelan democracy. </span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">At that time, I also thought that commenting article 16 was a waste of time because the text of this modification is the closest I have ever seen a constitutional text come to the legendary dyslectic speech of that beloved character called “Cantinflas” brilliantly portrayed by the Mexican actor Mario Moreno throughout his life. </span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">I decided to write comments on all three articles though because they are part of Title II of <a href="http://misionvenezuela.org/espanol/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf">the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999</a> that deals with the territory and the political division of that territory.</span> <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Far was I then from realizing that, as much as the implications of the modified text to article 11 where frightening, the implications of the modifications to the text of article 16 are by far, and I mean far, worse than those of article 11. Further, I was wrong and presumptuous by dismissing and labeling the text of the modifications to article 16 as “Cantinflesco”.</span><br /><br /><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Modifications</span>: Both the text of the original article 16 and the text of the modifications being proposed are long and they are better explained with the help of graphic outlines. I am therefore not going to quote these texts and instead I am herein including a link you can follow should you be interested in reading them ( <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/original-and-modified-text-of.html">Original Text / Modified Text</a> ).<br /><br />The political division of Federal Republics is a logical structure that divides the country in geographical areas for administration, political and citizen representation purposes. It basically resembles a pyramid with different levels of organization and citizen representation.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 divides Venezuela in three basic political and representation levels of government: 1) The Federal (National) level, 2) The State level and 3) the Municipal Level. It also includes provisions for the incorporation of two optional additional levels: 1) Metropolitan Districts - <a href="http://misionvenezuela.org/espanol/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf">Articles 170 and 171</a> - and 2) Parishes - <a href="http://misionvenezuela.org/espanol/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf">Article 173</a>.<br /><br />Figure # 1 below provides a graphic representation of the political division of the Venezuelan Republic as per the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnGbZGsJbgRl4ZI8Ka1nA04XCE0cK1D7Zup1fUoEdOwqKySEsjhyphenhyphen64A3ZdGCA1-1M9pszRtDqBBfyJmfVd_bRVpkvHOCID5b7FcEzeyOgRW8vd6pR8eW_0_EDwCxqdpV6MDNEl5WGg0e8/s1600-h/fig1-art16.gif"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5117091231239420834" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnGbZGsJbgRl4ZI8Ka1nA04XCE0cK1D7Zup1fUoEdOwqKySEsjhyphenhyphen64A3ZdGCA1-1M9pszRtDqBBfyJmfVd_bRVpkvHOCID5b7FcEzeyOgRW8vd6pR8eW_0_EDwCxqdpV6MDNEl5WGg0e8/s320/fig1-art16.gif" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center">Figure # 1<br /></div><br />The logic behind the option of creating Metropolitan Districts is that, in time, independent Municipalities may develop up to a point where a group of them could become a major metropolitan area. At that time these municipalities might want to incorporate as a “Metropolitan District” that encompasses the territory of all them. This way, they would be able to streamline rules and regulations as well as the political and representation relationship between Municipalities throughout the metropolitan area.<br /><br />Following the same logic, Municipalities with large rural territories that have scattered communities might want to consider creating smaller entities of political and citizen representation. Hence, the creation of Parishes is a constitutional option that Municipalities can use to decentralize government at the municipal level in order to better serve the population in those communities.<br /><br />In every case, all the political divisions or levels must comply with the constitutional mandate of allowing a republican representation of the citizens at each level. This is, the branches of power (Executive and Legislative) must be the same in every division or level and the representatives of the people (authorities) must be elected in general elections.<br /><br />The current political division of the Venezuelan territory complies with these conditions as mandated in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 outlined in Title I, Articles 1 though 9, <u>which are mandatory and “non amendable and/or revisable”</u> (articles 340 and 342), and more specifically with the mandate on articles 4 and 6 that read:<br /><br /><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Article 4:</span> The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a <u>decentralized Federal State</u> on the terms set forth in this Constitution, governed by the principles of territorial integrity, cooperation, solidarity, attendance and shared responsibility.<br /><br /><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Article 6:</span> <u>The government</u> of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela <u>and</u> of the <u>political organs that comprise the same</u>, <u>is and shall always be democratic</u>, participatory, <u>elective, decentralized, alternative</u>, responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates.<br /><br />It should be noted that the political division and the mandate to organize the country under a federal republican government constitutes the backbone of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999. So much so, that out of the total 350 articles included in the constitution, 153 articles, that is 43% of all articles, are dedicated to explaining and regulating the term, scope, attributions, responsibilities and the rights of the citizens in the different levels and/or political divisions of this government structure.<br /><br />The modifications being proposed to article 16 though, introduces a completely different political division (structure) of the Venezuelan Republic which, at first sight, seems to have absolutely no organizational, administrative, political and certainly, no constitutional logic. Further more, it introduces changes that are not explained and/or regulated anywhere in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and for that matter, not even vaguely referenced anywhere in the whole text of the constitution.<br /><br />To illustrate the major differences being introduced in the modified text of article 16 we are including a table (Figure # 2) that provides a visual reference as to the political division of the Venezuelan Republic in three different documents. These are; 1) The <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1961.html">Venezuelan Constitution of 1961</a>, 2) <a href="http://misionvenezuela.org/espanol/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf">The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 </a>and 3) <a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/original-and-modified-text-of.html">The proposed text for article 16</a>. The different political divisions and/or levels of organization are being outlined in the same order as they appear in the text of each document.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8VSMdxceWmhT6kkDReButuU8YKUmMJw3HVwT_yt2Ou6XCJbM_Fe5ZnIl_Om83A3B-Vs9r9q5eUHoMH1dPhyphenhyphent3ku97V4JqN29w48Ph_vJ2cb3TbafKJX1TjmXB9znB6xgPQTeD0UHdXxY/s1600-h/fig2-art16.gif"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5117094899141491634" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8VSMdxceWmhT6kkDReButuU8YKUmMJw3HVwT_yt2Ou6XCJbM_Fe5ZnIl_Om83A3B-Vs9r9q5eUHoMH1dPhyphenhyphent3ku97V4JqN29w48Ph_vJ2cb3TbafKJX1TjmXB9znB6xgPQTeD0UHdXxY/s400/fig2-art16.gif" border="0" /></a><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center">Figure # 2 (click to enlarge)<br /></div><br />Since the proposed political division in the modified text of article 16 is so confusing and given the fact that there is no precedence for this type of political division either in the Constitution of 1961 or the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 it seemed logical to research the constitutional text of other “federal republican constitutions” to try and find similar political divisions. None of the constitutions that were researched though (<a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html">Argentina</a>, <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil05.html">Brazil</a>, <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Mexico/mexico2004.html">Mexico</a>, and the <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/USA/usa1992.html">United States</a>) shed any light as to where this political division concept could have come from. Further, though Cuba is not a federal republic, we also could not find in the Cuban Constitution anything that vaguely resembles the above mentioned political division.<br /><br />Frustrated with the inability to find any logic to the proposed political division we were about to focus only on the confusing and in some instances somewhat pompous language of the proposed text when suddenly it strike us.<br /><br />The reason why we could not find any logic and/or sense to the proposed political division was because the text was not describing one political division but indeed two different, separate and overlapping political divisions written into the same text.<br /><br />Just like the notes of two different songs played together do not make sense unless played separately, the modified text of article 16 describes two separate political divisions that only make sense when outlined separately.<br /><br />In the following table (Figure # 3) we are outlining the two now perfectly logical and overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihyphenhyphenEoda09Mj54rMe-PY4aJqj975idsLU9_PiPQl2Hu93bnVBp4UmB43bHb6oRBub8iRLlc6zpKgRArn0Sjfn6Em79zm9JFTpfSCM6ZQLkDZNbZ6stTo5eik0X_Qo5N1y-FaHZ7wZlQPpo/s1600-h/fig3-art16.gif"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5117096776042200002" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihyphenhyphenEoda09Mj54rMe-PY4aJqj975idsLU9_PiPQl2Hu93bnVBp4UmB43bHb6oRBub8iRLlc6zpKgRArn0Sjfn6Em79zm9JFTpfSCM6ZQLkDZNbZ6stTo5eik0X_Qo5N1y-FaHZ7wZlQPpo/s400/fig3-art16.gif" border="0" /></a><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center">Figure # 3<br /></div><br />As amazing as it may be, the modified text of article 16 introduces two separate, opposite, parallel, overlapping and most probably competing government structures to govern the same country.<br /><br />It also re-arranges the territory introducing political divisions that are made up from parts or all the current territories assigned by the constitution to one or more States and Municipalities. These territorial assignments are very broadly described in the proposed amended text to article 16 and certainly they are not regulated in any way, shape or form.<br /><br /><blockquote>- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Federal Provinces:</span> Which are basically a political equivalent to the States, will be formed by …“<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">aggregating either States or Municipalities</span>”…The concept of Provinces is not alien to Venezuelan history since, originally, the political division of Venezuela included six provinces: Venezuela or Caracas, Maracaibo, Cumana, Guayana, Margarita and Trinidad.<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Functional Districts:</span> Which are basically political equivalents to the Metropolitan Districts will be formed …“<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">by one or more Municipalities or Territorial Lots on them, without regard to the State they belong to.</span>”…<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Insular Districts:</span> The original text of article 16 included Federal Dependencies. These have been dropped and replaced by Oceanic Regions. Federal Dependencies included all those islands that were not part of a State. Oceanic Regions do not make that distinction so territories such as Margarita could become Insular Districts subject to the executive branch of power.<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Federal Cities:</span> Will allow the government to take direct control over any major metropolitan city, regardless of which State they are in and/or their Municipalities (…”<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, after an agreement approved by a simple majority of Representatives of the National Assembly, will be able to create by decree, Federal Provinces, Federal Cities and Functional Districts”…), (…”In the Federal Territory, the Federal Municipality and the Federal City, the national Power will designate the respective authorities</span>”…).<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Federal Municipalities:</span> Municipalities in Federal Territories would be under government control and their authorities will be appointed by the national government.<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cities / Communal Cities:</span> This is the new …"<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">primary political unit in the national territory organization</span>"… and hence the political equivalent of the “Municipalities”. “Cities” and “Communal Cities” are the same thing since all cities will become “Communal Cities” when …"<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">organized Communities, Communes and self communal governments are established in the totality of its perimeter.</span>"… without any regard for the Municipalities.<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Communes:</span> Are the political equivalent of the Parishes except that they are mandatory; Parishes were optional. Also, Communes are political entities with …"<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">forms of self government and any other expression of direct Democracy</span>."…<br /><br />- <span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Communities:</span> This is a new micro political division that is being introduced by article 16 which can only be explained as an obsession to micro manage the lives of the people. After communities the only thing left are <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">“homes”</span>.<br /></blockquote><br />From a constitutional standpoint, the two overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16 are dramatically different.<br /><br />As per the constitutional mandate in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 (articles 4 & 6), Political Division “A” is Federal, Elective and Decentralized. “Political Division “B” though is quite the opposite; it is not Federal because none of the divisions created comply with the autonomous nature of a Federal Republic; it is non-elective because most of the authorities are appointed by the national government and, it is not decentralized because they are all subject to the national government.<br /><br />Finally, the undetermined and absurd nature of this dual political division is pretty much covered up with the all inclusive, all uncertain and all powerful political alibi measure of choice: …"<span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-STYLE: italic">The political-territorial organization of the Republic will be legislated by an Organic Law</span>."<br /><br /><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Comment 1: </span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Let me start by commenting what, without doubt, is the most important conclusion you arrive at after reading the above factual analysis.</span><br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The modified text of article 16 being introduced by the government is absolutely UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the following reasons:</span><br /><br /><blockquote>a. It violates Title I, article # 4 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a …federal State</span>”…<br />The new political division introduces new political divisions that are not subject to the States and hence they are not federal. Further, it introduces political divisions that include territories from more than one State and authorities that are not accountable to either of such destroying this way the integrity of the federal system.<br /><br />b. It violates Title I, article # 4 and 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized… State</span>”...” <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… decentralized</span>”…<br />The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and/or removed by the national government and hence dependant from such. This constitutes a centralized system of government and further, allows the executive branch to exercise authority at the State and Municipal level which is as power that neither the President nor the National Assembly has under the constitution.<br /><br />c. It violates Title I, article # 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… elective</span>”..<br />The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and not elected.<br /><br />d. It violates Title IX, Chapter II, article # 342 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …” <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The purpose of the constitutional reform is to effect a partial revision of this Constitution and replacement of one or more of the provisions hereof, without modifying the fundamental principles and structure of the text of the Constitution.</span>”…<br />The new political division introduces a significant modification to the fundamental principles and particularly to the structure of the text of the Constitution. It curtails the power and territory of the States and Municipalities. It introduces political divisions and entities that are not legislated under the Constitution. It creates a new primary political unit that modifies the responsibilities and the political relationship of the Municipalities with other political entities. It modifies the representation of the people at the Municipal and State level. It subjects people to different authorities without the legislation to guarantee their rights. In sum; it introduces a major modification to the structure of the text of the Constitution.