The proposed Constitutional Reform includes three articles that have to do with monetary policy, the Central Bank and international reserves, so that it makes sense to discuss them all at the same time, as I will do in this post. The Articles to be modified are 318, 320 and 321.
Let's start with Art. 318, which has the most extensive modifications. So extensive in fact, that it is not even worth looking at the original article except to note that the current Constitution grants the Central Bank "exclusive, obligatory and…autonomous" power over the country's monetary policy.
In contrast, the new text as proposed for Art. 318 says:
Article 318. The national monetary system has to tend to achieve the essential goals of the Socialist State and the well being of the people, above any other consideration.
The Executive Branch and the Venezuela Central Bank, in strict and obligatory coordination, will fix monetary policy and will exercise the monetary competence of the National Power.
The specific objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank, jointly with the Executive Branch, is to attain price stability and preserve the internal and external value of the monetary unit. The monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In the case that a currency is established in the framework of Latin American and Caribbean integration, that currency that is the subject of treaties subscribed by the Republic can be adopted
The Venezuelan Central bank is public law entity without autonomy for the formulation and exercising of the corresponding policies and its functions will be subordinated to the general economic policy and the National Development Plan to reach the superior objectives of the Socialist State and the greatest sum of happiness for all of the people.
For the adequate fulfilling of its specific objectives, the Central Bank of Venezuela will have among its functions, shared with the National Executive Power, those of participating in the formulation and execution of monetary policy, in the design and execution of foreign exchange policy, in the regulation of the coinage, credit and fixing interest rates.
Since they are so closely related (and maybe even repetitive), I will also list Articles 320 and 321, underlining what is new:
Art. 320 The state shall promote and defend economic stability, avoid the vulnerability of the economy and watch out for monetary and price stability of the economy, to insure social well-being. Equally, it will watch out for harmony in fiscal and monetary policy for the achievement of macroeconomic objectives (Two whole paragraphs disappear)
Art. 321:
Within the framework of his function as administrator of international reserves, the Head of State will establish, in coordination with the Venezuelan Central Bank and at the end of each year, the level of necessary reserves for the national economy, as well as the amount of the excess reserves, which will be destined to the funds earmarked by the national Executive Branch for productive investment, development and infrastructure, financing of the "misiones" and overall, in the integral, endogenous, humanist and socialist development. (The FIEM,
the macroeconomic stabilization Fund disappears)
The first consequence of the proposed reform is that as I mentioned before, the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be independent.
What that does mean?
There are roughly two ways of establishing monetary policy: You either have a Central Bank, like most countries do or you have a Currency Board, which is rare. In the Currency Board model, like Hong Kong, the currency in circulation exactly matches the reserves of the country.
The money is "backed" by the reserves, which may include gold, monetary instruments and investments. In the Central Bank model, you have a group of people who establish the policies to intervene in the monetary, currency and interest rate markets.
Central Banks are usually independent. That is, while the Government has representatives on the Board of the Central Bank, they function independently and can make independent decisions. The reason for this is that economic studies have proven that when Central Banks are not independent, the short-term political goals become a priority over the stability of the currency and prices. Thus, most countries have found this to be the optimum, if not perfect solution. As an example, if an election is coming up, the Government may not care if it spends too much, because it makes people feel that things are going well, but in the long run this creates inflation.
Thus, the first negative aspect of the reform is that the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be autonomous or independent, but will have to reach all decisions jointly with the Executive branch, allowing politics to get in the way. Of course, this has already happened, since all member of the Board of the Venezuelan Central Bank have by now been named by Hugo Chavez, the Central Bank has not even complained about this change in the Constitution and policy has become less and less independent in the last few years.
In the last few years, economists in the Central Bank have resisted some of Chavez' policies and forcing the Central Bank to implement them, but in most cases Chavez has gotten his way in the end.
