The proposed Constitutional Reform includes three articles that have to do with monetary policy, the Central Bank and international reserves, so that it makes sense to discuss them all at the same time, as I will do in this post. The Articles to be modified are 318, 320 and 321.
Let's start with Art. 318, which has the most extensive modifications. So extensive in fact, that it is not even worth looking at the original article except to note that the current Constitution grants the Central Bank "exclusive, obligatory and…autonomous" power over the country's monetary policy.
In contrast, the new text as proposed for Art. 318 says:
Article 318. The national monetary system has to tend to achieve the essential goals of the Socialist State and the well being of the people, above any other consideration.
The Executive Branch and the Venezuela Central Bank, in strict and obligatory coordination, will fix monetary policy and will exercise the monetary competence of the National Power.
The specific objective of the Venezuelan Central Bank, jointly with the Executive Branch, is to attain price stability and preserve the internal and external value of the monetary unit. The monetary unit of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the Bolivar. In the case that a currency is established in the framework of Latin American and Caribbean integration, that currency that is the subject of treaties subscribed by the Republic can be adopted
The Venezuelan Central bank is public law entity without autonomy for the formulation and exercising of the corresponding policies and its functions will be subordinated to the general economic policy and the National Development Plan to reach the superior objectives of the Socialist State and the greatest sum of happiness for all of the people.
For the adequate fulfilling of its specific objectives, the Central Bank of Venezuela will have among its functions, shared with the National Executive Power, those of participating in the formulation and execution of monetary policy, in the design and execution of foreign exchange policy, in the regulation of the coinage, credit and fixing interest rates.
Since they are so closely related (and maybe even repetitive), I will also list Articles 320 and 321, underlining what is new:
Art. 320 The state shall promote and defend economic stability, avoid the vulnerability of the economy and watch out for monetary and price stability of the economy, to insure social well-being. Equally, it will watch out for harmony in fiscal and monetary policy for the achievement of macroeconomic objectives (Two whole paragraphs disappear)
Art. 321:
Within the framework of his function as administrator of international reserves, the Head of State will establish, in coordination with the Venezuelan Central Bank and at the end of each year, the level of necessary reserves for the national economy, as well as the amount of the excess reserves, which will be destined to the funds earmarked by the national Executive Branch for productive investment, development and infrastructure, financing of the "misiones" and overall, in the integral, endogenous, humanist and socialist development. (The FIEM,
the macroeconomic stabilization Fund disappears)
The first consequence of the proposed reform is that as I mentioned before, the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be independent.
What that does mean?
There are roughly two ways of establishing monetary policy: You either have a Central Bank, like most countries do or you have a Currency Board, which is rare. In the Currency Board model, like Hong Kong, the currency in circulation exactly matches the reserves of the country.
The money is "backed" by the reserves, which may include gold, monetary instruments and investments. In the Central Bank model, you have a group of people who establish the policies to intervene in the monetary, currency and interest rate markets.
Central Banks are usually independent. That is, while the Government has representatives on the Board of the Central Bank, they function independently and can make independent decisions. The reason for this is that economic studies have proven that when Central Banks are not independent, the short-term political goals become a priority over the stability of the currency and prices. Thus, most countries have found this to be the optimum, if not perfect solution. As an example, if an election is coming up, the Government may not care if it spends too much, because it makes people feel that things are going well, but in the long run this creates inflation.
Thus, the first negative aspect of the reform is that the Venezuelan Central Bank will no longer be autonomous or independent, but will have to reach all decisions jointly with the Executive branch, allowing politics to get in the way. Of course, this has already happened, since all member of the Board of the Venezuelan Central Bank have by now been named by Hugo Chavez, the Central Bank has not even complained about this change in the Constitution and policy has become less and less independent in the last few years.
In the last few years, economists in the Central Bank have resisted some of Chavez' policies and forcing the Central Bank to implement them, but in most cases Chavez has gotten his way in the end.
However, in the end, the policies set by the Venezuelan Central bank have not been that great or independent in the last few years. Despite the mandate by the Venezuelan Constitution to maintain price and currency stability, the Venezuelan currency has devalued from Bs. 573.25 the day before Chavez took office to Bs. 2,150 (official rate) or Bs. 5,600 (parallel rate). Why? Because monetary policy has been out of control as the amount of Bolivars in circulation has gone from US$ 5.5 billion to US$ 62.5 billion, a factor of 12, while in the same period international reserves have only doubled [editor's emphasis]. That is why the currency continues to drop, to devalue constantly. In some sense, Articles 318 and 320 are repetitive, since some of the goals outlined in them are exactly the same, the goal of price and monetary stability and harmony, which is already mentioned in Article 320. This shows in part the level of improvisation in writing the proposed reforms.
Thus, up to a point, the changes in Article 318 and 321, simply formalize and institutionalize the policies that have been carried out in the last few years, which will simply allow the Government to do what it needs for political reasons, which economic studies have precisely shown does not work in the medium and long term.
These three articles also prove that the proposed reform of the Constitution violates the procedure for changing it, since in these articles everything is secondary to the aims and goals of establishing a Socialist State, something Venezuelans have never voted on. This should require a Constituent Assembly, as Art. 342 specifically says that a Constitutional reform can only be done when the fundamentals and structure of the Constitution are not changed. What could be more fundamental that restricting the country to being a socialist State?
We could also say that Art. 321 could also have been included in either Article 318 or 320. Essentially it incorporates into the Constitution the concept of "excess" international reserves. This concept "invented" by our current Minister of Finance Rodrigo Cabezas, says that once a year the Government will "determine" what is the optimum level of international reserves and any "excess" will be taken away from the Venezuelan Central Bank and given to funds for investment, development and infrastructure. This concept has no economic basis and sealed the progressive devaluation of the currency when it was first implemented. If it was absurd to make it into a law, like it was in 2004, it is simply irresponsible to incorporate this level of detail and precision into the Venezuelan Constitution.
Again, this simply institutionalizes what the Government has been doing in the last few years. For three years in a row, the Government has withdrawn these supposed "excess" reserves and given them to Fonden, which by the way has not really fulfilled its mandate to invest those funds in infrastructure and development.
Additionally, the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund disappears from the Constitution. That fund, if well managed, could represent the best option for the country to avoid the boom and bust cycles of oil prices, which will certainly repeat one day.