<br /><br />e. It violates Title IV, Chapter III, article # 164 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Is of the States exclusive competence: … (2) Organization of their Municipalities and other local organs and the territorial and political divisions between them</span>”…</blockquote><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Comment 2:</span> <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">From a political standpoint, the introduction of two overlapping political divisions is a clear attempt to destroy the power base of the States and their municipalities. The centralized political structure under the national government control will have more economic resources and no constitutional restrictions. Eventually, it will be perceived as more efficient than the federal structure and therefore such will loose political power and representation.</span><br /><br /><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Comment 3:</span> <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">The modifications introduced to article # 16 are a clear attempt by the government to introduce a centralize, non elective and dependent political structure that will change the nature of the Venezuelan government which by constitutional mandate is republican, federal and constitutional. The problem is that this can not be done through constitutional amendments and/or reforms because the constitution does not allow it. The only way to make those changes is to elect a National Constituent Assembly to write a new Constitution.</span><br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Mousqueton</span><br />venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com<br /><br />Spanish language version of this post can be found at the following site: “<a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/artculo-16.html">No a la reforma constitucional de Chávez</a>”<br /><br /><br /><span style="COLOR: rgb(0,0,153)">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-62905149678764216152007-10-01T19:50:00.000-04:002007-10-02T13:12:22.454-04:00Article 136 (Julia)From the 1999 Constitution:<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The Public Power is distributed between the Municipal Power, the State Power and the National Power. The National Public Power is divided in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral.<br /><br />Each one of the branches of the Public Power has its own functions, but the organs on which its exercise pertains will collaborate with each other in accomplishing the aims of the State.</span><br /><br />To the Chavez proposal:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Public Power is distributed territorially in the following form: the popular power, the municipal power, the state power and the national power.<br /><br />Regarding the content of the functions that it exerts, the public power is organized in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral<br /><br />The people are the holder of the sovereignty and they exert it directly through the Popular Power. This one is not born of the suffrage nor of election, but it is born of the condition of organized human groups as a basis of the population.<br /><br />The Popular Power expresses constituting the communities, the communes and the self-government of the cities, through the communal councils, workers councils, the student councils, the farmers councils and other beings that the law indicates.</span><br /><br />In order to discuss this article not many words are needed since not even the amazing revolutionary lexicon, – I won’t take out any credit for that – cares to make any effort to hide the real nature of the proposal.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />First, it introduces a brand new figure to the Venezuelan political system, the Popular Power, leaving the rest of the powers almost intact – you could say. It also divides the power in two groups: one according to the territorial distribution and another according to the functions.<br /><br />If the power is distributed territorially it has to claim some way of hierarchy (the national power upper layer is the state power and the municipal power refereed as the most local one). The proposed reform seems to give the higher hierarchy to this new Popular Power.<br /><br />-<span style="font-style: italic;">That is actually very progressive!</span> – One could argue – <span style="font-style: italic;">since it is giving to the people [us] even more power than the one the very same state has.</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The people over the institutions! </span>– A classic dream of which I won’t discuss the practical consequences of it in this space but I will rather just say that nothing could be far away from that dream of giving all the power to the citizens (so called, the people) than this reform as soon as the next lines we read tell us what the Popular Power its all about.<br /><br />The popular Power as far as this article concerns, gives to the reader a shape of an immense network of –also popular- organizations that at the end are the ones who seem to exert this power and are the only ones authorized to do it. The citizen – it doesn’t matter if you have time for those organizations or if you are familiar or not with the organizations’ ideology – can only be a citizen if he’s a member of any of those organizations. You have to add to this issue the fact that these organizations will have to be authorized by the state.<br /><br />In that way, it’s not hard to imagine this network of the so called Popular organizations as a new and impenetrable bureaucracy between the citizen and their individual rights.<br /><br />But the problem goes farther than that: the new article suppress the direct vote of any citizen at least on the matters that concerns the Popular Power (we are still not quite sure of those matters). For a revolution who has spoken over and over again about the promise of a more direct democracy; the word “directly” carefully written in the reform takes now a brand new meaning becoming without doubt the opposite:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">“is not born of the suffrage nor of election, but it is born of the condition of organized human groups as a basis of the population”.</span><br /><br />As you can see, elections are now discarded in any way to exert this Popular Power because it is saying that the councils themselves, instead of the citizens as individuals, are going to be able to vote in their representation.<br /><br />In replacement of the vote, the article establishes certain “condition” that will allow the people (hard to tell here if by people this article refers now to the citizens, the councils, or none of them). This “condition” might sound inspiring but its meaning on practical terms is certainly vague and even, dangerous for the preservation of a democratic system. [<span style="font-style: italic;">editor's note</span>: "<span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">condición</span>" in Spanish refers much more to the nature, the situation of the person than to an actual condition to be met]<br /><br />Vague because we don’t count with the vote of the citizens so other ways are needed to translate this condition and the article doesn’t bother on giving us any clue on how to start.<br /><br />And dangerous because the easiest way that comes to my mind to translate this condition, is through an interpreter able to understand it, who’ll tell us what to do to make us sure that this Popular Power is being really exerted. Now, this interpreter cannot logically be a normal citizen, it must be someone special, someone from the people, someone loved by the people, someone that has in its soul, the soul of the people. I haven’t met or heard such a special person yet, but certain speeches makes me suspect of the man who wrote the reform itself, imagining this non precedent condition of organized human groups.<br /><br />On synthesis, the article 136 creates a new power: The popular power which, even counting that its certainly translated as the “Power for the people” suppress the possibility of that people to exert it through the vote; putting an emphasis on the several councils (communal, farmers, student and so on) as the way to exert it. So, with the name of Popular Power, the article adds to the political system a new bureaucracy made of -government promoted and probably carefully watched –organizations (councils). [note added by the editor: many of the public proceedings of such councils end up in raised hands vote, and many in the voting session wear red shirts or are known to work with the government. The reader may draw his or her own conclusions]<br /><br />These councils will become the “condition” of the people (since the organized people are now established as the basis of the population leaving the non organized people practically without a citizenship) and only through that “condition” (no vote) the Popular Power will be exerted.<br /><br />The issues that this Popular Power is going to take care of remain unclear, but no matter what those issues are the most important thing to notice here is that the citizen will have no direct access to make their opinions, stances or demands on those issues since the vote could clearly suppressed.<br /><br />If someone asked me to put the meaning of this article in just a couple of words, I would said that, ironically, the proposed reform of the article 136, with the creation of the Popular Power kills with no mercy the sovereignty of the people.<br /><br />Julia_1984, one of the "dissenting students", opened her own blog early this year “<a href="http://antipatrioticvenezuelan.blogspot.com/">The end of Venezuela as I know it</a>”<br /><br />e-mail: venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 136<br /><br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-43162128041305064212007-09-29T22:45:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:26:11.459-04:00Article 87 (AIO)<span style="font-style: italic;">Introductory comment.</span><br /><br />First of all, let me say that I think <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-230.html">Bruni’s argument</a> about the questionable constitutionality of this process is worth reading – if you haven’t, do it. Being a non-Venezuelan, I don’t think I’m really qualified to weigh in on the validity of that argument, but I don’t want the fact that I’m discussing an article to make it seem that I consider it a non-issue. (Speaking of that, check out <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/11_ventana_detalle_foto45.html">this picture</a>, with its caption about constitutional reform. Ironic, no?)<br /><br />Second, I want to comment in general about constitutions. Being the most important aspect of a true democracy – since no one should be above the law, and it is the ultimate definition of that law, it therefore is more important than any person and their opinions – I believe it should contain only the most important, fundamental priorities. In other words, a constitution should always be short, because there are only so many things that deserve consideration as the highest priorities.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />This is partly true because a constitution should only contain things that the government can reasonably guarantee, the things which should be considered basic, fundamental rights. The U.S. Constitution, for example (I’m not holding it up as a model for the whole world, but simply as a good example – if it were lousy, it wouldn’t have lasted 224 years and counting – and the one I know the best), promises “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and pretty much everything in it fits into those categories. It doesn’t reach beyond the basics.<br /><br />Any overly long constitution (350 articles, perhaps?) will necessarily get into one or two areas beyond the fundamental rights: things which should properly be enacted as law, not the constitution; and things that can only be described as a wish list. A good standard for the first might be whether or not it can sustain at least 2/3 support of the people indefinitely (if it can, maybe it should be constitution material; if not, take it to the legislature). For the second, it comes down to whether or not the government can manage to provide it or not. If it’s beyond its power, but makes you think “Wouldn’t it be nice if…?” then leave it out. (And too much of that is one of the reasons Latin Americans have spent so much time writing new Constitutions – because they didn’t like the “wish list” of the last one.)<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">That said, on to Article 87.</span><br /><br />The old version (translation from <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/">www.constitucion.ve</a> – and it’s quite easy to see <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/03_const_presidente.html">what these pictures have to do </a>with the Constitution. Not!):<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">All persons have the right and duty to work. The State guarantees the adoption of the necessary measures so that every person shall be able to obtain productive work providing him or her with a dignified and decorous living and guarantee him or her the full exercise of this right. It is an objective of the State to promote employment. Measures tending to guarantee the exercise of the labor rights of self-employed persons shall be adopted by law. Freedom to work shall be subject only to such restrictions as may be established by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Every employer shall guarantee employees adequate safety, hygienic and environmental conditions on the job. The State shall adopt measures and create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions.</span><br /><br />The new version:<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">All persons of working age have the right and duty to work. The State will develop policies that generate productive work, and will adopt social measures necessary for each person to achieve an existence which is dignified, decorous and beneficial for themselves and for society.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The State will guarantee that in all labor centers safety, hygienic and environmental, and social relations conditions are fulfilled in accordance with human dignity, and will create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">In the application of these principles of co-responsibility and solidarity, the employer will adopt all necessary measures for the fulfillment of these conditions.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Work will be subject to the regime established in this Constitution and the laws of the Republic.</span><br /><br />For the purpose of guaranteeing the exercising of labor rights of independent workers, such as taxi drivers, truckers, retailers, craftsmen, professionals and who are self-employed in whatever productive activity to support themselves and their family, the Law will create and develop everything with regard to a social stability Fund for self-employed workers, so that with the contribution of the State and the worker, the worker can enjoy fundamental labor rights such as retirement, pensions, vacations, rest, prenatal and postnatal care, and other rights established by law.<br /><br />This article comes from the section called “<span style="font-style: italic;">De los Derechos Humanos y Garantías, y de los Deberes</span>” – “About Human Rights and Guarantees, and about Duties.” Anything related to employment, with the exception of precluding slavery, seems to me to fall well short of that category. If one were to list things that should be guaranteed to all, a job would not be near the top of the list. Same thing if one were to list things a government could guarantee. Frankly, the only appropriate change for this article would have been to delete it altogether. Everything in the old version fell into those two categories: things that should be a in a law (why does any legislature need a Constitution to tell them what laws to pass?), or “wish list.”<br /><br />On to the changes: the first big one is that the State will no longer guarantee the adoption of measures to help provide work, but will itself develop the policies for the same. In other words, more State intervention, which will do the opposite of facilitating job creation. Always has, always will. A certain degree of State intervention is very important, but I think Venezuela passed that point long ago, and just kept going. You see the same theme in the change about safety conditions, which were to be provided by the employer, and now are guaranteed by the State – with new institutions to “control” them. This implies a dependence on the State – is that the intent? Yet again when the State guarantees conditions about “social relations,” whatever that means. The employer’s responsibility will now be to fulfill “co-responsibility and solidarity.”<br /><br />Another notable change is that the end result of facilitating work that is beneficial for society. And just who makes that determination? If it’s anyone but society itself, it’s going to be mistaken at times. A promise of “human dignity” is also added, also without definition.<br /><br />“Work will be subject to the regime established in this Constitution and the laws of the Republic.” Can someone explain to me why this was necessary – if it weren’t included, then work would be supra-constitutional?<br /><br />I'm very amused by the addition of several types of independent workers. This has got to be the first proposed Constitution in the world to ever mention taxi drivers! The proposed stability fund is potentially a good idea, but far too vague to even guess. Plus the idea is utterly worthless without a law, so it’s pointless to include.<br /><br />There are some other little details, but the sum of the changes promise nothing concrete, except for additional State intervention. That intervention is vaguely defined to boot, which means that it could be quite excessive. Unfortunately, there is nothing here that gives any reason to think that anything employment-related will improve.