However, in the end, the policies set by the Venezuelan Central bank have not been that great or independent in the last few years. Despite the mandate by the Venezuelan Constitution to maintain price and currency stability, the Venezuelan currency has devalued from Bs. 573.25 the day before Chavez took office to Bs. 2,150 (official rate) or Bs. 5,600 (parallel rate). Why? Because monetary policy has been out of control as the amount of Bolivars in circulation has gone from US$ 5.5 billion to US$ 62.5 billion, a factor of 12, while in the same period international reserves have only doubled [editor's emphasis]. That is why the currency continues to drop, to devalue constantly. In some sense, Articles 318 and 320 are repetitive, since some of the goals outlined in them are exactly the same, the goal of price and monetary stability and harmony, which is already mentioned in Article 320. This shows in part the level of improvisation in writing the proposed reforms.
Thus, up to a point, the changes in Article 318 and 321, simply formalize and institutionalize the policies that have been carried out in the last few years, which will simply allow the Government to do what it needs for political reasons, which economic studies have precisely shown does not work in the medium and long term.
These three articles also prove that the proposed reform of the Constitution violates the procedure for changing it, since in these articles everything is secondary to the aims and goals of establishing a Socialist State, something Venezuelans have never voted on. This should require a Constituent Assembly, as Art. 342 specifically says that a Constitutional reform can only be done when the fundamentals and structure of the Constitution are not changed. What could be more fundamental that restricting the country to being a socialist State?
We could also say that Art. 321 could also have been included in either Article 318 or 320. Essentially it incorporates into the Constitution the concept of "excess" international reserves. This concept "invented" by our current Minister of Finance Rodrigo Cabezas, says that once a year the Government will "determine" what is the optimum level of international reserves and any "excess" will be taken away from the Venezuelan Central Bank and given to funds for investment, development and infrastructure. This concept has no economic basis and sealed the progressive devaluation of the currency when it was first implemented. If it was absurd to make it into a law, like it was in 2004, it is simply irresponsible to incorporate this level of detail and precision into the Venezuelan Constitution.
Again, this simply institutionalizes what the Government has been doing in the last few years. For three years in a row, the Government has withdrawn these supposed "excess" reserves and given them to Fonden, which by the way has not really fulfilled its mandate to invest those funds in infrastructure and development.
Additionally, the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund disappears from the Constitution. That fund, if well managed, could represent the best option for the country to avoid the boom and bust cycles of oil prices, which will certainly repeat one day.
In conclusion, the changes to Art. 318, 320 and 321 of the Constitution, formally remove the independence of the Central Bank which has been somewhat questionable in the last few years anyway and place monetary policy right in the hands of Hugo Chavez. This is exactly the opposite of what economic theory suggests a country should do, it subordinates monetary policy to social and political goals, and bodes badly for the future of inflation and the currency in Venezuela, as even valid structures to dampen the effect of oil fluctuations are eliminated.
---------------------------------------
Miguel Octavio writes The Devil's Excrement since late 2002 and can be contacted there directly.
This text originally published here.
A Spanish version of this text will be available soon.
Oct 7, 2007
Articles 318, 320 and 321 (Miguel Octavio)
Oct 3, 2007
Article 16 (Mousqueton)
Preamble: When I first asked the editor of this blog to allow me to comment on the constitutional modifications of articles 11, 16 and 18, I was totally aware, from the first reading, of the dangers that the modifications to article 11 posed to the Venezuelan democracy. At that time, I also thought that commenting article 16 was a waste of time because the text of this modification is the closest I have ever seen a constitutional text come to the legendary dyslectic speech of that beloved character called “Cantinflas” brilliantly portrayed by the Mexican actor Mario Moreno throughout his life. I decided to write comments on all three articles though because they are part of Title II of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that deals with the territory and the political division of that territory. Far was I then from realizing that, as much as the implications of the modified text to article 11 where frightening, the implications of the modifications to the text of article 16 are by far, and I mean far, worse than those of article 11. Further, I was wrong and presumptuous by dismissing and labeling the text of the modifications to article 16 as “Cantinflesco”.
Modifications: Both the text of the original article 16 and the text of the modifications being proposed are long and they are better explained with the help of graphic outlines. I am therefore not going to quote these texts and instead I am herein including a link you can follow should you be interested in reading them ( Original Text / Modified Text ).