In conclusion, the changes to Art. 318, 320 and 321 of the Constitution, formally remove the independence of the Central Bank which has been somewhat questionable in the last few years anyway and place monetary policy right in the hands of Hugo Chavez. This is exactly the opposite of what economic theory suggests a country should do, it subordinates monetary policy to social and political goals, and bodes badly for the future of inflation and the currency in Venezuela, as even valid structures to dampen the effect of oil fluctuations are eliminated.
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Miguel Octavio writes The Devil's Excrement since late 2002 and can be contacted there directly.
This text originally published here.
A Spanish version of this text will be available soon.
Oct 7, 2007
Articles 318, 320 and 321 (Miguel Octavio)
Oct 3, 2007
Article 16 (Mousqueton)
Preamble: When I first asked the editor of this blog to allow me to comment on the constitutional modifications of articles 11, 16 and 18, I was totally aware, from the first reading, of the dangers that the modifications to article 11 posed to the Venezuelan democracy. At that time, I also thought that commenting article 16 was a waste of time because the text of this modification is the closest I have ever seen a constitutional text come to the legendary dyslectic speech of that beloved character called “Cantinflas” brilliantly portrayed by the Mexican actor Mario Moreno throughout his life. I decided to write comments on all three articles though because they are part of Title II of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that deals with the territory and the political division of that territory. Far was I then from realizing that, as much as the implications of the modified text to article 11 where frightening, the implications of the modifications to the text of article 16 are by far, and I mean far, worse than those of article 11. Further, I was wrong and presumptuous by dismissing and labeling the text of the modifications to article 16 as “Cantinflesco”.
Modifications: Both the text of the original article 16 and the text of the modifications being proposed are long and they are better explained with the help of graphic outlines. I am therefore not going to quote these texts and instead I am herein including a link you can follow should you be interested in reading them ( Original Text / Modified Text ).
The political division of Federal Republics is a logical structure that divides the country in geographical areas for administration, political and citizen representation purposes. It basically resembles a pyramid with different levels of organization and citizen representation.
The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 divides Venezuela in three basic political and representation levels of government: 1) The Federal (National) level, 2) The State level and 3) the Municipal Level. It also includes provisions for the incorporation of two optional additional levels: 1) Metropolitan Districts - Articles 170 and 171 - and 2) Parishes - Article 173.
Figure # 1 below provides a graphic representation of the political division of the Venezuelan Republic as per the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999.
The logic behind the option of creating Metropolitan Districts is that, in time, independent Municipalities may develop up to a point where a group of them could become a major metropolitan area. At that time these municipalities might want to incorporate as a “Metropolitan District” that encompasses the territory of all them. This way, they would be able to streamline rules and regulations as well as the political and representation relationship between Municipalities throughout the metropolitan area.
Following the same logic, Municipalities with large rural territories that have scattered communities might want to consider creating smaller entities of political and citizen representation. Hence, the creation of Parishes is a constitutional option that Municipalities can use to decentralize government at the municipal level in order to better serve the population in those communities.
In every case, all the political divisions or levels must comply with the constitutional mandate of allowing a republican representation of the citizens at each level. This is, the branches of power (Executive and Legislative) must be the same in every division or level and the representatives of the people (authorities) must be elected in general elections.
The current political division of the Venezuelan territory complies with these conditions as mandated in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 outlined in Title I, Articles 1 though 9, which are mandatory and “non amendable and/or revisable” (articles 340 and 342), and more specifically with the mandate on articles 4 and 6 that read:
Article 4: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized Federal State on the terms set forth in this Constitution, governed by the principles of territorial integrity, cooperation, solidarity, attendance and shared responsibility.
Article 6: The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs that comprise the same, is and shall always be democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable mandates.
It should be noted that the political division and the mandate to organize the country under a federal republican government constitutes the backbone of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999. So much so, that out of the total 350 articles included in the constitution, 153 articles, that is 43% of all articles, are dedicated to explaining and regulating the term, scope, attributions, responsibilities and the rights of the citizens in the different levels and/or political divisions of this government structure.
The modifications being proposed to article 16 though, introduces a completely different political division (structure) of the Venezuelan Republic which, at first sight, seems to have absolutely no organizational, administrative, political and certainly, no constitutional logic. Further more, it introduces changes that are not explained and/or regulated anywhere in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and for that matter, not even vaguely referenced anywhere in the whole text of the constitution.
To illustrate the major differences being introduced in the modified text of article 16 we are including a table (Figure # 2) that provides a visual reference as to the political division of the Venezuelan Republic in three different documents. These are; 1) The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961, 2) The Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 and 3) The proposed text for article 16. The different political divisions and/or levels of organization are being outlined in the same order as they appear in the text of each document.
Since the proposed political division in the modified text of article 16 is so confusing and given the fact that there is no precedence for this type of political division either in the Constitution of 1961 or the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 it seemed logical to research the constitutional text of other “federal republican constitutions” to try and find similar political divisions. None of the constitutions that were researched though (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States) shed any light as to where this political division concept could have come from. Further, though Cuba is not a federal republic, we also could not find in the Cuban Constitution anything that vaguely resembles the above mentioned political division.
Frustrated with the inability to find any logic to the proposed political division we were about to focus only on the confusing and in some instances somewhat pompous language of the proposed text when suddenly it strike us.
The reason why we could not find any logic and/or sense to the proposed political division was because the text was not describing one political division but indeed two different, separate and overlapping political divisions written into the same text.
Just like the notes of two different songs played together do not make sense unless played separately, the modified text of article 16 describes two separate political divisions that only make sense when outlined separately.
In the following table (Figure # 3) we are outlining the two now perfectly logical and overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16.
As amazing as it may be, the modified text of article 16 introduces two separate, opposite, parallel, overlapping and most probably competing government structures to govern the same country.
It also re-arranges the territory introducing political divisions that are made up from parts or all the current territories assigned by the constitution to one or more States and Municipalities. These territorial assignments are very broadly described in the proposed amended text to article 16 and certainly they are not regulated in any way, shape or form.- Federal Provinces: Which are basically a political equivalent to the States, will be formed by …“aggregating either States or Municipalities”…The concept of Provinces is not alien to Venezuelan history since, originally, the political division of Venezuela included six provinces: Venezuela or Caracas, Maracaibo, Cumana, Guayana, Margarita and Trinidad.