<br /><br />Finally, <span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">there is one deletion</span> which is very intriguing: the sentence “It is an objective of the State to promote employment” has been removed! Why? Because “social relations,” “control” of employers, and “co-responsibility and solidarity” are more important? Because promoting employment isn’t “beneficial…for society”?<br /><br />I suspect another reason: because this is the one thing in the original article that Chavez knows he can’t fulfill. He can guarantee more control, greater intervention, lots of activities with “social” purposes (but not necessarily results). But he can’t make it easier to create employment.<br /><br />This isn’t just my opinion – the World Bank released its <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=201">annual “Doing Business” report </a>just this week. (Perfect timing!) Venezuela is 172 out of the 178 countries listed, ahead of economic luminaries Chad, Burundi, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, and the Dem. Republic of Congo. The nearest non-African country is Laos, at 164, and even Haiti – the closest in the Western Hemisphere – is out of reach at 148. Not only that, but Venezuela is <span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">20 spots below Zimbabwe!</span><br /><br />And when it comes to the criterion of “Employing Workers,” Venezuela is even worse off – they are <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/?direction=Asc&sort=4">tied for dead last in the entire world!</a> So there you have it – Chavez has proposed no longer having to promote employment, which the World Bank says no one in the world does worse already. And nothing in the proposed Constitutional change gives reason to think it will be the least bit better.<br /><br />AIO<br />aninterestedobserver at yahoo dot com<br /><br />Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constituion-article-87.html">here</a>.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-78201317638691044602007-09-28T23:06:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:27:41.739-04:00Article 115 (Pedro Bernardez)<span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;" >Analysis of Article 115 of the 1999 Constitution and Its proposed Reform</span><br /><span style="color: rgb(51, 102, 102);font-family:trebuchet ms;" >by Pedro Bernardez</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 115 as it stands:</span><br /><br />“The right to own property is guaranteed. Every person has a right to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of his/her goods. Property will be subject to the contributions, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. It is only in the spirit of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, that any kinds of goods may be expropriated”<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 115’s proposed reform:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">“The different forms of property are recognized and guaranteed. Public property [“<span style="font-style: italic;">la propiedad pública</span>”] is that which belongs to State entities; social property [“<span style="font-style: italic;">la propiedad social</span>”] is that which belongs to the people in its entirety and to the future generations, and may be of two types: indirect social property, when it is exercised by the State in name of the community, and direct social property, when the State assigns it, under different forms and in outlined territories, to one or several communities, to one or several communes [“<span style="font-style: italic;">comunas</span>”], constituting thusly communal property, or to one or several cities, constituting thusly cityward property; collective property [“<span style="font-style: italic;">la propiedad colectiva</span>”] is that which belongs to social groups or persons, for their benefit, use or common enjoyment, of either social or private origin; mixed property [“<span style="font-style: italic;">la propiedad mixta</span>”] is that constituted by the public sector, the social sector, the collective sector and the private sector, in differing combinations, for the utilization of resources or carrying out activities, always subject to the absolute respect of the Nation’s economic and social sovereignty; and private property [“<span style="font-style: italic;">la propiedad privada</span>”] is that which belongs to natural or juristic persons and is recognized over user and consumer goods, and legitimately acquired means of production.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">All property, </span>[the comma there is part of the article, and not my mistake] <span style="font-weight: bold;">will be subject to the contributions, burdens, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. In the name of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, the expropriation of any kind of good may be declared, without restricting the right of State officials,</span> [the comma is also part of the article] <span style="font-weight: bold;">of previously occupying, </span>[as is this comma]<span style="font-weight: bold;"> during the judicial process, the goods being expropriated, within the parameters established by law.”</span><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Essential changes</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Private property:</span> although, in a technical sense, the articles barely contradict each other in regards to private property, what does happen is that the definition of private property is specifically narrowed down to “user and consumer goods and legitimately acquired means of production” and subject to greater restrictions than in the current article.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />Under the new article, persons do not explicitly have a right to the <span style="font-style: italic;">disposition </span>of their goods, which means that for example rental of said goods <span style="font-style: italic;">could not be exploited for economic gain</span>.<br /><br />This means that all economic sectors that rely on rent such as hotels, rented apartments, rental stores, and businesses that rent out industrial equipment would cease to exist as private, either becoming collective or disappearing.<br /><br />Also, since private property is restricted to “user and consumer goods and legitimately acquired means of production” it includes neither land (unless it were a “legally acquired means of production”) nor intellectual property, unproductive land and real estate (even the land one lives on) and personally produced works of art could never constitute one’s own private property.<br /><br />In addition to these restrictions is the fact that State entities have the guaranteed right to occupy goods when and while a judicial process to expropriate them is pending.<br /><br />“Legitimately acquired means of production” presents another problem: since it is the people (on whom sovereignty rests according to the Constitution), and therefore the State (in the people’s name), what define what “legitimately acquired is”, it leaves the State with the option of acquiring said means of production, <span style="font-style: italic;">possibly without compensation</span>, by simply declaring such acquisition as “in the people’s interest. The use of legitimate as opposed to legal implies the possible use such supra or extralegal justifications for the acquisition of said means of production even if they were <span style="font-style: italic;">legally </span>acquired.<br /><br />This is in addition to any restrictions on legal acquisitions. It is also the State who defines the laws, and therefore may rule ownership of certain property illegal by simply altering existing laws to exclude such property. The State already did so when it redefined what legally acquired lands were in 2005, and took lands that were outside this definition (in this case, private lands that were not registered in 1821)<br /><br />In other words, as opposed to the current article (which guarantees private ownership except in the “spirit of public use or general interest”), the new article gives the government the implicit power to instantly requisition all means of production if it wanted to by a simple change of the law or “on behalf of the people”.<br /><br />Lastly, note that the new article does not explicitly establish the right for the personal and exclusive <span style="font-style: italic;">enjoyment </span>of one’s private property; in fact, nowhere in the article are citizens given any rights over property: only the State explicitly reserves them for itself.<br /><br />In conclusion, private property as understood by the new article is a much more restricted and narrow version than it is in the current one, and essentially nullifies most of it.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Other property:</span> in addition to private property, the new article outlines several different new kinds of property: public, social, collective, and mixed.<br /><br />Public property as defined by the article is conceivably that which belongs to state institutions. Since the definition is vague and succinct and not supported by a justification, it could be that anything could be potentially declared public property.<br /><br />Social property, although it seems to give “the people” sovereignty over it, in reality places it in the hands of the State since it is either managed by the State in the people’s <span style="font-style: italic;">name </span>(“indirect social property”) or <span style="font-style: italic;">assigned </span>to the people (“direct social property”), potentially meaning that the State could reassign it at any given time.<br /><br />Collective property is just that: property that belongs to a group or collective for their benefit. In reality, what is today private property could be conceivably transformed into collective property if it was <span style="font-style: italic;">de facto</span> shared by several people: a home shared by a family or a small business for example. However, this emphasis on the collective over the individual stifles forms of individual private enterprise, such as freelance artists, taxi drivers, tutors, psychiatrists, and the like. Unless they were part of a collective, any property they might own could not be used for this end. In reality, it forces people to form enterprises collectively to survive.<br /><br />In addition, since the article does not guarantee collective property and only defines it (and not even as a right), its actual existence can only be determined by subsequent laws. Analysis of other articles may also be necessary to understand further implications or restrictions.<br /><br />Mixed property is any combination of the former, subject to “the Nation’s economic and social sovereignty”. The main problem is that any such property and activities carried out with it could not contradict the State’s (representing “the Nation”) economic and social decisions, previous or future. In addition, since it is the <span style="font-style: italic;">only </span>type of property explicitly authorized for the <span style="font-style: italic;">utilization of resources</span>, and is subject to the Nation’s social sovereignty, presumably referring to the types of social property managed or assigned by the State in the Nation’s name, it places all type of resource exploitation under the State’s control.<br /><br />In conclusion, although several types of property have been defined, the article has <span style="font-style: italic;">de facto</span> placed almost all of them under the State’s direct administration, leaving the only one which hasn’t (collective property) up for grabs (I’m not considering private property in this statement since it was treated in another section).<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Property sytem: </span>since private property is redefined severely from the current article, (in opposition to the current article which gives an explicit right to individual property ownership) and since the State de facto reserves disposition of all the newly defined property in name of the collective including any former private property that would become collective under the new article, the system of property has been essentially altered from the current constitution.<br /><br />Therefore, it can be argued that it alters its fundamental structure, in opposition to article 342 of the current constitution. This article reads:<br /><br />“<span style="font-style: italic;">A Constitutional Reform has as its objective a partial revision of this Constitution and the substitution of one or several of its guidelines that do not modify the structure and fundamental principles of the Constitutional text.</span>”<br /><br />Because of this, the changes go beyond the scope of a Constitutional Reform, and should therefore be subject to another process. The article would be unconstitutional if passed under a Constitutional Reform.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 350: </span>the proposed article also flies in the face of this article of the current Constitution, which reads:<br /><br />“<span style="font-style: italic;">The people of Venezuela, loyal to their republican tradition, their fight for independence, peace and liberty, will disavow any regime, legislation or authority that contradicts democratic values, principles and guarantees </span>[,] <span style="font-style: italic;">or undermines human rights</span> [it doesn’t need a comma in Spanish; I added it to dispel the confusion that might arise from the phrase “and guarantees or undermines human rights”, since it refers to the contradiction of democratic guarantees and is not a semantic confusion]”.<br /><br />The regime, legislation and authority granted by this article contradict democratic values and principles for two main reasons.<br /><br />First, it infringes on article 17 of the Human Rights Charter (paragraph 2: “<span style="font-style: italic;">Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others</span>”) because it doesn’t define property as a right, and does not guarantee any property defined.<br /><br />Secondly, by subordinating almost all property to the State, it reduces the freedom of both groups and individuals as the choices of said groups or individuals can be largely overruled by the State; in addition, since property, and especially private property, is restricted further than in the current article, it shows a trend of restricting freedom, which is contrary to the democracy implied in article 350 (which includes freedom as a cornerstone of the people’s tradition).<br /><br />In conclusion: because of these violations, the people would have the right to disavow the government that would be put in place by the proposed article.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Final Conclusion</span><br /><br />The proposed article severely restricts private property while <span style="font-style: italic;">de facto</span> subordinating almost all proposed collective property to the State. In light of this contrast to the current article, which is not as restrictive, the proposed one contradicts article 342 of the current Constitution because it alters the fundamental structure of the principle of property outlined within the current one (and therefore being outside of the scope of a Constitutional Reform; another process would have to be used). In addition, because it violates democratic principles, values and guarantees in at least two areas, the regime, legislation and authority that would be put in place under the proposed article would have to be disavowed by the people as per article 350 of the current Constitution.<br />-------------------<br /><br />Additional private comments to venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 115<br /><br />Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-115.html">here</a>.<br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-84157912804330486512007-09-21T20:19:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:30:00.863-04:00Article 141 (Feathers)From this:<br /><br />Sección Segunda: De la administración pública<br /><br /><i>Artículo 141</i><br /><br /><i>La Administración Pública está al servicio de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas y se fundamenta en los principios de honestidad, participación, celeridad, eficacia, eficiencia, transparencia, rendición de cuentas y responsabilidad en el ejercicio de la función pública, con sometimiento pleno a la ley y al derecho.</i><br /><br /><b>The Public Administration is at the service of the citizens and is based on the principles of honesty, participation, speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsibility in the exercise of the public function, with total submission to the rule of law.</b><br /><br />To this:<br /><br /><i>Artículo 141</i><br /><br /><i>Las administraciones públicas son las estructuras organizativas destinadas a servir de instrumento a los poderes públicos, para el ejercicio de sus funciones, y para la prestación de los servicios. Las categorías de administraciones públicas son: las administraciones públicas burocráticas o tradicionales, que son las que atienden a las estructuras previstas y reguladas en esta constitución y las leyes; y “las misiones”, constituidas por organizaciones de variada naturaleza, creadas para atender a la satisfacción de las más sentidas y urgentes necesidades de la población, cuya prestación exige de la aplicación de sistemas excepcionales, e incluso, experimentales, los cuales serán establecidos por el Poder Ejecutivo mediante reglamentos organizativos y funcionales. </i><br /><br /><b>The public administrations are the organizational structures destined to serve as instrument to the public powers, for the exercise of their functions, and for the services they provide. The categories of public administrations are: the bureaucratic or traditional public administrations, that are those that takes care of the structures predicted and regulated in this constitution and the laws; and “the <i>misiones”</i>, constituted by organizations of varied nature, created to take care of the satisfaction of the most felt and urgent necessities of the population, whose benefit demands of the application of exceptional systems, and, even experimental, which will be established by the Executive authority by means of organizational and functional regulations.</b><br /><br /><br />What this art. 141 modification proposal means?