The political division of Federal Republics is a logical structure that divides the country in geographical areas for administration, political and citizen representation purposes. It basically resembles a pyramid with different levels of organization and citizen representation.
The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 divides Venezuela in three basic political and representation levels of government: 1) The Federal (National) level, 2) The State level and 3) the Municipal Level. It also includes provisions for the incorporation of two optional additional levels: 1) Metropolitan Districts - Articles 170 and 171 - and 2) Parishes - Article 173.
Figure # 1 below provides a graphic representation of the political division of the Venezuelan Republic as per the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999.
The logic behind the option of creating Metropolitan Districts is that, in time, independent Municipalities may develop up to a point where a group of them could become a major metropolitan area. At that time these municipalities might want to incorporate as a “Metropolitan District” that encompasses the territory of all them. This way, they would be able to streamline rules and regulations as well as the political and representation relationship between Municipalities throughout the metropolitan area.
Following the same logic, Municipalities with large rural territories that have scattered communities might want to consider creating smaller entities of political and citizen representation. Hence, the creation of Parishes is a constitutional option that Municipalities can use to decentralize government at the municipal level in order to better serve the population in those communities.
In every case, all the political divisions or levels must comply with the constitutional mandate of allowing a republican representation of the citizens at each level. This is, the branches of power (Executive and Legislative) must be the same in every division or level and the representatives of the people (authorities) must be elected in general elections.
The current political division of the Venezuelan territory complies with these conditions as mandated in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 outlined in Title I, Articles 1 though 9, which are mandatory and “non amendable and/or revisable” (articles 340 and 342), and more specifically with the mandate on articles 4 and 6 that read:
Article 4: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized Federal State on the terms set forth in this Constitution, governed by the principles of territorial integrity, cooperation, solidarity, attendance and shared responsibility.
Article 6: The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs that comprise the same, is and shall always be democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates.
It should be noted that the political division and the mandate to organize the country under a federal republican government constitutes the backbone of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999. So much so, that out of the total 350 articles included in the constitution, 153 articles, that is 43% of all articles, are dedicated to explaining and regulating the term, scope, attributions, responsibilities and the rights of the citizens in the different levels and/or political divisions of this government structure.
The modifications being proposed to article 16 though, introduces a completely different political division (structure) of the Venezuelan Republic which, at first sight, seems to have absolutely no organizational, administrative, political and certainly, no constitutional logic. Further more, it introduces changes that are not explained and/or regulated anywhere in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and for that matter, not even vaguely referenced anywhere in the whole text of the constitution.
To illustrate the major differences being introduced in the modified text of article 16 we are including a table (Figure # 2) that provides a visual reference as to the political division of the Venezuelan Republic in three different documents. These are; 1) The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961, 2) The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and 3) The proposed text for article 16. The different political divisions and/or levels of organization are being outlined in the same order as they appear in the text of each document.
Since the proposed political division in the modified text of article 16 is so confusing and given the fact that there is no precedence for this type of political division either in the Constitution of 1961 or the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 it seemed logical to research the constitutional text of other “federal republican constitutions” to try and find similar political divisions. None of the constitutions that were researched though (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States) shed any light as to where this political division concept could have come from. Further, though Cuba is not a federal republic, we also could not find in the Cuban Constitution anything that vaguely resembles the above mentioned political division.
Frustrated with the inability to find any logic to the proposed political division we were about to focus only on the confusing and in some instances somewhat pompous language of the proposed text when suddenly it strike us.
The reason why we could not find any logic and/or sense to the proposed political division was because the text was not describing one political division but indeed two different, separate and overlapping political divisions written into the same text.
Just like the notes of two different songs played together do not make sense unless played separately, the modified text of article 16 describes two separate political divisions that only make sense when outlined separately.
In the following table (Figure # 3) we are outlining the two now perfectly logical and overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16.
As amazing as it may be, the modified text of article 16 introduces two separate, opposite, parallel, overlapping and most probably competing government structures to govern the same country.