- Functional Districts: Which are basically political equivalents to the Metropolitan Districts will be formed …“by one or more Municipalities or Territorial Lots on them, without regard to the State they belong to.”…
- Insular Districts: The original text of article 16 included Federal Dependencies. These have been dropped and replaced by Oceanic Regions. Federal Dependencies included all those islands that were not part of a State. Oceanic Regions do not make that distinction so territories such as Margarita could become Insular Districts subject to the executive branch of power.
- Federal Cities: Will allow the government to take direct control over any major metropolitan city, regardless of which State they are in and/or their Municipalities (…”The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, after an agreement approved by a simple majority of Representatives of the National Assembly, will be able to create by decree, Federal Provinces, Federal Cities and Functional Districts”…), (…”In the Federal Territory, the Federal Municipality and the Federal City, the national Power will designate the respective authorities”…).
- Federal Municipalities: Municipalities in Federal Territories would be under government control and their authorities will be appointed by the national government.
- Cities / Communal Cities: This is the new …"primary political unit in the national territory organization"… and hence the political equivalent of the “Municipalities”. “Cities” and “Communal Cities” are the same thing since all cities will become “Communal Cities” when …"organized Communities, Communes and self communal governments are established in the totality of its perimeter."… without any regard for the Municipalities.
- Communes: Are the political equivalent of the Parishes except that they are mandatory; Parishes were optional. Also, Communes are political entities with …"forms of self government and any other expression of direct Democracy."…
- Communities: This is a new micro political division that is being introduced by article 16 which can only be explained as an obsession to micro manage the lives of the people. After communities the only thing left are “homes”.
From a constitutional standpoint, the two overlapping political divisions being introduced by the modified text of article 16 are dramatically different.
As per the constitutional mandate in the “Fundamental Principles” of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 (articles 4 & 6), Political Division “A” is Federal, Elective and Decentralized. “Political Division “B” though is quite the opposite; it is not Federal because none of the divisions created comply with the autonomous nature of a Federal Republic; it is non-elective because most of the authorities are appointed by the national government and, it is not decentralized because they are all subject to the national government.
Finally, the undetermined and absurd nature of this dual political division is pretty much covered up with the all inclusive, all uncertain and all powerful political alibi measure of choice: …"The political-territorial organization of the Republic will be legislated by an Organic Law."
Comment 1: Let me start by commenting what, without doubt, is the most important conclusion you arrive at after reading the above factual analysis.
The modified text of article 16 being introduced by the government is absolutely UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the following reasons:a. It violates Title I, article # 4 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a …federal State”…
Comment 2: From a political standpoint, the introduction of two overlapping political divisions is a clear attempt to destroy the power base of the States and their municipalities. The centralized political structure under the national government control will have more economic resources and no constitutional restrictions. Eventually, it will be perceived as more efficient than the federal structure and therefore such will loose political power and representation.
The new political division introduces new political divisions that are not subject to the States and hence they are not federal. Further, it introduces political divisions that include territories from more than one State and authorities that are not accountable to either of such destroying this way the integrity of the federal system.
b. It violates Title I, article # 4 and 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized… State”...” The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… decentralized”…
The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and/or removed by the national government and hence dependant from such. This constitutes a centralized system of government and further, allows the executive branch to exercise authority at the State and Municipal level which is as power that neither the President nor the National Assembly has under the constitution.
c. It violates Title I, article # 6 of the “Fundamental Principles” in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and of the political organs comprising the same, is and shall always be… elective”..
The new political division introduces authorities that are appointed and not elected.
d. It violates Title IX, Chapter II, article # 342 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …” The purpose of the constitutional reform is to effect a partial revision of this Constitution and replacement of one or more of the provisions hereof, without modifying the fundamental principles and structure of the text of the Constitution.”…
The new political division introduces a significant modification to the fundamental principles and particularly to the structure of the text of the Constitution. It curtails the power and territory of the States and Municipalities. It introduces political divisions and entities that are not legislated under the Constitution. It creates a new primary political unit that modifies the responsibilities and the political relationship of the Municipalities with other political entities. It modifies the representation of the people at the Municipal and State level. It subjects people to different authorities without the legislation to guarantee their rights. In sum; it introduces a major modification to the structure of the text of the Constitution.
e. It violates Title IV, Chapter III, article # 164 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 that mandates: …”Is of the States exclusive competence: … (2) Organization of their Municipalities and other local organs and the territorial and political divisions between them”…
Comment 3: The modifications introduced to article # 16 are a clear attempt by the government to introduce a centralize, non elective and dependent political structure that will change the nature of the Venezuelan government which by constitutional mandate is republican, federal and constitutional. The problem is that this can not be done through constitutional amendments and/or reforms because the constitution does not allow it. The only way to make those changes is to elect a National Constituent Assembly to write a new Constitution.
Mousqueton
venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com
Spanish language version of this post can be found at the following site: “No a la reforma constitucional de Chávez”
-The end-
Oct 1, 2007
Article 136 (Julia)
From the 1999 Constitution:
The Public Power is distributed between the Municipal Power, the State Power and the National Power. The National Public Power is divided in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral.
Each one of the branches of the Public Power has its own functions, but the organs on which its exercise pertains will collaborate with each other in accomplishing the aims of the State.
To the Chavez proposal:
The Public Power is distributed territorially in the following form: the popular power, the municipal power, the state power and the national power.
Regarding the content of the functions that it exerts, the public power is organized in Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral
The people are the holder of the sovereignty and they exert it directly through the Popular Power. This one is not born of the suffrage nor of election, but it is born of the condition of organized human groups as a basis of the population.
The Popular Power expresses constituting the communities, the communes and the self-government of the cities, through the communal councils, workers councils, the student councils, the farmers councils and other beings that the law indicates.
In order to discuss this article not many words are needed since not even the amazing revolutionary lexicon, – I won’t take out any credit for that – cares to make any effort to hide the real nature of the proposal.
First, it introduces a brand new figure to the Venezuelan political system, the Popular Power, leaving the rest of the powers almost intact – you could say. It also divides the power in two groups: one according to the territorial distribution and another according to the functions.