<span class="fullpost"><br /><br />The original art. 141 only states the function of public administration, and it states very clear that it is intended to serve the citizens. In this proposed modification, it doesn’t state clearly the function anymore, and tries to define a form to accomplish an unclear function. I am not a constitutional lawyer, but constitutions should only state rights and duties very clearly. The form is rarely a constitutional matter, that is what other laws are made for. Let’s see if I can explain myself better.<br /><br />This proposed reform has some relevant points that deserve the attention of all their citizens:<br /><br /><b>1.Public administration would not serve the citizens but through the public powers. </b><br /><br />The art. 141 proposal states that public administration, functioning as the traditional Max Weber’s bureaucratic model (used by all the countries, from the former Soviet Union to the United States of America), and functioning also as the famous Chavistas <i>Misiones </i>(welcome to the big bureaucracy elephant world of public administration!), are going to be serving to the public powers (<i>poderes públicos</i>), and not to the citizens. The article modified the wording, it does not say public administration is to serve their citizens anymore, but it says “<i>public administration is <b>a tool to public powers that</b>…</i>” . Art. 141 is not clear anymore in defining who the public administration should or not serve.<br /><br />Why this is not clear if constitutions should be very precise bodies of law?<br /><br />The devil’s advocate and Chavez can tell me, no! You didn’t understand why I was trying to say, you fool, the <i>Poder Público</i> is also the people´s, represented by this new power called “Citizen power” (or Popular Power). So the public administration, becoming a tool to the public powers and the citizen power will be the same as serving to the people, right? What? No, it’s not! It is not the same to say that people’s rights and duties as a community are the same as individuals’ citizen rights and duties.<br /><br />It doesn’t have the same meaning.<br /><br />If one dig deeper into the article that talks about what and whom constitute these “public powers”, one will find that Mr. Chavez is also reforming article 136, the one related to the public powers. In the proposed reform of art 136 the distribution of powers come divided in a territorial manner (popular, municipal, state and national) and as per their functions (legislative, executive, judiciary, citizen and electoral). Chavez is creating two new powers to give the impression of a decentralized autonomy between the government, but the reality is that there is no mention in the constitution that these powers must be autonomous. As a matter of fact, the whole constitutional proposal is aimed at centralized authority, and regulations. That’s why Chavez talks about it as a “block”. The only purpose for a country to structure its government into main powers is only to ensure that they function with autonomy in the most extended sense possible.<br /><br />Moreover, the important highlight of this art. 136 is that representatives of this new "Citizen power" <b>won’t be constituted by election</b>, but put in by organized human groups. There's no clear wording into how this representatives will be "put" in their jobs, but the reform is very clear in saying that these representatives won’t be “born” through elections. Since those organized human groups won't be able to vote for representatives, the assumption is that some bureaucrat from the socialist party will put these representatives on their jobs and their credibility as unbiased auditors working for the citizens will be very low.<br /><br />Hence, the “Citizen Power”, the branch of the public powers that will have the same constitutional weight as “individual citizens” in former constitutions, in reality won’t represent the people’s interest but the interest of the people who “put” them there in those jobs. Thus, it’s not the same thing as before the “reform”.<br /><br />Venezuelans have to consider if this “affidavit” somehow violates <a href="http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/spn.htm">the universal declaration of human rights</a>. (art 21, numeral 3?)<br /><br />What I am getting from all of this? This proposal is telling me, an individual citizen, to surrender my rights and duties regarding public administration to a public power that is not constituted by popular elections, so they can represent me. As a private citizen, as an individual, the only benefit I am getting is that this constitution will consider me an “organic nothing”… which, obviously, is not a benefit at all. My interest as a private citizen won’t be protected whatsoever in this reform and I won’t be able to complain, sue, and watch over the functioning of public administration. Can you imagine which levels will current corruption practices reach?<br /><br />As a result of this modification, since public administration would not serve directly the people any longer, our money also won’t be working for you constitutionally speaking, but for the interest of the bureaucracy of the party who will control the Venezuelan state. Chavismo already controls it, but with a questionable legitimacy.<br /><br />In conclusion, our public administration’s monies (Bolivares Fuertes or not) won’t be “ours” anymore, they would be intended for the public powers (and not the citizens), since this constitution is stripping us from our rights as citizens to be served by the state. If we received at the end some type of service form the public administration, we would had to thank Hugo for his graciousness in not taking it all for himself and his varied collection of powers, in his is sharing some breadcrumbs with us. Also, our very Venezuelan traditional right to complain (“<i>derecho a pataleo</i>”) will be gone since we wont have the constitutional right to ask for the services that the public administration owes us since, constitutionally speaking, civil servants are not legally bound to answer to you anymore, citizen of Venezuela.<br /><br /><b>2. Creation of more bureaucracy. </b><br /><br />As consequence of this lack of clarity into whom public administration should serve, our money will be funneled into the already gigantic and very greedy monster of Venezuela’s state bureaucracy, spitting it out and then swallowing it again for another loop (Chavismo always was best at inventing the hardest way to go from point A to point B). I can only think how hard would be for old folks and retired public office personnel to claim for their pensions and social security. It is a horror today where public administration still has to answer to the citizens, it will be hell when you have no right to claim but wait for a <i>mision </i>to pay you whenever they can, or want.<br /><br />Also, the funny thing is that when the rest of the world is trying to cut bureaucracy, Chavismo makes its goal, in a constitutional way, to make the state as big as it can. The problem with this set up in constitutional stone, is that first of all, it is terribly inefficient, and secondly, if in a few years some folk smarter and less greedy than Chavez and his collection of doofus that work for him come to power, and want to cut bureaucracy, they have to make a constitutional amendment, or propose a constitutional reform about it. That’s why I was writing above that Constitutions shouldn’t be talking about the way things take place. That’s why other bodies of law exist.<br /><br /><b>3.Why they took out the fundamental principles in which public administration should be based on? </b><br /><br />The reform also erased the following from the 1999 original: “<i>Public Administration … based on principles of honesty, participation, speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, ACCOUNTABILITY and responsibility on the exercise of Public service under total submission of the rule of law.</i>”<br /><br />Why erasing all of this? Well, we saw in point 2 that Chavez is not precisely worried about handling money on an effective way since the amount of bureaucracy will become gigantic with this new constitution. It will be OK to misspend money. The public administration won’t have more constitutional accountability since they would not be required to give answers to any citizens on the things they do or not do, or the way they use money for. So, they all can misspend and do whatever they want without worrying of pesky accountability, not that they are too worried right now, but they have to work hard to cover up, and at the end of the day they know they are committing serious crimes to the nation, that the truth will emerge. With this new constitution, it would be only a matter of gossiping in any newspaper but mishandling money won’t be a crime punished it by law. Are you getting where all of this is going? Any official can be caught with a suitcase full of money, and it won’t be a problem since they can excuse it as some public administration affair. It would be much more easy to cover up any money mishandling.<br /><br />Venezuelans might ask, but why this is so important? Our public administration during the 4th and the 5th republic have been always mediocre, and much very corrupted, so why worry that this article is been modified the way it is?<br /><br />Because, my dear countryman, Chavistas are trying to wash their hands like Pontius Pilates so when this government falls it will not be possible to prosecute and hunt down the worst offenders to face justice. They want to dip their hands in the money and not be accountable for it, not even work hard to cover up their corruption deals, as simple as that. Bank robbery to the highest level. And, you can imagine the amount of people, citizens and internationals, who are salivating for this to happen, supporting this bullshit.<br /><br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_S4y2REmwbcw/RvW0CbUdICI/AAAAAAAAAAM/EJcI72KGdYs/s1600-h/servicios-publicos-prereforma.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_S4y2REmwbcw/RvW0CbUdICI/AAAAAAAAAAM/EJcI72KGdYs/s320/servicios-publicos-prereforma.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5113190905735356450" border="0" /></a><br /><span style="" lang="ES"></span> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-family:";" >Graph taken from the official Venezuelan portal of the Venezuelan constitution of 1999. <a href="http://www.constitucion.ve/">www.constitucion.ve</a>.</span><br /><br />Do you think the new article 141 reflect this graphic at all? For starters, you can erased the man at the last square, yes, the cartoon of the guy who looks like that Independence hero named Bolivar, talking about honesty and responsibility. And the old woman, she can wait at home for some <i>misiones </i>functionary, who for sure won’t be a <i>catire </i>like the one in the cartoon, to knock her door whenever he is allowed to pay her, or never.<br /><br />Post written by Feathers, who writes <a href="http://feathersblog.blogspot.com/">her own blog</a>.<br /><br />Additional private comments to venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 141</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center">Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-141.html">here</a>.<br /></p></span>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-76244251640744748002007-09-20T22:57:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:31:15.839-04:00Article 230 (Brunilde Sansó)<span style="font-weight: bold;">Old article 230:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The presidential period is of 6 years. The President of the Republic can be reelected immediately, only once, for a new period.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">New article 230:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The presidential period is of 7 years. The President of the Republic can be reelected immediately for a new period.</span><br /><br />----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />There are several negative aspects concerning this article that I would discuss in three items.<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />1.-The illegality of the proposal</span><br /><span class="fullpost"><br />To understand the whole impact of this modification, one has to understand that before 1999, the Constitution did not even allow a single reelection. The reason was precisely to avoid that one of the many <span style="font-style: italic;">caudillo</span>-type of president that Venezuelans have witnessed in history would use the Constitution to stay in power forever.<br /><br />In 1999, the Constitution proposed by Chávez introduced, for the first time in modern times, the figure of a reelection and increased the presidential term from 5 to 6 years. However, just a single reelection was allowed.<br /><br />Now, Chavez's current proposal is twofold: eliminate reelections limit and increase the length of the Presidential term. It means the possibility of holding power for a longer time and being reelected without restrictions.<br /><br />This concept is simply unconstitutional because of the following two articles, the first being in the Fundamental Principles of the Constitution.<br /><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"></span><blockquote><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Article 6.</span>-<span style="font-style: italic;">The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its political entities is and will always be democratic, participative, decentralized, alternative, responsible, plural and will have revocable mandates.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Article 342.</span><span style="font-style: italic;">-The object of the Reform is to partially reform and substitute one or several norms that will not modify the structure and the fundamental principles of the constitutional text.</span></blockquote>Since Alternation is a Fundamental Principle underlined in Article 6, the Continuous Reelection proposed in this Reform goes against Article 6. Now, Article 342 says that no Fundamental Principle can be touched by a Constitutional Reform. Therefore, the proposed modification is simply unconstitutional.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">2.- The Presidential Asymmetry of power introduced by the proposal</span><br /><br />When President Chávez is asked about the dangers of allowing continuous reelection, he always states that the People of Venezuela hold the Sovereignty and that based on that principle, they have the right to decide whether they want the President to stay in power.<br /><br />If one accepts that logic, then one may ask why the People of Venezuela do not hold that Sovereignty when it is time to reelect a governor or a mayor?<br /><br />Thus, the fact that this principle of continuous reelection is introduced only for the President of the Republic and not for any other elected official shows a clear Asymmetry of Power that is exacerbated in the Presidential figure.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">3.- A <span style="font-style: italic;">de-facto</span> Constitutional dictatorship proposal</span><br /><br />Those that provide examples of healthy democracies in which continuous reelection is allowed forget that those cases only occur either in Parliamentary systems or mixed systems with strong parliamentary figures. In Parliamentary systems the Prime Minister has power as long as his/her party allows it; the Leader of the opposition is part of the government and for the other governmental entities, strict separation of powers is the norm. Thus, continuous reelection does not pose a threat to democracy because power is well spread and appropriate opposition representation in power is present.<br /><br />All the other existing cases where continuous reelection is currently allowed (like Cuba) are, in fact, dictatorships.<br /><br />President Chávez has already unprecedented power. The Supreme Court, The National Assembly, The People's Ombudsman, The General Prosecutor, the Central Bank and, most importantly, The National Electoral Council, are all totally under his grip. Moreover, the proposed Reform will provide him with even larger and more important powers than those that he has accumulated up to now. In fact, Constitutional scholars claim that no President in the history of Venezuela, not even dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, had requested as many powers in a Constitutional Reform.<br /><br />Under those circumstances allowing continuous reelection in the Constitution would be the equivalent of handling a dictatorship for life to Hugo Chávez, or to whoever happened to be the President of Venezuela under such a Reformed Constitution.<br /><br />--------------------------------<br /><br />A related Spanish language version by the author exists <a href="http://cuentosintrascendentes.blogspot.com/2007/09/mi-que-me-expliquen-ii-dos-preguntas.html">here</a>. <br />Full translation of this post by the author is <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/artculo-230.html">here</a>. <br />Published originally in English <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-230.html">here</a>.<br /><br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-2756248708535236032007-09-20T22:20:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:32:44.247-04:00Article 11 (Mousqueton)<span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Preamble: </i></b><i>Most constitutions include two basic sets of articles that define what and who are the subjects of the Constitution. This is; What is the country? and, Who are the nationals of that country?</i></span> <p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>In the </i></span><a href="http://misionvenezuela.org/espanol/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf" target="_blank" set="yes" linkindex="1"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>Bolivarian Constitution of 1999</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i> the definition of - What is Venezuela? - Is done in Title II, Chapter 1, Articles 10 through 15. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><u>Article 11</u>: “The full sovereignty of the Republic is exercised on the continental and insular spaces,”..... </b>-Click link above to read full text-<b> ....... “public international agreements and by the national legislation” . …….