It also re-arranges the territory introducing political divisions that are made up from parts or all the current territories assigned by the constitution to one or more States and Municipalities. These territorial assignments are very broadly described in the proposed amended text to article 16 and certainly they are not regulated in any way, shape or form.- Federal Provinces: Which are basically a political equivalent to the States, will be formed by …“aggregating either States or Municipalities”…The concept of Provinces is not alien to Venezuelan history since, originally, the political division of Venezuela included six provinces: Venezuela or Caracas, Maracaibo, Cumana, Guayana, Margarita and Trinidad.
- Functional Districts: Which are basically political equivalents to the Metropolitan Districts will be formed …“by one or more Municipalities or Territorial Lots on them, without regard to the State they belong to.”…
- Insular Districts: The original text of article 16 included Federal Dependencies. These have been dropped and replaced by Oceanic Regions. Federal Dependencies included all those islands that were not part of a State. Oceanic Regions do not make that distinction so territories such as Margarita could become Insular Districts subject to the executive branch of power.
- Federal Cities: Will allow the government to take direct control over any major metropolitan city, regardless of which State they are in and/or their Municipalities (…”The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, after an agreement approved by a simple majority of Representatives of the National Assembly, will be able to create by decree, Federal Provinces, Federal Cities and Functional Districts”…), (…”In the Federal Territory, the Federal Municipality and the Federal City, the national Power will designate the respective authorities”…).
- Federal Municipalities: Municipalities in Federal Territories would be under government control and their authorities will be appointed by the national government.
- Cities / Communal Cities: This is the new …"primary political unit in the national territory organization"… and hence the political equivalent of the “Municipalities”. “Cities” and “Communal Cities” are the same thing since all cities will become “Communal Cities” when …"organized Communities, Communes and self communal governments are established in the totality of its perimeter."… without any regard for the Municipalities.
- Communes: Are the political equivalent of the Parishes except that they are mandatory; Parishes were optional. Also, Communes are political entities with …"forms of self government and any other expression of direct Democracy."…
- Communities: This is a new micro political division that is being introduced by article 16 which can only be explained as an obsession to micro manage the lives of the people. After communities the only thing left are “homes”.
From a constitutional standpoint, the two overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16 are dramatically different.
As per the constitutional mandate in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 (articles 4 & 6), Political Division “A” is Federal, Elective and Decentralized. “Political Division “B” though is quite the opposite; it is not Federal because none of the divisions created comply with the autonomous nature of a Federal Republic; it is non-elective because most of the authorities are appointed by the national government and, it is not decentralized because they are all subject to the national government.
Finally, the undetermined and absurd nature of this dual political division is pretty much covered up with the all inclusive, all uncertain and all powerful political alibi measure of choice: …"The political-territorial organization of the Republic will be legislated by an Organic Law."
Comment 1: Let me start by commenting what, without doubt, is the most important conclusion you arrive at after reading the above factual analysis.
The modified text of article 16 being introduced by the government is absolutely UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the following reasons:a. It violates Title I, article # 4 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a …federal State”…
Comment 2: From a political standpoint, the introduction of two overlapping political divisions is a clear attempt to destroy the power base of the States and their municipalities. The centralized political structure under the national government control will have more economic resources and no constitutional restrictions. Eventually, it will be perceived as more efficient than the federal structure and therefore such will loose political power and representation.
The new political division introduces new political divisions that are not subject to the States and hence they are not federal. Further, it introduces political divisions that include territories from more than one State and authorities that are not accountable to either of such destroying this way the integrity of the federal system.
b. It violates Title I, article # 4 and 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized… State”...” The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… decentralized”…
The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and/or removed by the national government and hence dependant from such. This constitutes a centralized system of government and further, allows the executive branch to exercise authority at the State and Municipal level which is as power that neither the President nor the National Assembly has under the constitution.
c. It violates Title I, article # 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… elective”..