If the power is distributed territorially it has to claim some way of hierarchy (the national power upper layer is the state power and the municipal power refereed as the most local one). The proposed reform seems to give the higher hierarchy to this new Popular Power.
-That is actually very progressive! – One could argue – since it is giving to the people [us] even more power than the one the very same state has. The people over the institutions! – A classic dream of which I won’t discuss the practical consequences of it in this space but I will rather just say that nothing could be far away from that dream of giving all the power to the citizens (so called, the people) than this reform as soon as the next lines we read tell us what the Popular Power its all about.
The popular Power as far as this article concerns, gives to the reader a shape of an immense network of –also popular- organizations that at the end are the ones who seem to exert this power and are the only ones authorized to do it. The citizen – it doesn’t matter if you have time for those organizations or if you are familiar or not with the organizations’ ideology – can only be a citizen if he’s a member of any of those organizations. You have to add to this issue the fact that these organizations will have to be authorized by the state.
In that way, it’s not hard to imagine this network of the so called Popular organizations as a new and impenetrable bureaucracy between the citizen and their individual rights.
But the problem goes farther than that: the new article suppress the direct vote of any citizen at least on the matters that concerns the Popular Power (we are still not quite sure of those matters). For a revolution who has spoken over and over again about the promise of a more direct democracy; the word “directly” carefully written in the reform takes now a brand new meaning becoming without doubt the opposite:
“is not born of the suffrage nor of election, but it is born of the condition of organized human groups as a basis of the population”.
As you can see, elections are now discarded in any way to exert this Popular Power because it is saying that the councils themselves, instead of the citizens as individuals, are going to be able to vote in their representation.
In replacement of the vote, the article establishes certain “condition” that will allow the people (hard to tell here if by people this article refers now to the citizens, the councils, or none of them). This “condition” might sound inspiring but its meaning on practical terms is certainly vague and even, dangerous for the preservation of a democratic system. [editor's note: "condición" in Spanish refers much more to the nature, the situation of the person than to an actual condition to be met]
Vague because we don’t count with the vote of the citizens so other ways are needed to translate this condition and the article doesn’t bother on giving us any clue on how to start.
And dangerous because the easiest way that comes to my mind to translate this condition, is through an interpreter able to understand it, who’ll tell us what to do to make us sure that this Popular Power is being really exerted. Now, this interpreter cannot logically be a normal citizen, it must be someone special, someone from the people, someone loved by the people, someone that has in its soul, the soul of the people. I haven’t met or heard such a special person yet, but certain speeches makes me suspect of the man who wrote the reform itself, imagining this non precedent condition of organized human groups.
On synthesis, the article 136 creates a new power: The popular power which, even counting that its certainly translated as the “Power for the people” suppress the possibility of that people to exert it through the vote; putting an emphasis on the several councils (communal, farmers, student and so on) as the way to exert it. So, with the name of Popular Power, the article adds to the political system a new bureaucracy made of -government promoted and probably carefully watched –organizations (councils). [note added by the editor: many of the public proceedings of such councils end up in raised hands vote, and many in the voting session wear red shirts or are known to work with the government. The reader may draw his or her own conclusions]
These councils will become the “condition” of the people (since the organized people are now established as the basis of the population leaving the non organized people practically without a citizenship) and only through that “condition” (no vote) the Popular Power will be exerted.
The issues that this Popular Power is going to take care of remain unclear, but no matter what those issues are the most important thing to notice here is that the citizen will have no direct access to make their opinions, stances or demands on those issues since the vote could clearly suppressed.
If someone asked me to put the meaning of this article in just a couple of words, I would said that, ironically, the proposed reform of the article 136, with the creation of the Popular Power kills with no mercy the sovereignty of the people.
Julia_1984, one of the "dissenting students", opened her own blog early this year “The end of Venezuela as I know it”
e-mail: venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 136
Sep 29, 2007
Article 87 (AIO)
Introductory comment.
First of all, let me say that I think Bruni’s argument about the questionable constitutionality of this process is worth reading – if you haven’t, do it. Being a non-Venezuelan, I don’t think I’m really qualified to weigh in on the validity of that argument, but I don’t want the fact that I’m discussing an article to make it seem that I consider it a non-issue. (Speaking of that, check out this picture, with its caption about constitutional reform. Ironic, no?)
Second, I want to comment in general about constitutions. Being the most important aspect of a true democracy – since no one should be above the law, and it is the ultimate definition of that law, it therefore is more important than any person and their opinions – I believe it should contain only the most important, fundamental priorities. In other words, a constitution should always be short, because there are only so many things that deserve consideration as the highest priorities.
This is partly true because a constitution should only contain things that the government can reasonably guarantee, the things which should be considered basic, fundamental rights. The U.S. Constitution, for example (I’m not holding it up as a model for the whole world, but simply as a good example – if it were lousy, it wouldn’t have lasted 224 years and counting – and the one I know the best), promises “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and pretty much everything in it fits into those categories. It doesn’t reach beyond the basics.
Any overly long constitution (350 articles, perhaps?) will necessarily get into one or two areas beyond the fundamental rights: things which should properly be enacted as law, not the constitution; and things that can only be described as a wish list. A good standard for the first might be whether or not it can sustain at least 2/3 support of the people indefinitely (if it can, maybe it should be constitution material; if not, take it to the legislature). For the second, it comes down to whether or not the government can manage to provide it or not. If it’s beyond its power, but makes you think “Wouldn’t it be nice if…?” then leave it out. (And too much of that is one of the reasons Latin Americans have spent so much time writing new Constitutions – because they didn’t like the “wish list” of the last one.)
That said, on to Article 87.
The old version (translation from www.constitucion.ve – and it’s quite easy to see what these pictures have to do with the Constitution. Not!):
All persons have the right and duty to work. The State guarantees the adoption of the necessary measures so that every person shall be able to obtain productive work providing him or her with a dignified and decorous living and guarantee him or her the full exercise of this right. It is an objective of the State to promote employment. Measures tending to guarantee the exercise of the labor rights of self-employed persons shall be adopted by law. Freedom to work shall be subject only to such restrictions as may be established by law.
Every employer shall guarantee employees adequate safety, hygienic and environmental conditions on the job. The State shall adopt measures and create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions.
The new version:
All persons of working age have the right and duty to work. The State will develop policies that generate productive work, and will adopt social measures necessary for each person to achieve an existence which is dignified, decorous and beneficial for themselves and for society.