</b></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Comment 1: </i></b><i>The first part of the text of the</i><b><i> </i></b><i>newly proposed article 11 is exactly the same as the one in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999. The description of the Venezuelan territory in both texts though is extremely thorough by international standards and certainly far more specific than the description in the </i></span><a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1961.html" target="_blank" set="yes" linkindex="1"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>Constitution of 1961 and its reforms of 1983</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>.</i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>There is a reason for this though, since 1961 substantial changes and legal definitions have been introduced to international laws and more specifically in whole bodies of law such as the </i></span><a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf" target="_blank" linkindex="2"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>Law of the Sea</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>. </i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>While Venezuela was one of the countries that spearheaded the revolutionary United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and a signatory of the final document approved in Montego Bay (1982), Venezuela has not ratified the Convention because it has observations to the articles that deal with the delimitation of territories and more specifically with articles 15, 74, 83 and 121(3). </i></span></p><br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 though has incorporated all of the legal concepts and benefits of the Convention of the Law of the Sea to the Venezuelan Constitution without agreeing or being bound by the articles that it deems are not in the best interest of Venezuela.</i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>In this article, the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 also incorporated references to the rights of Venezuela over the extraterrestrial space. At this point in time the only practical application of these rights would be the allocation of the orbital slots in what is known as the Clarke geostationary orbit where most communication satellites are located. These slots are allocated by the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) of which Venezuela is a member. By including these references though Venezuela has become a pioneer in the pursuit for a United Nations body of legislation that deals with the increasingly controversial use of space. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b>… “The President of the Republic may decree Special Military Regions for strategic and defense ends, anywhere in the territory and other geographical spaces of the Republic. He may as well decree Special Authorities in situations of contingency, natural disasters, etc.”</b></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Comment 2: </i></b><i>The above mentioned two sentences have been added to the original article 11 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and is one of the modifications Venezuelans are being asked to vote on. These two sentences though are dangerous, wrong and preposterous in so many ways that I will try my best to be as didactic as possible to explain them. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The last sentence of this paragraph allows the President to decree Special Authorities in “situations of contingency” (“situaciones de contingencia”). The RAE (Royal Spanish Academy) definition of the word </i></span><a href="http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=contingencia" target="_blank" linkindex="2"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>“contingencia”</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i> (contingency) is: “</i>Posibilidad de que algo suceda o no suceda” (Possibility that something happens or not happens), <i>“</i>Cosa que puede suceder o no suceder” (Thing that might or might not happen). <i>This sentence therefore allows the President to decree Special Authorities for basically any and all reasons; be them real or imagined. The only condition is that they may or may not happen.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Just in case there is any doubt about the unlimited power to appoint Special Authorities in any situation whatsoever the sentence goes on and reinforces this concept by indicating that these authorities can also be appointed for “etc” reasons.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The RAE definition of the word </i></span><a href="http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=etcetera" target="_blank" linkindex="3"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>“etc”</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i> is: “</i><b><i>expr. U.</i></b><i> para sustituir el resto de una exposición o enumeración que se sobreentiende o que no interesa expresar. Se emplea generalmente en la abreviatura etc.” (to substitute the rest of an exposition or enumeration that is assumed to be understood or that there is no interest in expressing. Generally It is used in the abbreviation etc.) </i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>.</i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>While Constitutions are expected to be precise and specific it is a fact that even the best written constitutions are sometimes general and even vague. A constitution though can not be “undetermined” and give powers to a President to be used in “undetermined” situations and in “undetermined” ways.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>It should be noted that the intention of this sentence is not to provide the President with special powers in case of civil unrest, natural disaster or other emergency situations. The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 in Title VIII, Chapter 2 articles 337, 338 and 339 already provides special powers to the President to act in these kind of circumstances and regulates the term and scope of those powers. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Comment 3:</i></b><i> The dangers this sentence poses to the Venezuelan democracy though go far beyond the semantic implications herein mentioned. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Nowhere, either in the text of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 or the modifications being proposed today, is there any reference whatsoever to the term “Autoridades Especiales”. There is therefore no reference as to the power that could be granted to these Special Authorities. </i></span></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>It could be inferred though that since they are appointed in “situations of contingency” (whatever that means) they would have more power than the elected officials and/or constitutionally appointed authorities who would be deemed as incapable of handling such situations. Power, that would emanate directly from the President and that is not limited and/or even regulated by the Constitution. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>There is also absolutely no reference anywhere as to the term for which these Special Authorities would be appointed, their salary, where their budget will come from, who are they accountable to, what is their responsibility, what is the scope of their powers and/or what qualifications would be needed to be appointed as such. Under the proposed text anyone could be appointed a Special Authority with absolute power even if the person has a police and/or judicial record and, what is most intriguing, even if they are foreigners.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>For all intents and purposes, this last sentence of the proposed modification to article 11 renders the rest of the Constitution useless. It matters little what the Constitution says, because the President can appoint Special Authorities with powers over and above the power of any elected authority and/or constitutionally appointed government official. The President could appoint Special Legal, Economic, Constitutional, Social, Health, Education and even Religious Authorities to oversee and even decide over all aspects of government and/or the branches of power. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Just in case there is any doubt though, the first sentence of the paragraph being proposed in the amendment of article 11 provides an air tight alibi for the President to overcome any legal, jurisprudent and/or constitutional arguments against the use of this power.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Comment 4:</i></b><i> In the first sentence of this paragraph the President is granted the power to decree Special Military Regions for “strategic” and defense purposes. Here again language is used loosely to provide the President with an overwhelming power that goes far beyond the Constitution and certainly common sense. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>According to the RAE, the definition of </i></span><a href="http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=estrategico" target="_blank" set="yes" linkindex="4"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>“estrategico”</u></i></span></a><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i> (strategic) is the following: “De importancia decisiva para el desarrollo de algo” (Of decisive importance for the development of something). This sentence therefore allows the President to decree a Special Military Region for the only purpose of accomplishing something; whatever that might be.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Special security areas or buffer zones in and around military and valuable infrastructure installations are perfectly normal in every country except for the fact that in this case the intended purpose of the text is not to allow the President to create such security zones but instead to allow the President to be able to create Special Military Regions over vast parts and even the whole Venezuelan territory.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The word “regions” is only mentioned 4 times in the text of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and, except for the text proposed to modify article 11 and a reference to sea regions in the text of article 67, none whatsoever in the text of the other proposed amendments. In every case, except in one, the term it is used as an adjective and in a general way. This should not come as a surprise since “regions” are not part of the political division of Venezuela. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>In one case though, the word “region” is used to identify and describe specific territories. By doing so, the Constitution creates precedence as to what a “region” is understood to be and what a Special Military Region would or could encompass. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Article seven in the Temporary Provisions of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 creates three regions that encompass all of the Venezuelan territory. Each region includes two or more States and they are created for the purpose of electing native representatives to the National Assembly.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The definition of “regions” is therefore set by the same Constitution in these articles and by precedence they do apply to the definition of Special Military Regions.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>As for the administration of these regions, there isn’t a single reference in the Constitution or the modifications being proposed as to how or who would administer these Special Military Regions or, for that matter, what are the rights of the people who live in these regions. In Title V, Chapter II, Articles 236 (5) of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 though, the President is granted absolute authority over the National Armed Forces and appointed Commander in Chief. He therefore is the supreme authority of the armed forces and hence the supreme authority over the territories under military control.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Having absolute power over “Special Military Regions” and the Constitutional unlimited power to appoint “Special Authorities” for whatever reason, gives the President absolute power over the Venezuelan territory and the Venezuelan people. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>It should be noted that under the proposed modification to the Constitution Special Military Regions do not need to be occupied by the military. Further, the elected authorities and officials within the Special Military Regions may continue to act as such but subject to the decisions of their respective “Special Authority”.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><b><i>Conclusion: </i></b><i>It matters little what the other proposed modifications to the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 may be; it also matters little what the rest of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 may say because, with these two sentences, the President is granted absolute power over everything and everyone in Venezuela while rendering the rest of the Constitution mute.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The implications of the modifications introduced to article 11 are not a matter of ideology or even political, economic or social beliefs. For all intents and purposes you can be a socialist, communist or extreme capitalist and still this modification would be absolutely wrong.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>All the other modifications to the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that are being proposed have to do with the business and structure of government. In article 11 though Venezuelans are being asked to surrender all their rights to the Venezuelan land and their own freedom by giving absolute power over them to the President; whomever that might be. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>While writing these comments I can not help but remember the words of a song, “Solamente Una Vez” (Only one time), composed by Agustin Lara while working in Buenos Aires with some close friends. Most youngsters will not know who Agustin Lara was but they will most likely remember the song since it was part of a Luis Miguel CD (“Segundo Romance”).</i></span><br /></p><p><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>The thirdt verse of that song reads; “Una vez nada más se entrega el alma, con la dulce y total renunciación.” (Only once you surrender your soul with the sweetness of total resignation). </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Most people believe this song was composed by Agustin Lara to a woman he met in Buenos Aires. The truth though is that this song was composed to a man; his old and dear friend Jose Mojica, when Agustin Lara learned that he had decided to become a Catholic priest even though he was over 40 years old. This song is not about the love of a man for a woman but about the ultimate sweet sacrifice you can do for God; to surrender your soul.</i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>By asking to vote yes for the amendment of article 11 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 Venezuelans are not being asked to choose a political system and/or model of government but indeed they are being asked to surrender their soul and with it, their dignity, their history, their territory and their expectations; a sacrifice that is only reserved for God. </i></span><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i>Mousqueton</i></span></p><p align="justify"><a href="mailto:venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com" target="_blank"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i><u>venezuela.constitution.trap<wbr>@gmail.com</u></i></span></a><br /></p><p align="justify"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><i></i></span></p>Spanish language version of this post <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/artculo-11.html">here</a>.<br />Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-11.html">here</a>.<br /><p align="justify"><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/" target="_blank" linkindex="5"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><u></u></span></a></p><br /><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-36904158661718890532007-09-20T21:25:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:34:53.782-04:00Article 251 (Daniel D)<span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 251<br />The Council of State is the highest organization for consulting by the State and the National Government. It will exert its attribution with functional autonomy. Its opinions or decisions will not be binding. Its attributions are 1) Emit an opinion on the matter under consultation 2) Watch over the fulfillment of the constitution and the legal framework 3) Pronounce decisions over the matters that are submitted to its consideration and 4) Recommend policies of national interests on those matters that are of special transcendence.<br />An organic law will be able to determine other functions and/or other competencies. </span><br /><br />Even though article 251 and 252 are linked <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-252.html">I did discuss article 252 first</a> for two reasons. It was an easy article to offer as a clear exhibit of Chavez wanting to hold center stage alone and everywhere, to the point of reducing the role of the vice-president to very little even though he can remove and name a vice-president at will. But also because for some unaccountable reason, the electronic highlights that I had made on my PDF <span style="font-style: italic;">“refoma” </span>text were lost on article 251 and I did not realize that it was also modified when I later went on to discuss article 252. In the end it did not matter at all for the discussion of article 252 but it allows me to go into a new point: how the <span style="font-style: italic;">“reforma” </span>manages under a certain cover of superficiality and vacuity to prepare very carefully for future situations where the tiniest of challenge to Chavez could arise, something that I might not have highlighted as well if I had discussed both articles simultaneously.<br /><br />Article 251 is in fact significantly modified in words though not apparently that much in scope. This is the first hint, of course, that this change must be hiding something.