The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and not elected.
d. It violates Title IX, Chapter II, article # 342 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …” The purpose of the constitutional reform is to effect a partial revision of this Constitution and replacement of one or more of the provisions hereof, without modifying the fundamental principles and structure of the text of the Constitution.”…
The new political division introduces a significant modification to the fundamental principles and particularly to the structure of the text of the Constitution. It curtails the power and territory of the States and Municipalities. It introduces political divisions and entities that are not legislated under the Constitution. It creates a new primary political unit that modifies the responsibilities and the political relationship of the Municipalities with other political entities. It modifies the representation of the people at the Municipal and State level. It subjects people to different authorities without the legislation to guarantee their rights. In sum; it introduces a major modification to the structure of the text of the Constitution.
e. It violates Title IV, Chapter III, article # 164 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”Is of the States exclusive competence: … (2) Organization of their Municipalities and other local organs and the territorial and political divisions between them”…
Comment 3: The modifications introduced to article # 16 are a clear attempt by the government to introduce a centralize, non elective and dependent political structure that will change the nature of the Venezuelan government which by constitutional mandate is republican, federal and constitutional. The problem is that this can not be done through constitutional amendments and/or reforms because the constitution does not allow it. The only way to make those changes is to elect a National Constituent Assembly to write a new Constitution.
Mousqueton
venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com
Spanish language version of this post can be found at the following site: “No a la reforma constitucional de Chávez”
-The end-
Sep 20, 2007
Article 251 (Daniel D)
Article 251
The Council of State is the highest organization for consulting by the State and the National Government. It will exert its attribution with functional autonomy. Its opinions or decisions will not be binding. Its attributions are 1) Emit an opinion on the matter under consultation 2) Watch over the fulfillment of the constitution and the legal framework 3) Pronounce decisions over the matters that are submitted to its consideration and 4) Recommend policies of national interests on those matters that are of special transcendence.
An organic law will be able to determine other functions and/or other competencies.
Even though article 251 and 252 are linked I did discuss article 252 first for two reasons. It was an easy article to offer as a clear exhibit of Chavez wanting to hold center stage alone and everywhere, to the point of reducing the role of the vice-president to very little even though he can remove and name a vice-president at will. But also because for some unaccountable reason, the electronic highlights that I had made on my PDF “refoma” text were lost on article 251 and I did not realize that it was also modified when I later went on to discuss article 252. In the end it did not matter at all for the discussion of article 252 but it allows me to go into a new point: how the “reforma” manages under a certain cover of superficiality and vacuity to prepare very carefully for future situations where the tiniest of challenge to Chavez could arise, something that I might not have highlighted as well if I had discussed both articles simultaneously.
Article 251 is in fact significantly modified in words though not apparently that much in scope. This is the first hint, of course, that this change must be hiding something.
The original version set a gathering of notables under the direction of the vice president. Nothing much was specified. The original article read: it will be on its capacity to recommend policies of national interest. But now we have 4 items for the Council of State! Fascinating when we think that the 1999 article has yet to be applied! That the council has yet to be named! If we read that in article 252 the council only seats when convoked by the president to discuss items proposed by the president, we do wonder about that need to be specific in limiting the scope of the council. Perhaps chavismo wanted to remove this article altogether and did not dare to? Or perhaps chavismo is planning to use this council to announce or to deal with unpopular policies that Chavez might not want to announce alone?
There is a curious item that goes with that logic of using this Council to deal with the consequences of the new constitution. The original article said that the Council of State could be used by the “Administración Pública”, that is, civil service or any branch of the public administration could address directly the Council. That could be the government itself, a state legislature or the sewers administration. Now only the president and the NATIONAL GOVERNEMENT will be able to use the services of this council. Why?
There is in the also modified article 141 an important change: the original text read that the Public Administration was there to serve the citizens. This has been erased and now in the new 141 version the public administration serves the government. Obviously there will be some scheme that will have to oversee the public administration to make sure this one is at the service of the state (and henceforth of the all powerful president). Starting with the vote on this ill called constitutional reform, the public administration branches will lose the ability to consult the Council of State in case they enter into some form of conflict with another administrative branch or, the deity forbids, a direct dependence of the government. Only the government (that is, Chavez direct appointees) will be allowed to start such an administrative inquiry that will rule, we can be sure of that, in favor of the government most of the time. And in the rarest of cases that the State Council might go against something that Chavez wants, well, the decisions are not binding anyway. The beauty of the scheme is that the 5 powers of the state will share the burden of the decision whereas that decision will only benefit the executive power.