The State will guarantee that in all labor centers safety, hygienic and environmental, and social relations conditions are fulfilled in accordance with human dignity, and will create institutions such as to make it possible to control and promote these conditions.
In the application of these principles of co-responsibility and solidarity, the employer will adopt all necessary measures for the fulfillment of these conditions.
Work will be subject to the regime established in this Constitution and the laws of the Republic.
For the purpose of guaranteeing the exercising of labor rights of independent workers, such as taxi drivers, truckers, retailers, craftsmen, professionals and who are self-employed in whatever productive activity to support themselves and their family, the Law will create and develop everything with regard to a social stability Fund for self-employed workers, so that with the contribution of the State and the worker, the worker can enjoy fundamental labor rights such as retirement, pensions, vacations, rest, prenatal and postnatal care, and other rights established by law.
This article comes from the section called “De los Derechos Humanos y Garantías, y de los Deberes” – “About Human Rights and Guarantees, and about Duties.” Anything related to employment, with the exception of precluding slavery, seems to me to fall well short of that category. If one were to list things that should be guaranteed to all, a job would not be near the top of the list. Same thing if one were to list things a government could guarantee. Frankly, the only appropriate change for this article would have been to delete it altogether. Everything in the old version fell into those two categories: things that should be a in a law (why does any legislature need a Constitution to tell them what laws to pass?), or “wish list.”
On to the changes: the first big one is that the State will no longer guarantee the adoption of measures to help provide work, but will itself develop the policies for the same. In other words, more State intervention, which will do the opposite of facilitating job creation. Always has, always will. A certain degree of State intervention is very important, but I think Venezuela passed that point long ago, and just kept going. You see the same theme in the change about safety conditions, which were to be provided by the employer, and now are guaranteed by the State – with new institutions to “control” them. This implies a dependence on the State – is that the intent? Yet again when the State guarantees conditions about “social relations,” whatever that means. The employer’s responsibility will now be to fulfill “co-responsibility and solidarity.”
Another notable change is that the end result of facilitating work that is beneficial for society. And just who makes that determination? If it’s anyone but society itself, it’s going to be mistaken at times. A promise of “human dignity” is also added, also without definition.
“Work will be subject to the regime established in this Constitution and the laws of the Republic.” Can someone explain to me why this was necessary – if it weren’t included, then work would be supra-constitutional?
I'm very amused by the addition of several types of independent workers. This has got to be the first proposed Constitution in the world to ever mention taxi drivers! The proposed stability fund is potentially a good idea, but far too vague to even guess. Plus the idea is utterly worthless without a law, so it’s pointless to include.
There are some other little details, but the sum of the changes promise nothing concrete, except for additional State intervention. That intervention is vaguely defined to boot, which means that it could be quite excessive. Unfortunately, there is nothing here that gives any reason to think that anything employment-related will improve.
Finally, there is one deletion which is very intriguing: the sentence “It is an objective of the State to promote employment” has been removed! Why? Because “social relations,” “control” of employers, and “co-responsibility and solidarity” are more important? Because promoting employment isn’t “beneficial…for society”?
I suspect another reason: because this is the one thing in the original article that Chavez knows he can’t fulfill. He can guarantee more control, greater intervention, lots of activities with “social” purposes (but not necessarily results). But he can’t make it easier to create employment.
This isn’t just my opinion – the World Bank released its annual “Doing Business” report just this week. (Perfect timing!) Venezuela is 172 out of the 178 countries listed, ahead of economic luminaries Chad, Burundi, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, and the Dem. Republic of Congo. The nearest non-African country is Laos, at 164, and even Haiti – the closest in the Western Hemisphere – is out of reach at 148. Not only that, but Venezuela is 20 spots below Zimbabwe!
And when it comes to the criterion of “Employing Workers,” Venezuela is even worse off – they are tied for dead last in the entire world! So there you have it – Chavez has proposed no longer having to promote employment, which the World Bank says no one in the world does worse already. And nothing in the proposed Constitutional change gives reason to think it will be the least bit better.
AIO
aninterestedobserver at yahoo dot com
Published originally here.
-The end-
Sep 28, 2007
Article 115 (Pedro Bernardez)
Analysis of Article 115 of the 1999 Constitution and Its proposed Reform
by Pedro Bernardez
Article 115 as it stands:
“The right to own property is guaranteed. Every person has a right to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of his/her goods. Property will be subject to the contributions, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. It is only in the spirit of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, that any kinds of goods may be expropriated”
Article 115’s proposed reform:
“The different forms of property are recognized and guaranteed. Public property [“la propiedad pública”] is that which belongs to State entities; social property [“la propiedad social”] is that which belongs to the people in its entirety and to the future generations, and may be of two types: indirect social property, when it is exercised by the State in name of the community, and direct social property, when the State assigns it, under different forms and in outlined territories, to one or several communities, to one or several communes [“comunas”], constituting thusly communal property, or to one or several cities, constituting thusly cityward property; collective property [“la propiedad colectiva”] is that which belongs to social groups or persons, for their benefit, use or common enjoyment, of either social or private origin; mixed property [“la propiedad mixta”] is that constituted by the public sector, the social sector, the collective sector and the private sector, in differing combinations, for the utilization of resources or carrying out activities, always subject to the absolute respect of the Nation’s economic and social sovereignty; and private property [“la propiedad privada”] is that which belongs to natural or juristic persons and is recognized over user and consumer goods, and legitimately acquired means of production.
All property, [the comma there is part of the article, and not my mistake] will be subject to the contributions, burdens, restrictions and obligations that the law establishes in the spirit of public use or general interest. In the name of public use or general interest, through final judgment and quick payment of fair compensation, the expropriation of any kind of good may be declared, without restricting the right of State officials, [the comma is also part of the article] of previously occupying, [as is this comma] during the judicial process, the goods being expropriated, within the parameters established by law.”
Essential changes
Private property: although, in a technical sense, the articles barely contradict each other in regards to private property, what does happen is that the definition of private property is specifically narrowed down to “user and consumer goods and legitimately acquired means of production” and subject to greater restrictions than in the current article.
Under the new article, persons do not explicitly have a right to the disposition of their goods, which means that for example rental of said goods could not be exploited for economic gain.