<span class="fullpost"><br /><br /><a href="http://www.eluniversal.com/2007/08/16/reformaconstitucional2.pdf">The original version</a> set a gathering of notables under the direction of the vice president. Nothing much was specified. The original article read: it will be on its capacity to recommend policies of national interest. But now we have 4 items for the Council of State! Fascinating when we think that the 1999 article has yet to be applied! That the council has yet to be named! If we read that in article 252 the council only seats when convoked by the president to discuss items proposed by the president, we do wonder about that need to be specific in limiting the scope of the council. Perhaps chavismo wanted to remove this article altogether and did not dare to? Or perhaps chavismo is planning to use this council to announce or to deal with unpopular policies that Chavez might not want to announce alone?<br /><br />There is a curious item that goes with that logic of using this Council to deal with the consequences of the new constitution. The original article said that the Council of State could be used by the “<span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Administración Pública</span>”, that is, civil service or any branch of the public administration could address directly the Council. That could be the government itself, a state legislature or the sewers administration. Now only the president and the NATIONAL GOVERNEMENT will be able to use the services of this council. Why?<br /><br />There is in the also modified article 141 an important change: the original text read that the Public Administration was there to serve the citizens. This has been erased and now in the new 141 version the public administration serves the government. Obviously there will be some scheme that will have to oversee the public administration to make sure this one is at the service of the state (and henceforth of the all powerful president). Starting with the vote on this ill called constitutional reform, the public administration branches will lose the ability to consult the Council of State in case they enter into some form of conflict with another administrative branch or, the deity forbids, a direct dependence of the government. Only the government (that is, Chavez direct appointees) will be allowed to start such an administrative inquiry that will rule, we can be sure of that, in favor of the government most of the time. And in the rarest of cases that the State Council might go against something that Chavez wants, well, the decisions are not binding anyway. The beauty of the scheme is that the 5 powers of the state will share the burden of the decision whereas that decision will only benefit the executive power.<br /><br />There is a last little detail which might not be of much importance but could become very much so. In the original 251 there was just mention of a special law to establish the function and competences of the State Council. In the “reformed article” the law will now require to be <span style="font-style: italic;">“organica”</span>. In Venezuelan law that means that the law must be voted by 2/3 of the National Assembly, and can only be modified by a 2/3 vote. Why such a change? The only explanation we can advance at this time is that the Chavez administration indeed has a plan for the Council of State and that it wants this plan to be iron tight to be able to use it for as long as it needs, just in case a new National Assembly could arise (this 251 article could even allow Chavez to use the Council of State to control even the functioning of the National Assembly!)<br /><br />Or perhaps the aim is elsewhere: the end of decentralization. Any conflict between a non chavista town hall or state house with the chavista central administration could end up in the docket of the Council of State, if this one is ever installed. Now, the parts of the coming system that Chavez is creating and that he is less likely to control tightly are the small town halls and the states where local electoral surprises could still happen (even with the application of article 11). When these ones will enter into conflict with the central administration, something certain to happen as chavismo has clearly stated its desire to end decentralization, to curtail local powers, to “have direct contact with thousands of communes”, town halls and states will have one less recourse to go to if they want to seek redress from the central state. In fact, the revamped Council of State could be used directly against them as a more expedient way than judicial fiat or legislative process. And there will not be a voice from the provinces to defend them since article 252 takes care of that.<br /><br />Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-251.html">here</a>.<br />Spanish version <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/artculo-251.html">here</a>.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">-The end-</span><br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-47924493213822328802007-09-17T16:50:00.000-04:002007-10-01T20:37:12.434-04:00Article 252 (Daniel D)<span style="font-weight: bold;">The council of state is presided by the President of the Republic and it is also includes the President of the National Assembly, the President of the TSJ [high court], the President of the Citizen Power, the President of the Electoral Council and the people that the president of the republic deems necessary to summon to deal with the matter at hand in the consultation.</span><br /><span class="fullpost"><br />According to <a href="http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html">article 251</a> the council of State was a gathering of certain figures who were supposed to discuss and think about some project of special importance for the nation (Constitutional changes? Decentralization schemes?). Its origin is probably inspired <a href="http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/missio/index_mi_ce01.shtml">from French constitutional tradition</a> where in addition to propose administrative and constitutional matters to the government, the "Conseil d'Etat" also serves as a chamber which verifies the legality and constitutionality of laws before they are published. It is also an administrative tribunal where administration infighting as well as problems between the pubic service and the public can be settled before they go to judicial trials. The 1999 constitution created this novel figure in Venezuela but with much, much less power than what its inspiration might have been (after all there is a TSJ which covers some of the legal functions of the French Conseil). The Venezuelan council seems to have been intended as a simple gathering of notables to deal with matters of a certain importance that the president could not bother dealing with. As a matter of fact it was never assembled that I know of, and the law that was supposed to describe its function and organization in detail was never passed!<br /><br />What is noteworthy in this text is the change from the old article. Then the council was presided by the vice president of the republic, 5 folks named by the president, one representative of the national assembly, one representative from the TSJ and one governor named by the other ones. With this composition that council was designed to give something else to do to the vice president of Venezuela, a consultative body who would discuss matters of national importance. Now, in the new structure the council will be completely controlled by the president who will call it as he needs, probably never. Observe that the lone figure of the governor is now excluded while for some inexplicable reason the electoral council now seats in the council.<br /><br />It seems that the intended purpose for that council will be that of a registration chamber of sorts. Besides making the vice president a lesser function (in addition to the creation of several vice-presidencies it is now excluded of the body it could have directed) the president of the republic, the executive branch of power, will have an opportunity to demonstrate that it is the superior power of the five recognized powers in the 1999 constitution. That council of state will include all the powers but will be gathered only at the suffering of the president, and presided by this one. And the elected governors will not be good enough to send a single voice, lowering their rank even further. The symbol will be strong.<br /><br />Since it is difficult to conceive that the National Assembly (which names the other powers) will change hands in the foreseeable future, we can safely gather that this council will never be called, unless Chavez decides at some point to create some pageantry. But just in case, Chavez covered his back from such a council putative initiative since in the previous version the vice president could have theoretically called a meeting without notifying the president to examine questions that the president would not like to examine (for example the mental incompetence of a sitting president?). And that, simply, is unacceptable in the new power scheme of Venezuela.<br /><br />Published originally <a href="http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/chavez-new-constitution-article-252.html">here</a>.<br />Spanish version <a href="http://reforma-constitucional-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/articulo-252.html">here</a>.<br /></span>Danielhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12128609182544333477noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2117033376154094613.post-62692695649357610432007-09-16T12:45:00.000-04:002007-11-23T03:47:05.199-04:00Original and modified text of constitutional amendments<span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:100%;" >Herein you will find English translations of both the original text of the articles in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and the text of the proposed amendments to those articles. Translations have either been done or provided by the authors of each post. </span><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/11/article-98-kensey-amaya.html"><br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><span style="font-size:100%;"> </span></span></a><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-11-mousqueton.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 11 (Mousqueton)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Original text:</span></span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The full sovereignty of the Republic is exercised on the continental, and insular spaces, lake and river spaces, territorial sea, historic, vital and inland sea areas, and those lying within such straight baselines as have been adopted or may come to be adopted by the Republic; seabed and under the seabed of the aforementioned; the continental, insular and maritime air space and the resources located within the aforementioned spaces, including genetic resources, migratory species, derived products and any intangible components that may be present within the aforementioned spaces because of natural causes. The insular space of the Republic includes the Archipelago of Los Monjes, Las Aves, Los Roques, La Orchila, La Tortuga, La Blanquilla, Los Hermanos, islands of Margarita, Cubagua and Coche, Los Frailes, La Sola Island, Los Testigos Archipelago, Patos Island and Aves Island, as well as the islands, islets, keys and banks located or coming in the future to emerge from the territorial sea, that covering the continental shelf or that lying within the limits of the exclusive economic zone. As to the water spaces consisting of the contiguous maritime zone, the continental sheaf and the exclusive economic zone, the Republic exercises exclusive rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction on such terms, to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be determined by public international law and national law. The Republic has rights in outer space and in those areas which are or may be the Common Property of Humanity, on such terms, to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be determined by public international agreements and by the national legislation.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The full sovereignty of the Republic is exercised on the continental, and insular spaces, lake and river spaces, territorial sea, historic, vital and inland sea areas, and those lying within such straight baselines as have been adopted or may come to be adopted by the Republic; seabed and under the seabed of the aforementioned; the continental, insular and maritime air space and the resources located within the aforementioned spaces, including genetic resources, migratory species, derived products and any intangible components that may be present within the aforementioned spaces because of natural causes. The insular space of the Republic includes the Archipelago of Los Monjes, Las Aves, Los Roques, La Orchila, La Tortuga, La Blanquilla, Los Hermanos, islands of Margarita, Cubagua and Coche, Los Frailes, La Sola Island, Los Testigos Archipelago, Patos Island and Aves Island, as well as the islands, islets, keys and banks located or coming in the future to emerge from the territorial sea, that covering the continental shelf or that lying within the limits of the exclusive economic zone. As to the water spaces consisting of the contiguous maritime zone, the continental sheaf and the exclusive economic zone, the Republic exercises exclusive rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction on such terms, to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be determined by public international law and national law. The Republic has rights in outer space and in those areas which are or may be the Common Property of Humanity, on such terms, to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be determined by public international agreements and by the national legislation. The President of the Republic may decree Special Military Regions for strategic and defense ends, anywhere in the territory and other geographical spaces of the Republic. He may as well decree Special Authorities in situations of contingency, natural disasters, etc.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-16-mousqueton.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 16 (Mousqueton)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Original text:</span></span> <span style="font-style: italic;">For purposes of the political organization of the Republic, the territory of the nation is divided into those of the States, the Capital District, federal dependencies and federal territories. The territory is organized into Municipalities. The political division of the territory shall be regulated by an organic law which shall guarantee municipal autonomy and administrative/political decentralization. Such law may provide for the creation of federal territorial in certain areas within the States, the taking effect of which shall be subject to the holding of a referendum to approve the same in the organ concerned. By special law, a federal territory may be given the status of a State; being allocated part or all of the territorial area concerned.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The national territory conforms to the political and territorial objectives and in accordance to the new geometry of power by, a Federal District that will be home to the capital of the Republic, the States, the Oceanic Regions, the Federal Territories, The Federal Municipalities and the Insular Districts. The relevance of the Federal Territories and Federal Municipalities will be subject to the outcome of an approval referendum to be carried through in the respective entity. The States are organized in Municipalities. The primary political unit in the national territory organization will be the city, understood as every population settlement inside a Municipality, and made up by areas or geographic extensions denominated “Communes”. The Communes will be the geo-human cells of the territory y will be made up of “Communities”, each of which will constitute the basic and indivisible spatial nucleus of the Venezuelan Socialist State, where common citizens will have the power to build their own geography and history. Based on the Communities and the Communes, the Popular Power will develop forms of political-territorial communal aggregations, which will be regulated in the Law and that would constitute forms of self government and any other expression of direct Democracy. The Communal City is formed when organized Communities, Communes and self communal governments are established in the totality of its perimeter; Their formation is subject to a popular referendum to be called by the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, after an agreement approved by a simple majority of Representatives of the National Assembly, will be able to create by decree, Federal Provinces, Federal Cities and Functional Districts, as well as any other entity allowed by the Law. The Functional Districts will be created to conform to the historic, socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the geographical space as well as based on the economic potentialities that, through them, become necessary to develop for the benefit of the country. The creation of a Functional District implies the preparation and activation of a District Mission with its respective Strategic and Functional Plan by the National Government with the participation of the inhabitants of such Functional District and in permanent consultation with such inhabitants. The Functional District could be conformed by one or more Municipalities or Territorial Lots on them, without regard to the State they belong to. The organization and functionality of the Federal City will be made according to what is established in the respective law and it implies the activation of a Local Mission with its respective strategic development. In the Federal Territory, the Federal Municipality and the Federal City, the national Power will designate the respective authorities for that maximum term indicated in the Lay and subject to revocable mandates. The Federal Provinces will form as units of aggregation and policy coordination on territorial, social and economic matters on the regional level, subject to the national strategic plans and the international strategic outlook of the Venezuelan State. The Federal Provinces will incorporate by aggregating either States or Municipalities, without undercutting the attributions that this Constitution grants them. The political-territorial organization of the Republic will be legislated by an Organic Law.