There is a last little detail which might not be of much importance but could become very much so. In the original 251 there was just mention of a special law to establish the function and competences of the State Council. In the “reformed article” the law will now require to be “organica”. In Venezuelan law that means that the law must be voted by 2/3 of the National Assembly, and can only be modified by a 2/3 vote. Why such a change? The only explanation we can advance at this time is that the Chavez administration indeed has a plan for the Council of State and that it wants this plan to be iron tight to be able to use it for as long as it needs, just in case a new National Assembly could arise (this 251 article could even allow Chavez to use the Council of State to control even the functioning of the National Assembly!)
Or perhaps the aim is elsewhere: the end of decentralization. Any conflict between a non chavista town hall or state house with the chavista central administration could end up in the docket of the Council of State, if this one is ever installed. Now, the parts of the coming system that Chavez is creating and that he is less likely to control tightly are the small town halls and the states where local electoral surprises could still happen (even with the application of article 11). When these ones will enter into conflict with the central administration, something certain to happen as chavismo has clearly stated its desire to end decentralization, to curtail local powers, to “have direct contact with thousands of communes”, town halls and states will have one less recourse to go to if they want to seek redress from the central state. In fact, the revamped Council of State could be used directly against them as a more expedient way than judicial fiat or legislative process. And there will not be a voice from the provinces to defend them since article 252 takes care of that.
Published originally here.
Spanish version here.
-The end-
Sep 17, 2007
Article 252 (Daniel D)
The council of state is presided by the President of the Republic and it is also includes the President of the National Assembly, the President of the TSJ [high court], the President of the Citizen Power, the President of the Electoral Council and the people that the president of the republic deems necessary to summon to deal with the matter at hand in the consultation.
According to article 251 the council of State was a gathering of certain figures who were supposed to discuss and think about some project of special importance for the nation (Constitutional changes? Decentralization schemes?). Its origin is probably inspired from French constitutional tradition where in addition to propose administrative and constitutional matters to the government, the "Conseil d'Etat" also serves as a chamber which verifies the legality and constitutionality of laws before they are published. It is also an administrative tribunal where administration infighting as well as problems between the pubic service and the public can be settled before they go to judicial trials. The 1999 constitution created this novel figure in Venezuela but with much, much less power than what its inspiration might have been (after all there is a TSJ which covers some of the legal functions of the French Conseil). The Venezuelan council seems to have been intended as a simple gathering of notables to deal with matters of a certain importance that the president could not bother dealing with. As a matter of fact it was never assembled that I know of, and the law that was supposed to describe its function and organization in detail was never passed!
What is noteworthy in this text is the change from the old article. Then the council was presided by the vice president of the republic, 5 folks named by the president, one representative of the national assembly, one representative from the TSJ and one governor named by the other ones. With this composition that council was designed to give something else to do to the vice president of Venezuela, a consultative body who would discuss matters of national importance. Now, in the new structure the council will be completely controlled by the president who will call it as he needs, probably never. Observe that the lone figure of the governor is now excluded while for some inexplicable reason the electoral council now seats in the council.
It seems that the intended purpose for that council will be that of a registration chamber of sorts. Besides making the vice president a lesser function (in addition to the creation of several vice-presidencies it is now excluded of the body it could have directed) the president of the republic, the executive branch of power, will have an opportunity to demonstrate that it is the superior power of the five recognized powers in the 1999 constitution. That council of state will include all the powers but will be gathered only at the suffering of the president, and presided by this one. And the elected governors will not be good enough to send a single voice, lowering their rank even further. The symbol will be strong.
Since it is difficult to conceive that the National Assembly (which names the other powers) will change hands in the foreseeable future, we can safely gather that this council will never be called, unless Chavez decides at some point to create some pageantry. But just in case, Chavez covered his back from such a council putative initiative since in the previous version the vice president could have theoretically called a meeting without notifying the president to examine questions that the president would not like to examine (for example the mental incompetence of a sitting president?). And that, simply, is unacceptable in the new power scheme of Venezuela.
Published originally here.
Spanish version here.