This means that all economic sectors that rely on rent such as hotels, rented apartments, rental stores, and businesses that rent out industrial equipment would cease to exist as private, either becoming collective or disappearing.
Also, since private property is restricted to “user and consumer goods and legitimately acquired means of production” it includes neither land (unless it were a “legally acquired means of production”) nor intellectual property, unproductive land and real estate (even the land one lives on) and personally produced works of art could never constitute one’s own private property.
In addition to these restrictions is the fact that State entities have the guaranteed right to occupy goods when and while a judicial process to expropriate them is pending.
“Legitimately acquired means of production” presents another problem: since it is the people (on whom sovereignty rests according to the Constitution), and therefore the State (in the people’s name), what define what “legitimately acquired is”, it leaves the State with the option of acquiring said means of production, possibly without compensation, by simply declaring such acquisition as “in the people’s interest. The use of legitimate as opposed to legal implies the possible use such supra or extralegal justifications for the acquisition of said means of production even if they were legally acquired.
This is in addition to any restrictions on legal acquisitions. It is also the State who defines the laws, and therefore may rule ownership of certain property illegal by simply altering existing laws to exclude such property. The State already did so when it redefined what legally acquired lands were in 2005, and took lands that were outside this definition (in this case, private lands that were not registered in 1821)
In other words, as opposed to the current article (which guarantees private ownership except in the “spirit of public use or general interest”), the new article gives the government the implicit power to instantly requisition all means of production if it wanted to by a simple change of the law or “on behalf of the people”.
Lastly, note that the new article does not explicitly establish the right for the personal and exclusive enjoyment of one’s private property; in fact, nowhere in the article are citizens given any rights over property: only the State explicitly reserves them for itself.
In conclusion, private property as understood by the new article is a much more restricted and narrow version than it is in the current one, and essentially nullifies most of it.
Other property: in addition to private property, the new article outlines several different new kinds of property: public, social, collective, and mixed.
Public property as defined by the article is conceivably that which belongs to state institutions. Since the definition is vague and succinct and not supported by a justification, it could be that anything could be potentially declared public property.
Social property, although it seems to give “the people” sovereignty over it, in reality places it in the hands of the State since it is either managed by the State in the people’s name (“indirect social property”) or assigned to the people (“direct social property”), potentially meaning that the State could reassign it at any given time.
Collective property is just that: property that belongs to a group or collective for their benefit. In reality, what is today private property could be conceivably transformed into collective property if it was de facto shared by several people: a home shared by a family or a small business for example. However, this emphasis on the collective over the individual stifles forms of individual private enterprise, such as freelance artists, taxi drivers, tutors, psychiatrists, and the like. Unless they were part of a collective, any property they might own could not be used for this end. In reality, it forces people to form enterprises collectively to survive.
In addition, since the article does not guarantee collective property and only defines it (and not even as a right), its actual existence can only be determined by subsequent laws. Analysis of other articles may also be necessary to understand further implications or restrictions.
Mixed property is any combination of the former, subject to “the Nation’s economic and social sovereignty”. The main problem is that any such property and activities carried out with it could not contradict the State’s (representing “the Nation”) economic and social decisions, previous or future. In addition, since it is the only type of property explicitly authorized for the utilization of resources, and is subject to the Nation’s social sovereignty, presumably referring to the types of social property managed or assigned by the State in the Nation’s name, it places all type of resource exploitation under the State’s control.
In conclusion, although several types of property have been defined, the article has de facto placed almost all of them under the State’s direct administration, leaving the only one which hasn’t (collective property) up for grabs (I’m not considering private property in this statement since it was treated in another section).
Property sytem: since private property is redefined severely from the current article, (in opposition to the current article which gives an explicit right to individual property ownership) and since the State de facto reserves disposition of all the newly defined property in name of the collective including any former private property that would become collective under the new article, the system of property has been essentially altered from the current constitution.
Therefore, it can be argued that it alters its fundamental structure, in opposition to article 342 of the current constitution. This article reads:
“A Constitutional Reform has as its objective a partial revision of this Constitution and the substitution of one or several of its guidelines that do not modify the structure and fundamental principles of the Constitutional text.”
Because of this, the changes go beyond the scope of a Constitutional Reform, and should therefore be subject to another process. The article would be unconstitutional if passed under a Constitutional Reform.
Article 350: the proposed article also flies in the face of this article of the current Constitution, which reads:
“The people of Venezuela, loyal to their republican tradition, their fight for independence, peace and liberty, will disavow any regime, legislation or authority that contradicts democratic values, principles and guarantees [,] or undermines human rights [it doesn’t need a comma in Spanish; I added it to dispel the confusion that might arise from the phrase “and guarantees or undermines human rights”, since it refers to the contradiction of democratic guarantees and is not a semantic confusion]”.
The regime, legislation and authority granted by this article contradict democratic values and principles for two main reasons.
First, it infringes on article 17 of the Human Rights Charter (paragraph 2: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others”) because it doesn’t define property as a right, and does not guarantee any property defined.
Secondly, by subordinating almost all property to the State, it reduces the freedom of both groups and individuals as the choices of said groups or individuals can be largely overruled by the State; in addition, since property, and especially private property, is restricted further than in the current article, it shows a trend of restricting freedom, which is contrary to the democracy implied in article 350 (which includes freedom as a cornerstone of the people’s tradition).
In conclusion: because of these violations, the people would have the right to disavow the government that would be put in place by the proposed article.
Final Conclusion
The proposed article severely restricts private property while de facto subordinating almost all proposed collective property to the State. In light of this contrast to the current article, which is not as restrictive, the proposed one contradicts article 342 of the current Constitution because it alters the fundamental structure of the principle of property outlined within the current one (and therefore being outside of the scope of a Constitutional Reform; another process would have to be used). In addition, because it violates democratic principles, values and guarantees in at least two areas, the regime, legislation and authority that would be put in place under the proposed article would have to be disavowed by the people as per article 350 of the current Constitution.
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Additional private comments to venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 115
Published originally here.
-The end-
Sep 21, 2007
Article 141 (Feathers)
From this: Graph taken from the official Venezuelan portal of the Venezuelan constitution of 1999. www.constitucion.ve. Published originally here.