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-18-mousqueton.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 18 (Mousqueton)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Original text: </span> The city of Caracas is the capital of the Republic and the seat of the organs of National Power. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the exercise of National Power elsewhere in the Republic. A special law shall establish the territorial and political unit of the city of Caracas, incorporating into a two-tier system of municipal government the Municipalities of the Capital District and those of the State of Miranda. Such law shall provide for the organization, government, administration, competency as well as resources of the city, with a view to its harmonious overall development. In any case the law shall guarantee the democratic and participative character of its government.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span><span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);"> The city of Caracas is the capital of the Republic and the seat of the organs of National Power. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the said National Power from being exercise elsewhere in the Republic. The Venezuelan State will develop an integral policy to articulate a national system of cities, structuring logically and reasonably the relationship between the city and its associated territories and unifying and supporting the local and regional scales in the systematic vision of the country. For that purpose, the State will confront every speculative action in regard to the economic return of the land, the economic unbalances, the asymmetries in the provision of services and infrastructure as well as the conditions of accessibility, physical and economic, of each and everyone of the components of the national system of cities. Every citizen, without discrimination of gender, age, ethnicity, political and religious orientation or social condition, will enjoy and will be holders of the Right to the City, and that right should be understood as the equal benefit received by each one of the citizens as per the strategic role articulated by the city both at the regional urban context and the National System of Cities. A special law shall establish the territorial and political unit of the city of Caracas, which shall be called the “Crib of Bolivar” and “Queen of the Guaraira Repano.” The National Power, through the Executive Power and with the collaboration and participation of all the entities of the National, State and Municipal Public Power as well as the Popular Power, its Communities, Communes and Communal Councils and other social organizations, will take all necessary actions for the urban reorganization, road restructuring, recuperation of the environment, attainment of optimal personal and public security levels, integral reinforcement of the neighborhoods, urbanizations, health, education, sport, entertainment and cultural systems, total recuperation of their center and historical sites, construction of small and medium size Satellite Cities along their territorial axis of expansion and, in general, to accomplish the most humanizing sum possible in the “Crib of Bolivar” and “Queen of the Guaraira Repano. These dispositions will be applicable to the whole National System of Cities and their regional components.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-70-virginia.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 70 (Virginia)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Original text: </span> Means of people’s participation and involvement <span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">in the exercise of their sovereignty, in political affairs, among others,</span> are: the election of public officials, the referendum, the consultation of public opinion, mandate revocation, the legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, the open town council, and the citizens’ assembly, whose decisions shall be binding. <span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">Means of participation in social and economic affairs are:</span> the citizens’ service bureaus, self-management, <span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 153);">co-management</span>, all forms of cooperatives, including those of financial nature, credit unions, community enterprises, and other forms of association guided by the values of mutual cooperation and solidarity. The law shall establish conditions for the effective functioning of the means of participation contemplated under the present article.<br />(text in blue has been removed in the reformed article)</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span><span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);"> Means of people’s participation and involvement in the direct exercise of Their sovereignty, and FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM are: the election of public officials, the referendum, the consultation of public opinion, mandate revocation, the legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, the open town council, and the citizens’ assembly, THE DECISIONS OF THE LATTER BEING BINDING, THE COUNCILS OF POPULAR POWER (COMMUNAL COUNCILS, WORKERS COUNCILS, STUDENTS COUNCILS, FARMERS COUNCILS, AMONG OTHERS), THE WORKERS DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOCIAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE, THE COMMUNAL self-management, FINANCIAL AND MICRO-FINANCIAL COMMUNAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNAL PROPERTY COOPERATIVES, COMMUNAL credit unions, NETWORKS OF FREE ASSOCIATED PRODUCERS, VOLUNTARY WORK, community enterprises and other forms of association constituted to develop values of mutual cooperation and SOCIALIST solidarity. The law shall establish conditions for the effective functioning of the means of participation contemplated under the present article.<br />(sections in capital letters are new in the reformed article)<br /><br />The section in parenthesis was modified by the National Assembly in the following way:<br /><br />…/…THROUGH THE COMMUNAL COUNCILS, WORKERS COUNCILS, STUDENTS COUNCILS, FARMERS COUNCILS, ARTISAN COUNCILS, FISHERMEN COUNCILS, SPORTS COUNCILS, YOUTH COUNCILS, ELDERLY ADULTS COUNCILS, WOMEN COUNCILS, DISABLED PERSONS COUNCILS, AMONG OTHERS…/…<br /><br />And the last paragraph will say: A NATIONAL LAW, instead of ‘The law”</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-87-aio.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 87 (AIO):</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">All persons have the right and duty to work. The State guarantees the adoption of the necessary measures so that every person shall be able to obtain productive work providing him or her with a dignified and decorous living and guarantee him or her the full exercise of this right. It is an objective of the State to promote employment. Measures tending to guarantee the exercise of the labor rights of self-employed persons shall be adopted by law. Freedom to work shall be subject only to such restrictions as may be established by law. Every employer shall guarantee employees adequate safety, hygienic and environmental conditions on the job. The State shall adopt measures and create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">All persons of working age have the right and duty to work. The State will develop policies that generate productive work, and will adopt social measures necessary for each person to achieve an existence which is dignified, decorous and beneficial for themselves and for society. The State will guarantee that in all labor centers safety, hygienic and environmental, and social relations conditions are fulfilled in accordance with human dignity, and will create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions. In the application of these principles of co-responsibility and solidarity, the employer will adopt all necessary measures for the fulfillment of these conditions. Work will be subject to the regime established in this Constitution and the laws of the Republic.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-90-manuel-t.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 90 ( Manuel T.)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">Working hours shall not exceed eight hours per day or 44 hours per week. Where permitted by law, night work shall not exceed seven hours per day or 35 hours per week. No employer shall have the right to require employees to work overtime. An effort shall be made to reduce working hours progressively in the interest of society and in such sphere as may be determined, and appropriate provisions shall be adopted to make better use of free time for the benefit of the physical, spiritual and cultural development of workers. Workers are entitled to weekly time off and paid vacations on the same terms as for days actually worked. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">With the intention that workers have enough time for their integral development; day-shift work hours shall not exceed 6 hours per day and 36 hours per week, and night-shift work hours shall not exceed 6 hours per day and 34 hours per week. No employer shall force its employees to work overtime. Moreover, it (the subject in the Spanish version is tacit, so I’m guessing it refers to the employer as well) shall program and organize the mechanism for the better enjoyment of workers’ free time in benefit of their education, and human, physical, spiritual, ethical, cultural and technical development.<br />Workers shall have the right to a weekly rest and paid vacations in the same conditions as regular work shifts.</span><br /><br /><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/11/article-98-kensey-amaya.html">Article 98 (Kensey Amaya)</a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;"> Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right to invest in, produce and disseminate the creative, scientific, technical and humanistic work, as well as legal protection of the author’s rights in his works. The State recognizes and protects intellectual property rights in scientific, literary and artistic works, inventions, innovations, trade names, patents, trademarks and slogans, in accordance with the conditions and exceptions established by law and the international treaties executed and ratified by the Republic in this field.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);"> Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right to cultural diversity pertaining to invention, production and dissemination for creative works, scientific, technological, and humanistic, including the legal protection and rights to the author for their work. The state recognizes the rights of all to participate in the cultural community, enjoy the arts, and participate in scientific technological progress, and enjoy their benefits.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-100-kensey-amaya.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 100 (Kensey Amaya)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The folk cultures comprising the national identity of Venezuela enjoy special attention, with recognition of and respect for inter cultural relations under the principle of equality of cultures. Incentives and inducements shall be provided for by law for persons, institutions and communities which promote, support, develop or finance cultural plans, programs and activities within the country and Venezuelan culture abroad. The State guarantees cultural workers inclusion in the Social security system to provide them with a dignified life, recognizing the idiosyncrasies of cultural work, in accordance with law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a product of the mixing of various cultures; consequently the State recognizes and values the diversity of its Indigenous, European, and African roots that has created our great South American nation. The popular cultures, of Indigenous and African decent constituting the Venezuelan identity, enjoy special attention by recognizing and respecting its intercultural nature under the principle of cultural equality. Incentives and inducements shall be provided for by law for persons, institutions and communities which promote, support, develop or finance cultural plans, programs and activities within the country and Venezuelan culture abroad. The State guarantees cultural workers inclusion in the Social security system to provide them with a dignified life, recognizing the idiosyncrasies of cultural work, in accordance with law.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-115.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 115 (Pedro Bernardez) </span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The right to own property is guaranteed. Every person has a right to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of his/her goods. Property will be subject to the contributions, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. It is only in the spirit of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, that any kinds of goods may be expropriated</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The different forms of property are recognized and guaranteed. Public property [“la propiedad pública”] is that which belongs to State entities; social property [“la propiedad social”] is that which belongs to the people in its entirety and to the future generations, and may be of two types: indirect social property, when it is exercised by the State in name of the community, and direct social property, when the State assigns it, under different forms and in outlined territories, to one or several communities, to one or several communes [“comunas”], constituting thusly communal property, or to one or several cities, constituting thusly cityward property; collective property [“la propiedad colectiva”] is that which belongs to social groups or persons, for their benefit, use or common enjoyment, of either social or private origin; mixed property [“la propiedad mixta”] is that constituted by the public sector, the social sector, the collective sector and the private sector, in differing combinations, for the utilization of resources or carrying out activities, always subject to the absolute respect of the Nation’s economic and social sovereignty; and private property [“la propiedad privada”] is that which belongs to natural or juristic persons and is recognized over user and consumer goods, and legitimately acquired means of production.<br />All property, [the comma there is part of the article and not my mistake] will be subject to the contributions, burdens, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. In the name of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, the expropriation of any kind of good may be declared, without restricting the right of State officials, [the comma is also part of the article] of previously occupying, [as is this comma] during the judicial process, the goods being expropriated, within the parameters established by law.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-136-julia.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 136 (Julia)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The Public Power is distributed between the Municipal Power, the State Power and the National Power. The National Public Power is divided in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral. Each one of the branches of the Public Power has its own functions, but the organs on which its exercise pertains will collaborate with each other in accomplishing the aims of the State.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The Public Power is distributed territorially in the following form: the popular power, the municipal power, the state power and the national power. Regarding the content of the functions that it exerts, the public power is organized in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral. The people are the holder of the sovereignty and they exert it directly through the Popular Power. This one is not born of the suffrage nor of election, but it is born of the condition of organized human groups as a basis of the population. The Popular Power expresses constituting the communities, the communes and the self-government of the cities, through the communal councils, workers councils, the student councils, the farmer’s councils and other beings that the law indicates.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-141-feathers.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 141 (Feathers)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The Public Administration is at the service of the citizens and is based on the principles of honesty, participation, speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsibility in the exercise of the public function, with total submission to the rule of law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The public administrations are the organizational structures destined to serve as instrument to the public powers, for the exercise of their functions, and for the services they provide. The categories of public administrations are: the bureaucratic or traditional public administrations, that are those that takes care of the structures predicted and regulated in this constitution and the laws; and “the misiones”, constituted by organizations of varied nature, created to take care of the satisfaction of the most felt and urgent necessities of the population, whose benefit demands of the application of exceptional systems, and, even experimental, which will be established by the Executive authority by means of organizational and functional regulations.</span><br /><br /><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/article-167-aio.html">Article 167 (AIO)</a> <br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Original text:</span></span> <span style="font-style: italic;">Are revenues of the States:<br />(1) Those deriving from their property and the management of their assets.<o:p></o:p><br />(2) Charges for the use of their goods and services, fines and penalties, and any charges allocated to them.<br />(3) Proceeds from the sale of State-owned commodities.<br />(4) The resources to which they are entitled by virtue of constitutional revenue share (situado constitutional).