Sección Segunda: De la administración pública
Artículo 141
La Administración Pública está al servicio de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas y se fundamenta en los principios de honestidad, participación, celeridad, eficacia, eficiencia, transparencia, rendición de cuentas y responsabilidad en el ejercicio de la función pública, con sometimiento pleno a la ley y al derecho.
The Public Administration is at the service of the citizens and is based on the principles of honesty, participation, speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsibility in the exercise of the public function, with total submission to the rule of law.
To this:
Artículo 141
Las administraciones públicas son las estructuras organizativas destinadas a servir de instrumento a los poderes públicos, para el ejercicio de sus funciones, y para la prestación de los servicios. Las categorías de administraciones públicas son: las administraciones públicas burocráticas o tradicionales, que son las que atienden a las estructuras previstas y reguladas en esta constitución y las leyes; y “las misiones”, constituidas por organizaciones de variada naturaleza, creadas para atender a la satisfacción de las más sentidas y urgentes necesidades de la población, cuya prestación exige de la aplicación de sistemas excepcionales, e incluso, experimentales, los cuales serán establecidos por el Poder Ejecutivo mediante reglamentos organizativos y funcionales.
The public administrations are the organizational structures destined to serve as instrument to the public powers, for the exercise of their functions, and for the services they provide. The categories of public administrations are: the bureaucratic or traditional public administrations, that are those that takes care of the structures predicted and regulated in this constitution and the laws; and “the misiones”, constituted by organizations of varied nature, created to take care of the satisfaction of the most felt and urgent necessities of the population, whose benefit demands of the application of exceptional systems, and, even experimental, which will be established by the Executive authority by means of organizational and functional regulations.
What this art. 141 modification proposal means?
The original art. 141 only states the function of public administration, and it states very clear that it is intended to serve the citizens. In this proposed modification, it doesn’t state clearly the function anymore, and tries to define a form to accomplish an unclear function. I am not a constitutional lawyer, but constitutions should only state rights and duties very clearly. The form is rarely a constitutional matter, that is what other laws are made for. Let’s see if I can explain myself better.
This proposed reform has some relevant points that deserve the attention of all their citizens:
1.Public administration would not serve the citizens but through the public powers.
The art. 141 proposal states that public administration, functioning as the traditional Max Weber’s bureaucratic model (used by all the countries, from the former Soviet Union to the United States of America), and functioning also as the famous Chavistas Misiones (welcome to the big bureaucracy elephant world of public administration!), are going to be serving to the public powers (poderes públicos), and not to the citizens. The article modified the wording, it does not say public administration is to serve their citizens anymore, but it says “public administration is a tool to public powers that…” . Art. 141 is not clear anymore in defining who the public administration should or not serve.
Why this is not clear if constitutions should be very precise bodies of law?
The devil’s advocate and Chavez can tell me, no! You didn’t understand why I was trying to say, you fool, the Poder Público is also the people´s, represented by this new power called “Citizen power” (or Popular Power). So the public administration, becoming a tool to the public powers and the citizen power will be the same as serving to the people, right? What? No, it’s not! It is not the same to say that people’s rights and duties as a community are the same as individuals’ citizen rights and duties.
It doesn’t have the same meaning.
If one dig deeper into the article that talks about what and whom constitute these “public powers”, one will find that Mr. Chavez is also reforming article 136, the one related to the public powers. In the proposed reform of art 136 the distribution of powers come divided in a territorial manner (popular, municipal, state and national) and as per their functions (legislative, executive, judiciary, citizen and electoral). Chavez is creating two new powers to give the impression of a decentralized autonomy between the government, but the reality is that there is no mention in the constitution that these powers must be autonomous. As a matter of fact, the whole constitutional proposal is aimed at centralized authority, and regulations. That’s why Chavez talks about it as a “block”. The only purpose for a country to structure its government into main powers is only to ensure that they function with autonomy in the most extended sense possible.
Moreover, the important highlight of this art. 136 is that representatives of this new "Citizen power" won’t be constituted by election, but put in by organized human groups. There's no clear wording into how this representatives will be "put" in their jobs, but the reform is very clear in saying that these representatives won’t be “born” through elections. Since those organized human groups won't be able to vote for representatives, the assumption is that some bureaucrat from the socialist party will put these representatives on their jobs and their credibility as unbiased auditors working for the citizens will be very low.
Hence, the “Citizen Power”, the branch of the public powers that will have the same constitutional weight as “individual citizens” in former constitutions, in reality won’t represent the people’s interest but the interest of the people who “put” them there in those jobs. Thus, it’s not the same thing as before the “reform”.
Venezuelans have to consider if this “affidavit” somehow violates the universal declaration of human rights. (art 21, numeral 3?)
What I am getting from all of this? This proposal is telling me, an individual citizen, to surrender my rights and duties regarding public administration to a public power that is not constituted by popular elections, so they can represent me. As a private citizen, as an individual, the only benefit I am getting is that this constitution will consider me an “organic nothing”… which, obviously, is not a benefit at all. My interest as a private citizen won’t be protected whatsoever in this reform and I won’t be able to complain, sue, and watch over the functioning of public administration. Can you imagine which levels will current corruption practices reach?
As a result of this modification, since public administration would not serve directly the people any longer, our money also won’t be working for you constitutionally speaking, but for the interest of the bureaucracy of the party who will control the Venezuelan state. Chavismo already controls it, but with a questionable legitimacy.
In conclusion, our public administration’s monies (Bolivares Fuertes or not) won’t be “ours” anymore, they would be intended for the public powers (and not the citizens), since this constitution is stripping us from our rights as citizens to be served by the state. If we received at the end some type of service form the public administration, we would had to thank Hugo for his graciousness in not taking it all for himself and his varied collection of powers, in his is sharing some breadcrumbs with us. Also, our very Venezuelan traditional right to complain (“derecho a pataleo”) will be gone since we wont have the constitutional right to ask for the services that the public administration owes us since, constitutionally speaking, civil servants are not legally bound to answer to you anymore, citizen of Venezuela.
2. Creation of more bureaucracy.
As consequence of this lack of clarity into whom public administration should serve, our money will be funneled into the already gigantic and very greedy monster of Venezuela’s state bureaucracy, spitting it out and then swallowing it again for another loop (Chavismo always was best at inventing the hardest way to go from point A to point B). I can only think how hard would be for old folks and retired public office personnel to claim for their pensions and social security. It is a horror today where public administration still has to answer to the citizens, it will be hell when you have no right to claim but wait for a mision to pay you whenever they can, or want.