<br />The revenue share is equivalent to up to 20% of total ordinary revenues as estimated annually by the National Treasure, which is to be distributed among the States and the Capital District as follows: 30% of the aforementioned percentage in equal shares, and the remaining 70% in proportion to the population of each of such entities. During each fiscal year, the States must invest at least 50% of the amount to which they are entitled by way of revenue share. During each fiscal year, the Municipalities of each State shall be entitled to at least 20% of the revenue share and of all other ordinary revenues of the State corresponding.<br />(1) In the event of changes in the revenues of the National Treasury that require an adjustment to the National Budget, the constitutional revenue share shall be adjusted in the same proportion.<br />(2) Principles, rules and procedures with a view to ensure the proper and efficient use of the resources deriving from the constitutional revenue share and the share of the Municipalities therein shall be established by law.<br />(3) Any other taxes, charges and special contributions that may be allocated to them by national law for the purpose of helping to develop the state treasuries. Laws creating or transferring tax revenues to the States may offset these allocations by means of changes in the other revenue categories indicated in this article, in order to preserve inter-territorial fairness. The percentage of estimated ordinary national revenues allocated to the constitutional revenue share shall be no less than 15% of estimated ordinary revenues, taking into account the financial position and sustainability of the National Public Treasury, without neglecting the ability of the state administrative authorities to provide adequately for the services for which they are responsible.<br />(4) Resources deriving from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund and from any other transfer, subsidy or special appropriation, as well as those allocated to them as a share of national tax revenues, in accordance with the pertinent law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Are revenues of the States:<br />1. Those deriving from their property and the management of their assets.<br />2. Charges for the use of their goods and services, fines and penalties, and any charges allocated to them.<br />3. Proceeds from the sale of State-owned commodities.<br />4. The resources to which they are entitled by virtue of constitutional revenue share (situado constitutional). The revenue share is equivalent to up to 20% of total ordinary revenues as estimated annually by the National Treasure, which is to be distributed among the States and the Capital District as follows: 30% of the aforementioned percentage in equal shares, and the remaining 70% in proportion to the population of each of such entities.<br />During each fiscal year, the States must invest at least 50% of the amount to which they are entitled by way of revenue share. During each fiscal year, the Municipalities of each State shall be entitled to at least 20% of the revenue share and of all other ordinary revenues of the State corresponding. In the event of changes in the revenues of the National Treasury that require an adjustment to the National Budget, the constitutional revenue share shall be adjusted in the same proportion.<br />Principles, rules and procedures with a view to ensure the proper and efficient use of the resources deriving from the constitutional revenue share and the share of the Municipalities therein shall be established by law.<br />5. Any other taxes, charges and special contributions that may be allocated to them by national law for the purpose of helping to develop the state treasuries.<br />Laws creating or transferring tax revenues to the States may offset these allocations by means of changes in the other revenue categories indicated in this article, in order to preserve inter-territorial fairness. The percentage of estimated ordinary national revenues allocated to the constitutional revenue share shall be no less than 15% of estimated ordinary revenues, taking into account the financial position and sustainability of the National Public Treasury, without neglecting the ability of the state administrative authorities to provide adequately for the services for which they are responsible.<br />6. Resources deriving from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund and from any other transfer, subsidy or special appropriation, as well as those allocated to them as a share of national tax revenues, in accordance with the pertinent law.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-230-brunilde-sans.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 230 (Brunilde Sansó) </span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The presidential term is six years. The President of the Republic may be reelected, immediately and once only, to an additional term.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The presidential period is of 7 years. The President of the Republic can be reelected immediately for a new period.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-251-daniel-d.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 251 (Daniel D) </span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The Council of State is the highest consultative organ of the Government and the National Public Administration. It shall be charged with making policy recommendations in the national interest with regard to matters recognized by the President* of the Republic as being of particular importance and requiring the Council's opinion. The pertinent law shall determine its functions and powers.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The Council of State is the highest organization for consulting by the State and the National Government. It will exert its attribution with functional autonomy. Its opinions or decisions will not be binding. Its attributions are 1) Emit an opinion on the matter under consultation 2) Watch over the fulfillment of the constitution and the legal framework 3) Pronounce decisions over the matters that are submitted to its consideration and 4) Recommend policies of national interests on those matters that are of special transcendence. An organic law will be able to determine other functions and/or other competencies.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/09/article-252.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 252 (Daniel D) </span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> The Council of State shall be presided over by the Executive Vice President, and shall be also integrated by five members designated by the President of the Republic; one representative designated by the National Assembly; one representative designated by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and One State Governor designated by all of the States chief executives jointly.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The Council of State is presided by the President of the Republic and it is also includes the President of the National Assembly, the President of the TSJ [high court], the President of the Citizen Power, the President of the Electoral Council and the people that the president of the republic deems necessary to summon to deal with the matter at hand in the consultation.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/articles-318-320-and-321-miguel-octavio.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 318 (Miguel Octavio)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> The monetary competence of National Authority shall necessarily be exercised exclusively by the Venezuelan Central Bank. The fundamental objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank is to achieve price stability and preserve the internal and foreign exchange value of the monetary unit. The monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In the event a common currency is instituted within the framework of Latin American and integration, it shall be permissible to adopt the currency provided for by a treaty signed by the Republic. The Venezuelan Central Bank is a public-law juridical person with autonomy to formulate and implement policies within its sphere of competence. The Venezuelan Central Bank shall perform its functions in coordination with general economic policy, in the interest of attaining the higher objectives of the State and the Nation. In order to provide for the adequate attainment of its objective, the functions of the Venezuelan Central Bank shall include those of formulating and implementing monetary policy, participating in the design of and implementing foreign exchange policy, currency regulation, credit and interest rate, administrating international reserves and any others established by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The national monetary system has to tend to achieve the essential goals of the State and the well being of the people, above any other consideration.<br />The Executive Branch and the Venezuela Central Bank, in strict and obligatory coordination, will fix monetary policy and will exercise the monetary competence of the National Power.<br />The specific objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank, jointly with the Executive Branch, is to attain price stability and preserve the internal and external value of the monetary unit. The monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In the case that a currency is established in the framework of Latin American and Caribbean integration, that currency that is the subject of treaties subscribed by the Republic can be adopted.<br />The Venezuelan Central bank is public law entity without autonomy for the formulation and exercising of the corresponding policies and its functions will be subordinated to the general economic policy and the National Development Plan to reach the superior objectives of the Socialist State and the greatest sum of happiness for all of the people.<br />For the adequate fulfilling of its specific objectives, the Central Bank of Venezuela will have among its functions, shared with the National Executive Power, those of participating in the formulation and execution of monetary policy, in the design and execution of foreign exchange policy, in the regulation of the coinage, credit and fixing interest rates. </span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/articles-318-320-and-321-miguel-octavio.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 320 (Miguel Octavio)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">The State shall promote and defend economic stability, prevent the vulnerability of the economy and see to monetary and price stability, in order to ensure the welfare of society. The ministry responsible for finance and the Venezuelan Central Bank shall contribute to the harmony between fiscal and monetary policy, thereby facilitating the attainment of macroeconomic objectives. In performing its functions, the Central Bank of Venezuela shall not be subject to directives from the National Executive and shall not be permitted to endorse or finance deficit fiscal policies. The coordinated actions of the National Executive and the Venezuelan Central Bank shall be achieved through an annual policy agreement which shall establish the final growth objectives and their repercussion on society, the external balance of payments and inflation, as regards fiscal, foreign exchange and monetary policy; as well as the levels of intermediate and instrumental variables required in order to achieve the aforementioned final objectives. This agreement shall be signed by the President* of the Venezuelan Central Bank and the head of the ministry responsible for finance, and shall be made public at the time of approval of the budget by the National Assembly. It is the responsibility of the signers of the agreement to see that policy actions are consistent with the objectives. The aforementioned agreement shall specify the results expected and the policies and actions designed to achieve the same. The characteristics of the annual economic policy agreement and the mechanisms for submitting an accounting shall be established by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">The state shall promote and defend economic stability, avoid the vulnerability of the economy and watch out for monetary and price stability of the economy, to insure social well-being. Equally, it will watch out for harmony in fiscal and monetary policy for the achievement of macroeconomic objectives (Two whole paragraphs disappear)</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/10/articles-318-320-and-321-miguel-octavio.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 321 (Miguel Octavio)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">A macroeconomic stabilization fund shall be established by law for the purpose of guaranteeing the stability of the State's expenses at the national, regional and municipal levels, in the face of fluctuations in ordinary revenues. The operating rules for this fund shall observe the basic principles of efficiency, fairness and nondiscrimination as between the public organs contributing resources to the fund.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Within the framework of his function as administrator of international reserves, the Head of State will establish, in coordination with the Venezuelan Central Bank and at the end of each year, the level of necessary reserves for the national economy, as well as the amount of the excess reserves, which will be destined to the funds earmarked by the national Executive Branch for productive investment, development and infrastructure, financing of the "misiones" and overall, in the integral, endogenous, humanist and socialist development. (The FIEM, the macroeconomic stabilization Fund disappears)</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/11/articles-328-and-329-alek-boyd.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 328 (Alek Boyd) </span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;"> The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially professional institution, with no political orientation, organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation and ensure the integrity of its geographical space, through military defense, cooperation for the purpose of maintaining internal order and active participation in national development, in accordance with this Constitution and the law. In performing their functions, they are at the exclusive service of the Nation, and in no case at the service of any person or political partisanship. The pillars on which they are founded are discipline, obedience and subordination. The National Armed Forces consist of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the National Guard, which function in an integrated manner within the scope of their competence to fulfill their mission, with their own overall Social Security system, as established under the pertinent organic law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);"> The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist institution organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation; to preserve it from any internal or external attacks and ensure the integrity of its geographic area through the study, planning and execution of the Bolivarian military doctrine, the implementation of the principles of integral military defense and the war of popular resistance, the permanent participation in tasks akin to maintaining security of the citizenry, and the upkeep of the internal order as well as the active engagement in economic, social, scientific and technological development plans in accordance to this constitution and the law.<br />In the performance of its functions it will always be at the service of the Venezuelan people defending its sacred interests and under no circumstances will serve any oligarchies or imperial foreign powers.<br />Its fundamental pillars are this constitution and the law, as well as discipline, obedience and subordination.<br />Its historical pillars are in Bolivar's mandate: to free the nation, to take the sword to defend social guarantees and to deserve people's blessings.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://constitutional-reform-venezuela.blogspot.com/2007/11/articles-328-and-329-alek-boyd.html"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Article 329 (Alek Boyd)</span></a><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Original text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic;"> The Army, Navy and Air Force have as their essential responsibility the planning, execution and control of military operations as required to ensure the defense of the Nation. The National Guard shall cooperate in the carrying out of these operations, and shall have as its basic responsibility that of conducting operations as required to maintain internal order within the country. The National Armed Forces shall carry out activities of administrative policing and criminal investigation activities as provided for by law.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);">Modified text:</span> <span style="font-style: italic; color: rgb(102, 0, 0);"> The Bolivarian Armed Forces are formed by the different land, sea and air bodies, administratively organized in the following components: the Bolivarian Army, the Bolivarian Navy, the Bolivarian Air Force, The Bolivarian Territorial Guard and the Bolivarian Popular Militia, said components structured in combined units of assistance, training and joint operations, both at the tactical and strategic level in order to fulfill its mission.<br />The Bolivarian Armed Forces will be able to perform administrative police and penal investigation activities as mandated by law.<br /><br />Provisional ordinance (from the National Assembly dispositions)<br /><br />The National Guard will become an essentially military body that might be destined by its commander in chief to form land, sea and air units as part of other military components. With part of its human, technical and material resources police corps could also be formed. Its military definition will change to that of Territorial Guard.<br /><br />Another provisional ordinance<br /><br />The units and components of the military reserve will become units of the Bolivarian Popular Militia.</span>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com1