Also, the funny thing is that when the rest of the world is trying to cut bureaucracy, Chavismo makes its goal, in a constitutional way, to make the state as big as it can. The problem with this set up in constitutional stone, is that first of all, it is terribly inefficient, and secondly, if in a few years some folk smarter and less greedy than Chavez and his collection of doofus that work for him come to power, and want to cut bureaucracy, they have to make a constitutional amendment, or propose a constitutional reform about it. That’s why I was writing above that Constitutions shouldn’t be talking about the way things take place. That’s why other bodies of law exist.
3.Why they took out the fundamental principles in which public administration should be based on?
The reform also erased the following from the 1999 original: “Public Administration … based on principles of honesty, participation, speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, ACCOUNTABILITY and responsibility on the exercise of Public service under total submission of the rule of law.”
Why erasing all of this? Well, we saw in point 2 that Chavez is not precisely worried about handling money on an effective way since the amount of bureaucracy will become gigantic with this new constitution. It will be OK to misspend money. The public administration won’t have more constitutional accountability since they would not be required to give answers to any citizens on the things they do or not do, or the way they use money for. So, they all can misspend and do whatever they want without worrying of pesky accountability, not that they are too worried right now, but they have to work hard to cover up, and at the end of the day they know they are committing serious crimes to the nation, that the truth will emerge. With this new constitution, it would be only a matter of gossiping in any newspaper but mishandling money won’t be a crime punished it by law. Are you getting where all of this is going? Any official can be caught with a suitcase full of money, and it won’t be a problem since they can excuse it as some public administration affair. It would be much more easy to cover up any money mishandling.
Venezuelans might ask, but why this is so important? Our public administration during the 4th and the 5th republic have been always mediocre, and much very corrupted, so why worry that this article is been modified the way it is?
Because, my dear countryman, Chavistas are trying to wash their hands like Pontius Pilates so when this government falls it will not be possible to prosecute and hunt down the worst offenders to face justice. They want to dip their hands in the money and not be accountable for it, not even work hard to cover up their corruption deals, as simple as that. Bank robbery to the highest level. And, you can imagine the amount of people, citizens and internationals, who are salivating for this to happen, supporting this bullshit.
Do you think the new article 141 reflect this graphic at all? For starters, you can erased the man at the last square, yes, the cartoon of the guy who looks like that Independence hero named Bolivar, talking about honesty and responsibility. And the old woman, she can wait at home for some misiones functionary, who for sure won’t be a catire like the one in the cartoon, to knock her door whenever he is allowed to pay her, or never.
Post written by Feathers, who writes her own blog.
Additional private comments to venezuela.constitution.trap@gmail.com, Subject: Art 141
Sep 20, 2007
Article 230 (Brunilde Sansó)
Old article 230:
The presidential period is of 6 years. The President of the Republic can be reelected immediately, only once, for a new period.
New article 230:
The presidential period is of 7 years. The President of the Republic can be reelected immediately for a new period.
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There are several negative aspects concerning this article that I would discuss in three items.
1.-The illegality of the proposal
To understand the whole impact of this modification, one has to understand that before 1999, the Constitution did not even allow a single reelection. The reason was precisely to avoid that one of the many caudillo-type of president that Venezuelans have witnessed in history would use the Constitution to stay in power forever.
In 1999, the Constitution proposed by Chávez introduced, for the first time in modern times, the figure of a reelection and increased the presidential term from 5 to 6 years. However, just a single reelection was allowed.
Now, Chavez's current proposal is twofold: eliminate reelections limit and increase the length of the Presidential term. It means the possibility of holding power for a longer time and being reelected without restrictions.
This concept is simply unconstitutional because of the following two articles, the first being in the Fundamental Principles of the Constitution.Article 6.-The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its political entities is and will always be democratic, participative, decentralized, alternative, responsible, plural and will have revocable mandates.
Since Alternation is a Fundamental Principle underlined in Article 6, the Continuous Reelection proposed in this Reform goes against Article 6. Now, Article 342 says that no Fundamental Principle can be touched by a Constitutional Reform. Therefore, the proposed modification is simply unconstitutional.
Article 342.-The object of the Reform is to partially reform and substitute one or several norms that will not modify the structure and the fundamental principles of the constitutional text.
2.- The Presidential Asymmetry of power introduced by the proposal
When President Chávez is asked about the dangers of allowing continuous reelection, he always states that the People of Venezuela hold the Sovereignty and that based on that principle, they have the right to decide whether they want the President to stay in power.
If one accepts that logic, then one may ask why the People of Venezuela do not hold that Sovereignty when it is time to reelect a governor or a mayor?
Thus, the fact that this principle of continuous reelection is introduced only for the President of the Republic and not for any other elected official shows a clear Asymmetry of Power that is exacerbated in the Presidential figure.
3.- A de-facto Constitutional dictatorship proposal
Those that provide examples of healthy democracies in which continuous reelection is allowed forget that those cases only occur either in Parliamentary systems or mixed systems with strong parliamentary figures. In Parliamentary systems the Prime Minister has power as long as his/her party allows it; the Leader of the opposition is part of the government and for the other governmental entities, strict separation of powers is the norm. Thus, continuous reelection does not pose a threat to democracy because power is well spread and appropriate opposition representation in power is present.
All the other existing cases where continuous reelection is currently allowed (like Cuba) are, in fact, dictatorships.
President Chávez has already unprecedented power. The Supreme Court, The National Assembly, The People's Ombudsman, The General Prosecutor, the Central Bank and, most importantly, The National Electoral Council, are all totally under his grip. Moreover, the proposed Reform will provide him with even larger and more important powers than those that he has accumulated up to now. In fact, Constitutional scholars claim that no President in the history of Venezuela, not even dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, had requested as many powers in a Constitutional Reform.
Under those circumstances allowing continuous reelection in the Constitution would be the equivalent of handling a dictatorship for life to Hugo Chávez, or to whoever happened to be the President of Venezuela under such a Reformed Constitution.
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A related Spanish language version by the author exists here.
Full translation of this post by the author is here.
Published originally in English here.
